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ABSTRACT




Health monitoring and fault diagnosis in traditional single spacecraft missions
are mostly accomplished by human operators on ground through around-the-clock
monitoring and trend analysis on huge amount of telemetry data. Future multi-
platform space missions, commonly known as the formation flight missions, will uti-
lize multiple inexpensive spacecraft in formation by distributing the functionalities
of a single platform among the miniature inexpensive platforms. Current space-
craft diagnosis practices do not scale up well for multiple space platforms due to
an increasing need to make the long-duration missions cost-effective by limiting the
size of the operations team which will be large if traditional diagnosis is employed.
An ideal solution to this problem is to incorporate an autonomous fault detection,
isolation, and recovery (FDIR) mechanism. However, the effectiveness of spacecraft
autonomy is yet to be demonstrated and due to the existence of perceived risks,
it is often desired that the expert human operators be involved in the spacecraft
operations and diagnosis processes i.e., the autonomous spacecraft actions be un-
derstandable by the human operators on ground so that intervention may be made,
if necessary.
To address the above problems and requirements, in this research a system-
atic and transparent fault diagnosis methodology for ground-based operations of
multi-platform space systems is developed. First, novel hierarchical fault diagnosis
concepts and framework are developed. Within this framework, a multi-platform
iii
space system is decomposed hierarchically into multiple levels. The decomposition
is driven by the need for supporting the development of the components/subsystems
of the overall system by a number of design teams and performing integration at the
end. A multi-platform system is considered to be a set of interacting components
where components at different levels correspond to formation, system, sub-system,
etc. depending on the location of the node in the hierarchy. Two directed graph
based fault diagnosis models are developed namely, fuzzy rule based hierarchical
fault diagnosis model (HFDM), and Bayesian networks (BN)-based component de-
pendency model (CDM).
In HFDM, fault diagnosis of different components in the formation flight is
investigated. Fuzzy rules are developed for fault diagnosis at different levels in the
hierarchy by taking into account the uncertainties in the fault manifestations in a
given component. In this model, the component interactions are quantified without
taking the uncertainties in the component health state dependencies into account.
Next, a component dependency model (CDM) based on Bayesian networks (BN)
models is developed in order to take the uncertainties in component dependencies
into account. A novel methodology for identifying CDM parameters is proposed.
Fault evidences are introduced to the CDM when the fault modes of a component
are observed via fuzzy rule activations. Advantages and limitations associated with
the proposed HFDM and the CDM are also discussed. Finally, the verification
and validation (V&V) of the hierarchical diagnosis models are investigated via a
sensitivity analysis approach.
It should be noted that the proposed methodology and the fault diagnosis
strategies and algorithms that are developed in this research are generic in a sense
that they can be applied to any hierarchically decomposable complex systems. How-
ever, the system and domain specific knowledge they require, especially for model-
ing component dependencies, are mostly available in the aerospace industry where
iv
extensive system design and integration-related analysis are common due to high
system building cost and failure risks involved.
v
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In this chapter, first a brief introduction to the general problem domain of this thesis
is provided and the research motivations are presented. Next, the general problem
statement and a literature review are presented. Finally, the contributions of the
thesis are outlined.
1.1 Spacecraft Formation Flying
Multi-platform space systems and missions, also known as spacecraft formation fly-
ing (FF) or formation flight, is an emerging area in the Earth observation (EO) as
well as space science and exploration domains. The conventional space missions uti-
lize large, expensive spacecraft platforms. In contrast, the formation flying missions
utilize multiple inexpensive spacecraft in formation by distributing the functional-
ities of a single platform among the miniature inexpensive platforms for achieving
new capabilities in sensing objects and phenomenon in space, gathering scientific
information, and sharing information among space vehicles and ground [1]. From
system’s point of view, the advantages of utilizing clusters of spacecraft, i.e., multi-
ple platforms in place of an expensive single platform, are the increased robustness,
flexibility, and fault tolerance, among others. However, the primary motivations for
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(a) Earth observing system (EOS) [2]. (b) Terrestrial planet finder (TPF) [3].
Figure 1.1: Multi-platform space missions for Earth observation and space explo-
ration.
formation flying come from the fact that this revolutionary concept will provide the
space research community with new capabilities in sensing objects and phenomenon
in space, gathering scientific information, sharing information among space vehicles
and ground [1]. Based on the type of science activities that are to be performed,
multi-platform missions can be grouped into two categories:
1. Formations for Earth Observation and Planetary Exploration [2,4]: This type
of multi-platform space systems are known as planetary environment orbit
(PEO) formations. In this type of formation flying missions, specialized probes
are deployed with explicitly separate science objectives. The typical mission
goals here are to achieve synergy of observations, synthesis of apertures for
higher spacial resolution, and signal space coverage. Observation synergy in-
volves multiple missions and multiple platforms where each platform carries
specialized payloads. For example, the Earth observing system (EOS) [2]
has five coordinated spacecraft as shown in Figure 1.1(a). CloudSat has a
millimeter-wave radar to observe clouds and precipitation, and Calipso has a
polarization-sensitive instrument for observing vertical profiles of aerosols and
clouds. Each mission was designed around separate objectives, but combining
signals enables answering questions such as the relationships between aerosols
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and precipitation. Recently, formation flying missions for interferometric syn-
thetic aperture radar (InSAR) applications have been proposed [5, 6]. For
improved coverage over large areas, multiple Earth orbiting satellites are de-
ployed [7–9]. However, in such missions each spacecraft is operated/controlled
as an isolated entity and precise formation coordination and control are not
required. Consequently, they are identified as “constellations” as opposed to
“formations”.
2. Formations for Space Science and Exploration [3, 10–12]: This type of multi-
platform space systems are known as deep space (DS) formations. In this
type of missions, the idea is to build (or simulate) a large virtual telescope,
typically kilometer wide, with a number of spatially separated spacecraft each
carrying instruments for imaging remote objects in deep space. The formation
pattern/geometry of the formation varies depending on the mission; however,
each spacecraft is coordinated (in terms of position, attitude, and payload
operations) with all the other members in the formation to maintain the de-
sired formation pattern. The objective is to isolate signals that may be only
milli-arcsec apart in the celestial space. Figure 1.1(b) provides an illustration
of the Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF) formation which requires very precise
pointing.
It is worthwhile to mention that at present, the space community is at the
initial stage in exploring the full potential of spacecraft formation flight. Some
of the planned precision formation flight missions require new technologies that
are not utilized in conventional spacecraft. In order to transform this vision into
reality, active research is being performed in the areas of sensors and actuators
development; inter-spacecraft communications; spacecraft guidance, navigation, and
control (GNC); fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR); computing and data
management; and tools and test-beds development [13].
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In this thesis, particular attention is paid on the problem of fault diagnosis in
spacecraft formation flying.
1.2 Fault Diagnosis
Fault diagnosis is commonly referred to as the problem of detection, isolation, iden-
tification, or classification of faults or anomalies in the system under consideration.
The overall goal of health monitoring and fault diagnosis is to detect fault(s) at
early stages and to identify the location/sources of malfunction so that appropriate
recovery/reconfiguration actions can be taken before the fault(s) causes a failure.
Fault diagnosis is a part of a general problem area that is commonly known as
Diagnostics, Prognostics and Health Management (DPHM). In this thesis, by the
term “fault detection” we imply a binary decision-making about the existence of
fault(s) in the system. We consider the identification/determination of the loca-
tion/type/source(s) of fault in the system as “fault diagnosis” (FD). In this thesis,
we use the terms “fault diagnosis” and “fault isolation” interchangeably.
Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) [14–18] refers to the integra-
tion of techniques and technologies to provide a health management system for a
vehicle or fleet of vehicles. Although the requirements are unique to a specific type
of vehicle, health management has become increasingly important to automotive,
commercial and military aircraft, rotorcraft, unmanned and manned vehicles, space-
craft, and satellites. In the space and commercial aviation sectors, the concept of
IVHM is used to describe the automation of activities that are performed onboard
as well as offboard by the ground support teams and maintenance personnel. Fault
diagnosis is the part of an IVHM system which aims to identify the root causes of
faults and performance degradations.
Figure 1.2 shows the IVHM elements for a fleet of satellites where depending
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on the desired level of onboard autonomy, diagnostic functionalities are distributed
between the space and the ground segments. Within the offboard elements, a data
warehouse and a ground-based reasoner (GBR) support post-processing that include
health monitoring and fault diagnosis. Note that for a feet of aircraft, it would be
necessary to add an additional “maintenance” element which has very limited scope
in the cases of satellites.
Figure 1.2: Onboard and offboard IVHM elements (adopted from [14]).
Within an IVHM framework, diagnosis of various components and subsys-
tems are carried out by employing different types of reasoning algorithms. It is
well-known within the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community that the diagnostic
reasoning methods [19] are commonly classified into three main categories, namely
(1) Case-Based Reasoning (CBR), (2) Rule-Based Reasoning (RBR), and (3) Model-
Based Reasoning (MBR). Other approaches are mainly pure data-driven that include
machine-learning (ML) and Neural Network (NN)-based strategies. The MBR ap-
proach includes graph-based models such as logical causal graph models as well as
Bayesian network (BN) models. One of the fault diagnosis approaches developed
in this thesis is a model-based reasoning method that utilizes a Bayesian network
model which has been identified here as the Component Dependency Model (CDM).
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As an alternative to the above-mentioned AI-based fault diagnosis methods, model-
based fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods [20] are extensively developed
and utilized by the control community. Model-based FDI methods are primarily
based on precise mathematical models of the system under consideration. Based
on the above discussion, fault diagnosis techniques can be broadly classified into
two categories: (1) model-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods, and (2)
artificial intelligence (AI)-based or intelligent model-based fault diagnosis methods.
In model-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods, understanding of
the system from the first principles is utilized. Fault detection is performed based on
residual generation and detection decisions are made by examining if the residual(s)
has (have) exceed some pre-defined thresholds. For fault diagnosis, structured resid-
uals; i.e., a set of residuals that are sensitive to a subset of faults are utilized. An
incidence table is usually generated which is essentially a binary matrix with rows
associated with residuals and columns associated with faults. This table provides
a summary of which residual is sensitive to which fault. Usually, only single faults
are considered in order to limit the size of this table. The fault diagnosis problem is
reduced to finding a theoretical fault signature similar to the practical/actual one.
On the other hand, artificial intelligence (AI)-based fault diagnosis methods
utilize “intelligent models” and expert human knowledge and do not require explicit
mathematical models. Some of these techniques utilize numerical data while others
utilize symbolic data and knowledge. Diagnosis is performed based on the knowl-
edge and observations of much a system/component behavior is deviated from the
nominal. As mentioned above, different types of computationally intelligent models
and schemes such as case-based reasoning (CBR), rule-based reasoning (RBR), and
model-based reasoning (MBR) are utilized depending on the depth of the available
knowledge. Empirical and heuristic information as well as the experience of human
experts are encoded as associative knowledge in the reasoning schemes.
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Spacecraft Fault Diagnosis: There exist a variety of fault diagnosis techniques
in the literature which are reviewed in Section 1.5. However, when it comes to the
problem of spacecraft fault diagnosis and health monitoring, diagnostic procedures
are largely dependent on human experts. Although there has been extensive re-
search on model-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods in recent years,
model accuracy and model-building cost are the main limitations in transferring
these technologies to industries which have a more detailed information and experi-
ence with various components and subsystems. Furthermore, precise mathematical
models of spacecraft systems and system components are often difficult to obtain
and there are uncertainties in modeling due to incomplete understanding of the
system or system component behaviors, unmodeled environmental effects, etc.
In the operations of Earth-orbiting satellites, typically large amount of teleme-
try data are utilized by the expert human operators located at ground stations [21].
In such cases, in the event of an anomaly, manually finding the cause and making
recovery-related decisions often become a very challenging and a difficult task, if not
impossible, due to the presence of a large amount of telemetry data downloaded.
This approach of spacecraft diagnosis does not scale well for multiple space platform
missions due to an increasing need to make the long-duration missions cost-effective
by limiting the size of the operations team. Therefore, ideally the spacecraft should
achieve the mission goals by autonomously carrying out fault diagnosis and recov-
ery tasks. The need for spacecraft autonomy has been extensively discussed in
the literature, and onboard planning, execution, diagnosis and recovery have been
demonstrated in a deep space mission [22–25]. A framework that facilitates reduc-
ing the operational cost at the ground station for the NASA’s Deep Space Network
is available in [26]. However, in the operation of the Earth-orbiting satellites the
implementation of such onboard autonomous diagnosis and recovery functions and
capabilities has not yet become a common practice due to cost considerations and
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perceived risks. Consequently, it is often desired that expert human operators be
involved in the spacecraft operations and diagnosis processes [27]. The need for effi-
cient utilization of the telemetry data by employing machine learning and rule-based
reasoning have been pointed out in [21] in order to enhance diagnostic performance
and assist the less-experienced personnel in performing monitoring and diagnosis
tasks.
Based on the above observations, it is therefore necessary to develop a system-
atic diagnosis approach for multi-platform missions in order to respond to anoma-
lies within shortest possible time specially when critical health and safety issues are
involved. The effectiveness of such a scheme is to be first demonstrated via imple-
mentation and validation as part of a ground segment automation tool (this will
help limit the size of the operations team) and may be transferred on-board after a
thorough feasibility analysis.
1.3 Related Work and Motivations
From the discussions on spacecraft formation flying and spacecraft fault diagnosis
in Sections 1.1, and 1.2 respectively, it is important to note that there is a need and
desire for the expert human operators’ involvement in the spacecraft operations and
diagnosis processes. In other words, spacecraft actions should be understandable
by the human operators at ground so that intervention may be made, if necessary.
Automated fault detection and diagnosis approaches often do not have good explana-
tion facility to point out the source(s) of detected anomalies. This is another reason
why simple and easily understandable threshold or limit checks are still preferred
in satellite fault diagnosis despite the availability of much sophisticated techniques
in the literature. In the remaining part of this section the works that are related to
this thesis as well as the thesis motivation are discussed.
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Related Work: A hierarchical Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)
concept for a single satellite system was presented in [28] in order to streamline
and manage FDIR designs of multiple teams across a large number of spacecraft
subsystems during various project phases. However, the authors in [28] present
the concept mainly from the FDIR task management perspective without providing
details on the systematic development of frameworks and methodologies. In [29],
the authors describe the application of a model-based reasoning methodology to
the health management for an Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system. In this
work, diagnosing root causes from known symptoms is achieved by tracing upstream
along the causal pathways from the symptoms to the faults. Impact prediction of
root causes is performed by propagating downstream from causes to effects. The
approach relies on quantitative behavioral models to detect incipient problems by
simulating expected behavior and comparing against observed data. Discrepancies
between predicted and observed behaviors trigger diagnosis based on qualitative
fault models. These fault models capture expert diagnostic reasoning and help to
isolate root causes as well as predict future impacts.
A generic hierarchical fault diagnosis approach similar to the work in this thesis
is available in [19]; however, the properties of their hierarchical structure are much
restrictive for applications to complex systems with multiple interactive subsystems.
The purpose of the 3-level hierarchical fuzzy system model that is proposed in [30] is
to model a given system with rules that are “tuned” hierarchically in 3 stages/levels.
Therefore, the hierarchical decomposition goal in [30] is completely different from
that of in this thesis.
The applicability of hierarchical fault diagnosis methodologies that are based
on the discrete-event systems theory is available in [31]. The method in [31] is
restricted to systems that are characterized by discrete events, and does not take into
account uncertainties in the diagnosis model. A systems analysis method known as
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the fault propagation analysis (FPA) is available in [32] that facilitates a systematic
design of fault tolerant control systems by identifying all possible faults in various
components and their effects on the system. The method requires an in-depth
knowledge of the components interactions and serves mostly as an analysis tool for
early design modifications as opposed to a tool for operational fault diagnosis which
is the primary focus of this thesis. Furthermore, unlike the proposed method in this
thesis, FPA does not address uncertainties in the fault manifestations at different
components of the FPA model.
Rule-based reasoning have been extensively used in various applications [30,
33–41] including fault diagnosis. For example, in [37] the authors showed the ef-
fectiveness of a fuzzy logic-based fault isolation scheme on jet engines by utilizing
typical gas path parameters. The author in [38] proposed an extended neuro-fuzzy
scheme for online machinery condition monitoring and applied it on an experimen-
tal setup of a gearbox driven by a d.c. motor in order to classify different gear
conditions. The authors in [39] proposed a rule-based diagnosis method for space-
craft that applies two different data mining techniques namely, time-series pattern
clustering and association rule mining to spacecraft telemetry data.
As mentioned above, the need for efficient utilization of spacecraft telemetry
data by employing machine learning and rule-based reasoning has been identified
in the literature recently. The author in [40] has pointed out that when the system
or the application domain is very large and complex, an entirely rule-based repre-
sentation and associated inference leads to a large and inefficient knowledge base,
causing a poor quality in diagnosis. The author in [40] has reported a method of data
analysis intended for autonomous real-time fault detection and characterization in
spacecraft by utilizing both rule-bases and causal system model without providing
much details on how the models are developed and integrated.
The schemes in [37–39] appear to be suitable for the fault diagnosis of a small
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set of actuators that are operated in isolation. However, there is no information
available on how to utilize or employ such scheme systematically in the presence
of a number of interacting components or subsystems. Eventhough a number of
research on dynamic neural networks [42–46] and machine learning techniques [43,
47] have been related to the fault diagnosis of subsystem components, they do
not provide details on how the methodologies can be applied in the presence of a
large number of interactive components and subsystems. Furthermore, on-board
design and implementation of model-based FDI methods that include parameter
estimation, robust observers and filter design techniques [20, 48–51] may be cost-
prohibitive for a large number of subsystems and their components even if sufficiently
accurate mathematical models are available.
The methodology for quantifying the parameters of the Bayesian networks
(BN) that is developed in this thesis is the result of and is being motivated by
the inapplicability of the existing methods (for example, the ones in [52,53]) to the
system under consideration. The method available in [52] utilizes domain-dependent
constraints that are not relevant to the problem investigated in this thesis. The
method that is available in [53] is also not applicable because it was developed for
ranked nodes whose states are expressed on an ordinal scale which is mapped to
a continuous, monotonically ordered, bounded numerical scale. Note that several
belief or evidence propagation methods in BN are available in the literature [54,
55], and the methods require that the BN parameters of the nodes be specified
numerically. The focus in this thesis has been on the BN-based fault diagnosis
model development (structure and parameters) as opposed to the development of a
belief propagation method.
As mentioned above, although the need for spacecraft autonomy is extensively
investigated in a deep space mission of NASA, in the operation of the Earth-orbiting
satellites the implementation of such onboard autonomous diagnosis functions have
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yet to become a common practice due to cost considerations and perceived risks.
Motivation: As mentioned in Section 1.2, fault diagnosis is considered to be an
integral part of an IVHM system which aims to identify the root cause of faults and
performance degradations. For complex systems such as satellites, it is often the
case that different design and development teams are involved in developing diag-
nostic algorithms for various components and subsystems. When these algorithms
are employed independently and in isolation for diagnosing a specific component or
subsystem, correlating faults that are identified at separate locations will lead to
difficulties in assessing the overall system health. Therefore, a decision support sys-
tem should be developed that would provide the ground personnel with an ability to
perform diagnostic reasoning coherently. The above observations on the limitations
of the existing fault diagnosis schemes are consistent with the problems and generic
fault diagnosis requirements that were encountered during the course of the indus-
trial research and development work reported in [43] which utilized many years of
actual satellite telemetry data.
The focus of this thesis is to develop a methodology for ground station-based
diagnosis of complex multi-vehicle systems, such as the formation flight of satellites,
where telemetry data is available and access to precise mathematical models of the
system under consideration is limited. Since it is desired that the diagnosis model
would provide decision support to human experts, it is reasonable to decompose the
overall system into simpler subcomponents, and to develop a fault diagnosis model
to relate the faults that are occurring at the subcomponents. The systematic design
of such fault diagnosis scheme for satellite formations has not been investigated so
far.
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The above needs and limitations of the existing work have motivated the re-
search that is pursued in this thesis. In this thesis, we develop a novel hierarchi-
cal fault diagnosis framework and methodology which allows systematic diagnos-
tic reasoning across large number of spacecraft components or subsystems. The
general idea is to decompose a complex system hierarchically into simpler mod-
ules/components, and to develop fault diagnosis models that allow the representa-
tion of module/component dependencies.
1.4 General Problem Statement
The overall research objectives are to design, develop and verify/validate fault di-
agnosis framework and methodologies that would enhance the level of autonomy
that is achievable in ground stations, and to determine the advantages as well as
limitations of the proposed approach. The problem to be addressed in this research
can be formally stated as follows:
General Problem Statement
Design, implement and verify/validate a novel hierarchical fault diagnosis (HFD)
scheme that is applicable for fault diagnosis in multi-platform space systems and
enjoys the following properties:
• Transparent and tractable diagnostic reasoning process that is understandable
by expert humans, and allows integration of FD designs performed separately
by a number of design teams,
• Robust against modeling uncertainty with capability for diagnostic decision
making under uncertainty, and




In order to address the problem stated above, the following approach is proposed.
Specifically, in order to achieve tractability of the diagnostic reasoning and integra-
tion of FD designs, it is necessary to decompose the complex system (formation
flying system) into different levels of abstraction. Therefore, the first task is to
develop concepts and framework for hierarchical fault diagnosis.
Once the framework is developed, the next task is to model the fault be-
haviors of individual components of the system at different levels in the hierarchy.
Appropriate modeling schemes are to be selected that would provide transparency
in reasoning and robustness against modeling uncertainty. The selected modeling
scheme should also allow flexility for incorporation of qualitative knowledge of the
domain experts.
Next, it will be necessary to relate the fault modes/behaviors of different
components and their manifestations at different levels of the proposed hierarchical
framework. Therefore, it is necessary that appropriate dependency modeling of fault
behaviors be performed that would allow incorporation of imprecise knowledge and
diagnostic decision making under uncertainty. In summary, the following major
tasks are proposed:
• Development of novel hierarchical fault diagnosis concepts and framework that
would allow transparent and tractable diagnostic reasoning.
• Modeling of component fault modes and their interactions by utilizing appro-
priate modeling schemes that would make it possible to satisfy the require-
ments of the general problem stated above.
• Design and development of hierarchical fault diagnosis algorithms and strate-
gies by utilizing the above-mentioned models.
• Verification and validation of the proposed fault diagnosis scheme.
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• Identification of the advantages and the limitations of the developed fault
diagnosis strategies.
In the above generic problem statement, the term “uncertainty” refers to the
unclear fault manifestations in signals that are used for diagnosis as well as the
misidentification of faults that is quantified typically in a standard performance
matrix such as a confusion matrix [56,57]. Therefore, the term “robustness” against
modeling uncertainty refers to an algorithm’s capability to identify faults by using
such unclear fault manifestations, and to utilize uncertainty information that is
available in confusion matrices. Furthermore, the V&V of the proposed schemes that
is investigated in the thesis (in Chapter 7) provides some insights about whether
the proposed scheme would break down due to some given changes in the level of
uncertainty which is considered in design.
As the fault diagnosis problem under consideration is related to ground-based
satellite health monitoring and fault diagnosis, the proposed schemes would not
be subjected to a stringent constraint on computational resources as it would be
typically the case for an on-board fault diagnosis scheme. Furthermore, the emphasis
of this thesis is not on a belief propagation algorithm development (as discussed in
detail in Section 6.2), and a standard belief propagation algorithm is used in the
thesis to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model. The computational
complexity and the scalability of such standard belief propagation algorithms [54,55]
are well-known, and are not investigated in this thesis.
In a well recognized recent work on the standardization of DPHM techniques,
as appears in [56], fault isolation or classification accuracy of 95% within a major
component for flight critical use is recommended. Therefore, in this thesis an overall
fault identification accuracy across various components in the hierarchy is considered
to be acceptable when it is close to 95%. Such fault identification or classification
accuracy has been used as a measure of performance throughout this thesis, and
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further investigation of the optimality of the proposed fault diagnosis schemes has
been considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis.
Finally, the investigation on the V&V of the proposed schemes is mostly related
to the verification of some generic fault diagnosis requirements as opposed to the
validation of the proposed schemes with real satellite formation flight data in a real
operational environment.
Main Assumptions
1. The formation control is based on Leader-follower approach.
2. Efficient fault detection mechanisms (binary decision making mechanism about
the existence of fault(s)) are available that invoke or trigger the proposed fault
diagnosis scheme.
The first assumption is related to the simplicity of the formation control archi-
tecture under consideration. This assumption has significant impact on the forma-
tion level (defined formally in Section 4.1) fault diagnosis rules that are proposed in
Chapter 5. However, as long as the health states and their dependencies are defined
in the same way as that in Chapter 6, the Bayesian network-based fault diagnosis
model that is developed in this thesis would be still applicable to other formation
control architectures. The second assumption simply states that the proposed fault
diagnosis is invoked or initiated when deemed necessary by the user.
1.5 Literature Review
As mentioned in Section 1.2, fault diagnosis techniques for continuous-time as well
as discrete-time systems can be broadly classified into two categories depending on
the types of models they utilize for diagnosis: (1) model-based fault detection and
isolation (FDI) methods, and (2) artificial intelligence (AI)-based fault diagnosis
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methods or intelligent model-based fault diagnosis methods. The literature review
presented below is primarily on the artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods since
these approaches are the main focus of this research. However, for the sake of
completeness, some widely used model-based fault detection and isolation (FDI)
methods are also briefly reviewed.
Model-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods are mainly inves-
tigated within the FDI/control community. The methods [20] include parity rela-
tion approaches, parameter estimation approaches, and observer or filter-based ap-
proaches. The main idea behind parity relation approaches [58–60] is to check the
consistency of mathematical relations between (a subset of) outputs and inputs. The
parity space is the space of residuals namely, parity vectors. The overall objective of
this approach is to construct a parity space for the system model under considera-
tion and to analyze its elements for FDI. Fault detection and isolation via parameter
estimation [61, 62] relies on the principle that possible faults in the monitored sys-
tem are associated with specific parameters and states of the mathematical model
of the system. Process parameters that are not directly measurable requires on-line
parameter estimation and these parameters are utilized in the FDI. The main idea
behind observer or filter-based methods [63–65] is to estimate the states of the sys-
tem by using either Luenberger observer(s) or Kalman filters. A popular approach
is to use a bank of estimators (Kalman filters or observers) where each estimator
is designed for a specific fault hypothesis. Recent applications of the model-based
diagnosis in spacecraft subsystem/component FDI are found in [48,51,66,67].
The authors in [68] present a hybrid framework for fault diagnosis of complex
systems that are modeled by hybrid automata where they model a residual generator
by a discrete-event system (DES). The hybrid diagnosis approach is employed to
investigate faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator of a single-spool
turbojet engine. The authors in [69] discuss a hierarchical model-based approach
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to Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) that combines fault detection,
isolation and identification, fault-adaptive control, and prognosis into a common
framework. They demonstrate the approach on a fluid loop of a secondary sodium
cooling loop of a nuclear reactor system.
Model-based FDI methods are very good candidates, especially for fault de-
tection, when the system behavior can be sufficiently approximated by a mathe-
matical model. Note that in this case fault detection can be performed with a
model of healthy system model (without explicit fault models). When it comes to
the problem of diagnosis (the problem of localizing a fault, determining its type,
etc.), residuals that are sensitive to a particular (set of) known faults are evalu-
ated in order to determine what fault has occurred in the system. Therefore, as
pointed out in [20], for residual evaluation/classification, model-based diagnosis ap-
proaches commonly utilize either classification techniques (statistical, geometrical,
neural network-based, fuzzy clustering, etc.) or inference methods (fault symptom
trees, if-then rules, probabilistic/fuzzy reasoning, etc.).
Artificial intelligence (AI)-based fault diagnosis methods do not require ex-
plicit mathematical models of the system; however, they utilize data and domain
knowledge related to the system. As indicated in Section 1.2, AI-based diagnostic
reasoning methods [19] are commonly classified into three main categories, namely
(1) Case-Based Reasoning (CBR), (2) Rule-Based Reasoning (RBR), and (3) Model-
Based Reasoning (MBR). Other approaches are mainly pure data-driven that include
machine-learning (ML) and Neural Network (NN)-based strategies. The MBR ap-
proach includes graph-based models such as logical causal graph models as well as
the Bayesian network (BN) models.
Different types of AI-based fault diagnosis methods are utilized depending
on the depth of the available knowledge. When the system behavior is poorly
understood, and mathematical models and/or diagnostic rules are difficult to derive,
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CBR is employed. RBR is performed when it is possible for the domain experts to
derive rules for diagnosis. When deep understanding of the system behavior and its
component interactions are possible, and rich domain knowledge is available, MBR
is employed for diagnosis. Purely data driven approaches such as neural network-
based models are also utilized for diagnosis. In the subsequent paragraphs, these
artificial intelligence-based techniques are reviewed.
The authors in [70] explored the use of case-based reasoning (CBR) as a tech-
nique for encoding fault management experience of the satellite operators at NASA
for confronting similar anomalous situations in future. The Fault Information Ex-
traction and Investigation Tool (FIXIT), which was implemented in the proof-of-
concept form, utilized spacecraft anomaly reports to generate cases and catego-
rized anomalies according to three levels of abstraction for performing search in the
database. The authors in [71] presented a hybrid CBR architecture for integrated
fault diagnosis and health maintenance of fleet of defense aviation vehicles by utiliz-
ing both textual information from maintenance records as well as sensor data. The
CBR scheme in [72] was applied to fault diagnosis in spacecraft thermal subsystem
by utilizing both actual and synthetic data. Simple time-domain feature extrac-
tion and time-series distance computations were utilizes for case construction and
retrieval. In [73], the authors identified some confidence measures in the CBR for
classification of shutdown events in order to perform effective maintenance, repair,
and possible design improvements of aircraft engines. CBR has also been applied
to process operation support systems [74], dynamic model of a chiller system [75],
online machine fault diagnosis [76], and automotive fault diagnosis [77]. The au-
thor in [78] developed a knowledge-based architecture for integrated condition based
maintenance of fleet vehicles by utilizing dynamic case-based reasoning (DCBR).
Diagnostic expert systems that utilize rule-based reasoning have been exten-
sively used for diagnosis in various applications. The authors in [39] proposed a
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rule-based diagnosis method for spacecraft that applies two different data mining
techniques namely, time-series pattern clustering and association rule mining to
spacecraft telemetry data. When the system or application domain is very large
and complex, an entirely rule-based representation and associated inference leads to
a large and inefficient knowledge base, causing a poor quality in diagnosis. In such
cases, the system is decomposed hierarchically into smaller modules and rule-bases,
built for each module, are connected via a causal system model. For example, in [40]
the authors describe briefly the architecture, application, and operating theory of
BEAM (Beacon-based Exception Analysis for Multimissions) which is an end-to-end
method of data analysis intended for real-time fault detection and characterization
in spacecraft by utilizing both rule-bases and causal system model. Also, in [79] the
authors discussed an architecture that allowed concurrent and cooperative process-
ing of multiple expert systems in a hierarchical organization for real-time monitoring
of spacecraft.
Fuzzy models, where the system/component behavior is represented as fuzzy
if-then rules, are well-known for their robustness against modeling uncertainty. The
authors in [80] presented a fuzzy rule-based approach for diagnosing aircraft engines
where the rule base is derived by using heuristics extracted from designed exper-
iments and flight data representing component performance changes due to field
service degradation. In [37] and [81], the authors presented a fuzzy rule-based ap-
proach for aircraft engine fault isolation by utilizing gas path parameters. In [82],
the authors described an expert system for gas turbine condition monitoring in
which rule-based diagnostic reasoning is performed with causal graphs as well as
model-based diagnosis. In [83], the authors proposed an extension to failure mode
effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) for satellite fault diagnosis by utilizing
fuzzy sets and causal relational methods. The authors in [84] presented a fuzzy
reasoning method that allows to take various types of uncertainty between faults
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and observed symptoms into account. In [85], they discussed a set of practical issues
related to fault isolation in large scale industrial systems by using fuzzy reasoning
methods. Applications of fuzzy rule-based reasoning are also found in fault isola-
tion in analog circuits [86], fault diagnosis in transformers [87], fault diagnosis in
benchmark actuator system [88], and diagnosis in robotic assembly lines [89].
Data driven approaches such as decision/diagnostic trees, and neural networks
have been utilized for fault diagnosis when the model of the system or compo-
nent under consideration is not available. In [90], the authors proposed a decision
tree-based fault diagnosis scheme in which decision trees are constructed by utiliz-
ing simplified model of the process and machine-learning. The effectiveness of the
scheme was demonstrated through an experimental setup of a tank-valve system.
In [91], the authors proposed a fault diagnosis scheme in order to classify different
states of a rotating machine by using decision trees and showed that by utilizing
principal component analysis (PCA), faster tree synthesis can be achieved without
compromising significant classification accuracy. However, the trees do not provide
user-understandable explanation facility that is necessary in fault-cause identifica-
tion and the authors pointed out that their approach had scalability issues.
In [21], the author described how data driven software tools have been applied
to the NASA mission control operations and discussed plans for future mission
control system health monitoring software systems. The authors in [92] used decision
trees to detect and isolate simulated leaks in a rocket engine where high-fidelity
simulated engine data was used to train a decision tree for fault detection and fault
isolation.
The authors in [47] presented a machine learning-based automatic diagnos-
tic tree synthesis approach in order to determine the cause of actuator faults in a
satellite in terms of a set of events. However, the trees do not represent causal de-
pendency among the events. This approach is inspired by fault-trees [93, 94] which
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are primarily reliability analysis models that are widely used as a failure investi-
gation tool in aerospace industries. Generation or synthesis of fault-trees requires
very good understanding and design-phase knowledge of the system, and even the
software-assisted fault-tree synthesis is not time-effective for complex systems [95].
Consequently, the application of fault-tree analysis is more common in reliability
analysis, failure investigations (when the system operation has come to a halt), and
design verifications as compared to the operational fault diagnosis. The authors
in [95] proposed a method for converting fault-trees (reliability analysis models) to
decision trees (diagnostic models), denoted as the diagnostic decision trees (DDT),
which allows time-effective fault diagnosis in space systems. This scheme depends
on the availability of fault-trees for different parts of the system and ignores human
operators’ expertise/knowledge. The authors in [96] proposed an automatic health
monitoring method for spacecraft which adaptively predicts the upper and the lower
limits of each sensor measurement in the telemetry data by using a machine learning
technique known as the regression tree learning.
The authors in [42, 44, 45] have utilized neural networks for fault diagnosis in
the actuators of satellites. However, one of the main limitations of neural networks
is that their diagnostic decision making process is not transparent or understandable
to human experts. In order to overcome this limitation, neuro-fuzzy schemes are
proposed for diagnosis in different applications such as d.c. motor [97], two-link
rigid planar manipulator [98], etc. In [99], a computer-assisted FDI scheme based
on a fuzzy qualitative simulation algorithm was used for fault detection purposes,
coupled with a hierarchical structure of fuzzy neural networks that was used to
perform the fault isolation task. The FDI scheme was applied to a benchmark
actuator system. In [43], the authors integrated a dynamic neural network method
and automatic diagnostic tree/fault tree synthesis method for fault diagnosis in the
attitude control subsystem (ACS) of a satellite by utilizing actual telemetry data.
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Through this integration, it has been possible to both detect faults and identify
fault-causes in the ACS.
Model-based reasoning (MBR) is based on the deep knowledge of the struc-
ture and behavior of the system. In his classical paper [100] on MBR, the author
presented a “constraint suspension” approach for diagnosis of digital electronic cir-
cuits. The overall strategy is based on progressive relaxation of the underlying
assumptions about the correct functioning of devices that are made systematically
and utilized in diagnosis. Logical causal graph-based models are also utilized in
model-based reasoning. For example, the authors in [101] presented a multi-level
diagnostic reasoning procedure based on causal models (AND/OR causal graphs).
This method is developed based on sound logic without taking any uncertainty into
account. In [102], authors presented an adaptive fuzzy inference causal graph ap-
proach for fault detection and isolation of field devices including sensors, actuators,
and controllers in nuclear power plants. In this approach, nuclear plant systems are
represented as a causal graph consisting of individual process variables that are con-
nected with adaptive fuzzy inference system models. The authors in [103] presented
a distributed, model-based, qualitative fault-diagnosis approach for formation of
mobile robots. This approach is based on a bond-graph modeling framework that
can deal with multiple sensor types and isolate process, sensor, and actuator faults.
The authors in [104] developed a fast sensor fault diagnosis approach for component
failures in large scale systems. Their approach is based on a precise and integrated
statistical modeling of the fault isolation and sensor error processes where the prob-
abilities of missed detection and of false alarms are not known a priori and must be
estimated online.
Bayesian networks (BN) are used for uncertain causal dependency modeling
and fault diagnosis in different applications. In [105], the authors identified BN as
the most suitable computational method for spacecraft FDIR because of its ability
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to process uncertain information about dependencies among system components,
observation about the status of the components, effects of different alarms, etc.
In [106], the authors proposed a Bayesian network-based probabilistic reasoning
and statistical learning method for fault diagnosis in spacecraft thrusters by utiliz-
ing telemetry data. In [107], the authors utilized influence diagrams (generalized
Bayesian networks) for fault diagnosis and decision making about corrective actions
in gas turbine applications.
The authors in [108] pointed out that without systematic Bayesian network
model construction techniques, BNs may never become widely used in practical di-
agnostic systems. They discussed systematic Bayesian network model construction
by decomposing the overall problem into subproblems and representing the subprob-
lems with simplest Bayesian networks. In [109], they proposed a large layered BN
structure as a decision support tool for locomotive systems. In [110], the authors
presented a novel form of layered dynamic Bayesian network model for the prognosis
of electromechanical and electronic subsystems in aviation.
The authors in [111] present an uncertainty management approach for diag-
nostics and prognostics algorithms. In their approach, a Relevance Vector Machine
(RVM), which is a Bayesian treatment of the Support Vector Machine (SVM), is
used for model identification; while a Particle Filter (PF) framework uses the learnt
model, statistical estimates of noise and anticipated operational conditions to pro-
vide estimates of the remaining useful life (RUL) in the form of a probability density
function (PDF). The authors in [112] designed a hierarchical hybrid Bayesian net-
work structure for information integration for security applications. In this struc-
ture, BNs are adopted in the top (decision) layer to address global assessment and
hidden Markov models (HMM) functions in the bottom (observation) layer to report
processed evidence to the BN. In [113], the authors presented a hierarchical system
architecture for managing accountability in a service oriented architectures (SOA).
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They identified root cause of service delivery failure by utilizing Bayesian network
reasoning.
In [114], the authors described the “remote agent flight experiment” in which
an AI-based diagnostic system namely, Livingstone that consists of a mode identifi-
cation (MI) component was designed to perform fault diagnosis. Spacecraft compo-
nents’ states were modeled as a set of discrete component modes rather than a set
of low-level sensor readings. Inferred mode changes were reported to a central exe-
cution system for diagnosis and recovery. In [115], authors presented a distributed
real-time model-based diagnosis (DRMD) system that combines rule-based reason-
ing with model-based diagnosis. DRMD utilizes Livingstone’s modeling language,
called model-based programming language (MPL) and finds the most likely mode
with a much simple algorithm as compared to that in the Livingstone which al-
lows DRMD to deliver hard real-time performance. DRMD was tested on a space
interferometer test-bed.
The authors in [116] discussed the issues related to the implementation of AI-
based FDIR for onboard autonomy that have been identified in the SMART-FDIR
project, an ESA research study. In [117], the author proposed a methodology and
framework for incorporation of FDIR in on-board software (OBSW) of ESA satel-
lites. In [118], the author proposed formulation of spacecraft health management
by defining six generalized health management decisions and developed a method
for modeling spacecraft component dependencies. In [28], the authors presented a
hierarchical FDIR framework for spacecraft systems in order to implement system-
atic FDIR scheme within the project development. The framework is based on the
experiences from different ESA projects.
Benchmarking and standardization of diagnostic and prognostic algorithms
have been investigated by several authors recently. The authors in [119] described
a formal framework that was developed for benchmarking of diagnostic algorithms.
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The diagnosed system is the Advanced Diagnostics and Prognostics Testbed (ADAPT),
a real-world electrical power system (EPS). In [120], the author introduces several
new evaluation metrics tailored for prognostics and show that the tailored metrics
can effectively evaluate various algorithms as compared to other conventional met-
rics. The recommended practice in [56] investigated metrics that may be useful
in evaluating vibration-based diagnostic algorithms as health monitors in vehicle
health and usage management systems.
1.6 Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis, a hierarchical fault diagnosis framework that allows transparent di-
agnostic reasoning is proposed. Within the proposed framework, the main contri-
butions of the thesis are as follows:
1. Designed and developed a fuzzy rule-based hierarchical fault diagnosis scheme:
(a) Formalized the proposed fault diagnosis with a hierarchical fault diagnosis
model (HFDM).
(b) Developed fuzzy rules for fault diagnosis in different levels in the hierar-
chy.
(c) Proposed a hierarchical fault diagnosis algorithm for identifying the faulty
components in the system.
2. Designed and developed a Bayesian network-based hierarchical fault diagnosis
scheme:
(a) Formalized the proposed fault diagnosis with a Bayesian network-based
component dependency model (CDM).
(b) Developed a novel Bayesian network structure, and an approach for
health state definition and mapping in the CDM.
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(c) Developed a novel methodology for determining CDM parameters from
confusion matrix data.
3. Evaluated the performances of proposed component fault diagnosis schemes,
and performed the V&V of the proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis model.
(a) Proposed and developed a sensitivity analysis-based CDM verification
approach.
(b) Demonstrated the verification of the CDM that is implemented in this
thesis.
In addition, the advantages and the limitations of the developed fault diagnosis
schemes in items 1 and 2 above have been identified.
1.7 Organization of the Thesis
The organization of the remaining parts of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2,
the background information that are utilized in this thesis are briefly reviewed. In
Chapter 3, the modeling of a formation flight system and formation flight synthetic
data generation are discussed. In Chapter 4, the proposed hierarchical framework
for satellites formation flight fault diagnosis is discussed in detail. In Chapter 5,
the proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis framework is formalized and a fuzzy rule-
based fault diagnosis methodology within the proposed framework is presented. In
Chapter 6, a Bayesian network-based fault diagnosis methodology is investigated
and developed. In Chapter 7, the verification and validation of the above fault




In this chapter, the state-of-the-art on multi-platform space missions namely, space-
craft formation flying missions, spacecraft fault diagnosis and spacecraft autonomy
are discussed. The problem of multi-platform space systems fault diagnosis, which
is the focus of this research, is discussed and motivations for pursuing this research
are outlined. Next, the thesis contributions are summarized, and the organization
of the thesis is presented. Finally, an extensive literature review on fault diagno-
sis methodologies, with an emphasis on the artificial intelligence (AI)-based fault
diagnosis methods is presented.
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Chapter 2
Fault Diagnosis using Fuzzy
Rule-Based Reasoning and
Bayesian Model-Based Reasoning
In this chapter the methodologies that are necessary for this research are briefly
reviewed and discussed.
2.1 Fuzzy Rule-Based Fault Diagnosis
In this section, a brief review of fuzzy reasoning-based fault isolation is discussed
based on the formulation available in [19, 84, 85]. For fault isolation in physical
systems, relationships among observed symptoms and faults is necessary. Symp-
toms are the manifestation of faults available diagnostic signals (measured from the
process or calculated). Therefore, symptoms are obtained by monitoring some pre-
identified diagnostic signals that are of one of the following types [19]: (1) residuals
generated based on system models, (2) binary or multi-valued signals resulted from
residual classification/quantification, (3) statistical parameters (features) describing
signal properties, and (4) process states and/or variables (measured or calculated).
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Let F = {fk : k = 1, ......K} be a finite set of K faults under considera-
tion and S = {sj : j = 1, ......J} be a finite set of J available diagnostic signals.
Each diagnostic signal sj ∈ S can then have a set of possible values Mj where,
Mj = {mj,a,mj,b...mj,z}, called the domain of sj, is a fuzzy set with fuzzy/lingustic
variables mj,a,mj,b...etc.. Note that the number of variables in Mj for each sj need
not necessarily be the same. In practice, usually two- or three-valued signals are
considered for simplicity; for example, Mj = {mj,a,mj,b,mj,c} for a three-valued
diagnostic signal sj ∈ S. Consequently, for each value mj, a membership function
µ(mj) ∈ (0, 1) is determined which essentially represents the degree of truth that
the value of sj is mj.
A mapping S × F →M is defined which assigns to each pair 〈sj, fk〉 a subset
of the values Mj,k ⊂ Mj. Note that Mj,k are the possible values (considered as
manifestations) of sj when fault fk occurs. A fault signature model (FSM), with
matrix representation M(fk) is constructed in which the k-th column of M is called







Note that the k-th column of M represents a complex signature that may consist
of multiple elementary signatures (refer to [19,84] for detail). Relationships among
faults and symptoms are expressed in the form of if-then rules such as:
If (s1 ∈M1,k) and... (sj ∈Mj,k) ...and (sJ ∈MJ,k) then (fk) (2.2)
Complex premise fulfillment factor is determined as follows:
µ(sj ∈Mj,k) = µ(sj ∈ mj,1)⊕ µ(sj ∈ mj,2)......⊕ µ(sj ∈ mj,n) (2.3)
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for n-valued evaluation of sj. The symbol ⊕ represents fuzzy sum operator, for
example, s-norm operators such as MAX or drastic sum (refer to [121] for further
detail on the operator). The activation level for the rule for k-th fault is given by:
µ(fk) = µ(s1 ∈M1,k)⊗ ...(sj ∈Mj,k)⊗ ...(sJ ∈MJ,k) (2.4)
where the symbol ⊗ represents fuzzy conjunction operator, for example, t-norm
operators such as MIN or PROD (refer to [19, 121] for further detail on the opera-
tors). Diagnosis is formulated on the basis of rule activation level. Identified faults
usually have rule activation level higher that some pre-defined fixed threshold value
H, which is available from expert knowledge and/or through observation of nomi-
nal activation due to the presence of noise and disturbances acting on the system
according to:
Fisolated = {fk : µ(fk) > H} (2.5)
2.2 Bayesian Model-Based Reasoning
A brief background study on Bayesian networks is provided in Sections 2.2.1 and
2.2.3. The reviews in the subsequent sections are based on [54], [122], and [55].
2.2.1 Probabilistic Reasoning using Bayesian Networks
Bayesian inference is based on the “degree of belief” interpretation of probability
as opposed to classical statistical inference which is based on a long-run frequency
interpretation of probability. The heart of Bayesian techniques lies in the celebrated
inversion formula:




which states that the belief about a hypothesis X upon obtaining evidence e can
be computed by multiplying previous belief P (X) by the likelihood P (e|X) that
e will materialize if X is true. P (X|e) is called the posterior probability, and
P (X) is the prior probability. The denominator is merely a normalizing constant
P (e) = P (e|X)P (X) + P (e|¬X)P (¬X), which can be computed by requiring that
P (X|e) and P (¬X|e) sum to unity. Equation (2.6) is regarded as a normative rule
for updating beliefs in response to evidence.
A Bayesian network (BN) consists of the following: A set of variables and a
set of directed edges between variables; where each variable has a finite set of mu-
tually exclusive states, are characterized so that the variables together with the di-
rected edges form a directed acyclic graph (DAG). To each variable Xi, with parents
U1, U2, ..., Un there is a attached conditional probability distribution P (Xi|U1, ..., Un).
For a BN over X = {X1, ..., Xn}, the joint probability distribution P (X) is the prod-





where, pa(Xi) is the parent set of Xi.
Let BN be a Bayesian network over the universe of variables U , and let ai,
where i = 1, 2, ..., n, be a state of A ∈ U and bj, where j = 1, 2, ...,m, be a state of
B ∈ U . The probability of observing joint outcomes is expressed by joint probability.
The joint probability table P (A,B) consists of n.m numbers and is represented in





P (ai, bj) (2.8)
This calculation is called marginalization, and we say that the variable B is








Multiplication and marginalization of tables are possible. The tables needs not be
(conditional) probabilities, and they are generally called potentials. A potential φ is
a real-valued function over a domain of finite variables X :
φ : sp(X )→ R
where sp(X ) is the span of X . The domain of a potential is denoted by dom(φ). For
example, the domain of the potential φ(A,B|C) is dom(P (A,B|C)) = {A,B,C}.
Two potentials can be multiplied, and he multiplication has several properties
that include dom(φ1, φ2) = dom(φ1) ∪ dom(φ2) in addition to commutative law,
associative law, and distributive law, existence of unit potential properties (refer
to [55] for details).
The marginalization can be generalized to potentials so that
∑
A φ is a poten-











2.2.2 Belief Updating in Bayesian Networks
In this section belief/information propagation and belief updating in Bayesian net-
works are reviewed. Various information propagation methods that are available in
the literature are discussed in [55] (in Chapter 4). In the subsequent paragraphs,
belief updating in causal poly-tree type Bayesian networks is reviewed.
Belief Updating by Unidirectional Information Propagation
In a simple tree structured network with two nodes and one link, X → Y , the
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directed link is quantified by a conditional probability distribution or a fixed condi-
tional probability matrix MY |X in the discrete case:
MY |X , P (Y |X) =

P (y1|x1) ... P (yN |x1)
... P (yn|xm) ...
P (y1|xM) ... P (yN |xM)
 (2.9)
If an evidence e− = {Y = y} is observed, then from Baye’s rule, the belief distribu-
tion of X is given by:
BEL(X) , P (X|e−) = αP (X)λ(X) (2.10)
where, α = [P (e−)]−1 is a normalizing constant, P (X) is the prior probability of
X, and λ(X) is the likelihood vector or diagnostic support contributed by the child
which corresponds to the y’s column of the link matrix MY |X , namely:
λ(X) = P (e−|X) = P (Y = y|X) = MY |X (2.11)
If Y is not observed directly but supported by an indirect observation e− = {Z = y}
in a chain X → Y → Z, then






P (e−|Y )P (Y |X)
= MY |Xλ(Y )
(2.12)
Belief Updating by Bidirectional Information Propagation
Let a chain be e+ → T → U → X → Y → Z → e− as shown in Figure 2.1; where
e+ and e− are the evidences connected to X through its parent U and child Y ,
respectively. The impacts of e+ and e− on X are expressed in two separate vectors
pi(X) = P (X|e+) and λ(X) = P (e−|X); where, λ(X) is called the diagnostic support
contributed by child (as above), and pi(X) is called the causal support contributed by
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Figure 2.1: Belief calculation using bidirectional message passing (adopted from
[55]).
parent, where
BEL(X) , P (X|e−, e+) = αP (e−|X, e+)P (X|e+)
= αP (e−|X)P (X|e+) = αλ(X)pi(X)
(2.13)
which is identical to Equation (2.10) with pi(X) replacing the prior probability P (X).
Conditioning pi(X) = P (X|e+) on the parent variable U we obtain:
pi(X) = P (X|e+) =
∑
u






Therefore, from Equations (2.12, 2.13, 2.14) it is observed that in order to compute
belief distribution BEL(X), a node requires pi(U) of its parent and λ(X) of its child.
Figure 2.2: A fragment of a poly-tree (adopted from [55]).
Now, consider a fragment of a poly-tree (the tree is singly connected namely, no
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more than one path exists between any two nodes, as shown in Figure 2.2) consisting
of a node X, the set of all X’s parents, U = {U1, U2, ..., Un}, and the set of all X’s
children Y = {Y1, Y2, ..., Ym}. Let e be the total evidence obtained, e−X be the
evidence connected to X through its children Y, and e+X be the evidence connected
to X through its parents U. Moreover, e−X and e
+
X are further decomposed into
e−X = {e−XY1 , e−XY2 , ..., e−XYm} and e+X = {e+U1X , e+U2X , ..., e+UnX}, respectively.
Incoming information to X are: λYj(X) : j = 1, 2, ...,m and piX(Ui) : i =
1, 2, ..., n. Outgoing information from X are: λX(Ui) : i = 1, 2, ..., n and piY j(X)
: j = 1, 2, ...,m. Stored information is the fixed conditional probability matrix
P (X|U1, U2, ..., Un) that relates X to its immediate parents. Utilizing the incoming
information, at X, λ(X) and pi(X) are computed so that the belief distribution
BEL(X) can be obtained according to:






pi(X) , P (X|e+X) =
∑
U1,...,Un






























Let BN be a Bayesian network with evidence e. Assume that there is a single
hypothesis variable H, and let a particular state h of H be in focus of interest. Let t
be a set of parameters of the BN (a parameter is an entry in a conditional probability
table (CPT)). One is interested to know how P (h|e) varies with t. Therefore, the
probabilities must be expressed as the functions of the parameters which is discussed
next for a binary variable.
Let X be a binary variable, and let pi be a configuration of X’s parents pa(X).
Then t = P (X = x|pi) is a parameter (an entry in a CPT), but consequently P (X =
x¯|pi) = 1 − t co-varies with t. If X has more that two states, proportional scaling
is assumed, that is the remaining probabilities are scaled by the same factor. If X
has n states, and x1 is a parameterized state, it is assumed that P (X|pi) = (t, (1−
t)x2, ..., (1− t)xn), where
∑
xi = 1. It is possible to deal with several parameters in
the same distribution. If, for example, the first two states are parameterized, one
would require P (X|pi) = (t, s, (1− t− s)x3, ..., (1− t− s)xn). Then, s does not scale
when t is changed. The following assumes proportional scaling, and at most one
parameter per distribution.
Theorem 2.2.1 (P (e) as a function of a parameter [55]). Let BN be a Bayesian
network over the universe of variables U . Let t be a parameter and let e be evidence
entered in BN . Then assuming proportional scaling, we have P (e)(t) = αt + β;
where α and β are real numbers.
Let t = (t1, ..., tm) be a set of parameters, and let pol(t) be a polynomial over
t. The polynomial pol(t) is said to be multilinear if all exponents in the expression
are of degree at most 1. If so, it has a term for each subset of t.
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Corollary 2.2.1 (P (e)(t) is multilinear [55]). Let BN be a Bayesian network over
the universe of variables U . Let t be a set of parameters for different distributions
and let e be evidence entered to BN . Then assuming proportional scaling, P (e)(t)
is a multilinear polynomial over t.
Corollary 2.2.2 (P (h|e)(t) is a fraction of multilinear polynomials [55]).
Let BN be a Bayesian network over the universe of variables U . Let t be a set of
parameters for different distributions and let x be a state of X ∈ U and let e be
evidence. Then P (h|e)(t) is a fraction of two multilinear polynomials over t.
For a parameter t, Corollary 2.2.2 yields that P (h|e) has the form







In this chapter, background information that are necessary for this research are
provided. The topics include fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis, and probabilistic
reasoning using Bayesian networks.
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Chapter 3
Modeling of Multi-Platform Space
System and Synthetic Data
Generation
In this thesis synthetic formation flight data has been utilized in order to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the fault diagnosis schemes that are developed and to
evaluate the performances of the fault diagnosis schemes. Note that utilization of
synthetic formation flying system data has been necessary due to the unavailabil-
ity of actual telemetry data from multi-platform or formation flight space missions
which are still mostly in the planning and design stages. First, description of the
data generation model is provided in the subsequent paragraphs and sections.
A satellite consists of a number of interacting subsystems. In this thesis,
the focus is only on some selected subsystems. Primarily, faults that are related
to the attitude control subsystem (ACS) actuators are investigated; specifically
the reaction wheel actuators. For this purpose, sufficiently accurate ACSs with a
“Leader-Follower” formation control architecture with high-fidelity subsystem com-
ponents/actuator models have been implemented. In addition, a simplified satellite
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electrical power subsystem (EPS) model has been utilized. The following are the
characteristics and assumptions that are associated with the implemented leader-
follower formation flight simulation model:
• Attitude control is not coupled with orbital control, and the satellites’ reference
attitude (desired attitude manoeuvres) as well as the external disturbances are
computed and specified based on the following assumptions:
– The leader is in a Keplerian orbit, orbit type: LEO, altitude 550 km
(refer to Section 3.1 for details)
– The followers follow an elliptical orbit around the leader, and maintain
the same attitude with respect to the leader (refer to Sections 3.1 and
3.2 for details)
• Attitude controllers are designed for each axis based on PID control laws (refer
to Section 3.2.1)
• A high fidelity reaction wheel actuator [123] model is implemented that in-
cludes motor driver/torque control mechanism, motor disturbances such as
cogging and ripple torques, Coulomb and viscous friction, torque noise that
results due to lubricant dynamics, and EMF torque limiting (refer to Section
3.2.2)
• Ideal attitude sensor dynamics is assumed
• Worst-case environmental disturbances are assumed: cyclic magnetic torque
and constant gravity gradient and aerodynamic torque are applied (refer to
Section 3.2.3)
• Virtual test bed (VTB) [124,125] simulation is used to generate EPS data
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– VTB includes a solar array illumination model, a solar array model, a
controller or simplified power distribution and control unit (PDCU), a
battery model, and a voltage regulator
– EPS data is generated by setting the assumed orbital characteristics as
mentioned above
• Pre-generated EPS data is fed to ACS which implies that the EPS behavior
impacts the ACS but the converse is not true (refer to Section 3.3 for details)
In the subsequent sections, the ACS and the EPS models that are utilized for
synthetic fault data generation are discussed in some detail.
3.1 System and Mission Parameter Selection
The primary interest of this research is on the faults that are related to the ACS and
the EPS of satellites in a formation flight. The orbital control subsystem (OCS),
in general, has significant impact on the ACS of a satellite. However, for faults
at steady state conditions, it is reasonable to assume that the two subsystems are
decoupled. Furthermore, in order to generate reference attitude states for individual
satellites in the formation, it is necessary to know the orbital parameters (desired
orbit altitude, orbit inclination, etc.) as well as the desired formation geometry
or the desired relative position of the satellites in the formation even though one
assumes that spacecraft orbital dynamics is decoupled from its attitude dynamics.
Furthermore, orbit characteristics play a significant role in determining worst-case
attitude disturbance toques. In this research planetary environment orbit (PEO)
formations are considered. PEO formations for scientific observation synergy as
well as interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) applications often require
to maintain fixed formation configuration/pattern [5, 6, 126]. In the case of circular
orbits with inter-spacecraft separation distances less than 1 km, it is possible to
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derive a closed form relative motion equations known as the Clohessy-Whiltshire
or the Hill’s equations [127]. Assuming that the Leader satellite is in a Keplerian
orbit, the “special class of periodic solution” of Hill’s equation provide orbits for each
follower relative to the Leader [128]. Based on the information available in [6, 129],
it is reasonable to assume a Sun-synchronous Low Earth Orbit (LEO) with 550 km
altitude (orbital period: 95 min (approx.)); i.e., the orbital specification in terms
of the six classical orbital elements [130] for the leader satellite is as follows: semi-
major axis, a = 6928 km; eccentricity, e = 0 (circular orbit); time of perigee passage,
tp = 0 s; right ascension longitude of the ascending node Ω = 0 degrees; inclination
of the orbit plane, i = 97.5 degrees; and argument of perigee, ω = 0 degree. It is
Figure 3.1: Orbits of the satellites in formation based on the special solution of the
Hill’s equation and its projection on ground (adopted from [128,131]).
further assumed that the follower satellites’ desired orbits are specified by utilizing
the solutions of Hill’s equations (as available in [128]) and the followers circle the
Leader satellite in an elliptical orbit such that the projection of this ellipse on the
ground (area covered on the ground) has a circular shape with a desired radius of
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800 m as shown in Figure 3.1. For case study, a formation of 5 (five) satellites is
considered where a dotted arrow in Figure 3.1 from satellite-j to satellite-i indicates
that attitude of satellite-i can be obtained with respect to satellite-j. Though it is
possible to employ big satellites (with approx. 1000 kg mass) in formation-flying
mission, tight formation flying (inter-satellite distance less than 1 km) of small
satellites is considered in this thesis. Therefore, based on the information available
in [132], mass of each satellite has been selected as 100 kg with principal moment
of inertia [Ixx, Iyy, Izz] = [5, 5, 4] kg-m
2. It is assumed, for the sake of simplicity and
without loss of generality, that all the satellites in the formation have identical mass
and inertia.
3.2 Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS)
In general, in this research a formation of satellites with a single leader and n
followers is considered. Three coordinate frames are used, namely: (1) a reference
frame F0 is used as an inertial frame whose origin is at the center of the Earth,
(2) a reference frame FL embedded at the center of mass of the leader as a body
frame which rotates with the spacecraft and represents its orientation, and (3) a
local vertical local horizontal (LVLH) reference frame Fi attached to the orbit of
each satellite. The RAC-reference frame is used as a spacecraft-centered frame (as
opposed to the roll, pitch, yaw (RPY) frame) in which x, y, z coordinates correspond
to radial, along-track (direction of motion), and cross-track (perpendicular to orbit
plane) directions, respectively.
Attitude of a satellite can be represented in different ways with sets of variables
such as the Euler angles, direction cosine matrix (DCM), Euler parameters (some-
times called quaternion), etc. Euler angles consist of three successive rotation angles
(φ, θ, ψ) around the x, y, z axes of satellite’s body frame. The main advantage of
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the Euler angle representation is that it provides easy visualization of the rotations
and orientation of the satellite. Despite its advantages, the presence of singularities
at specific angles limits applicability of the Euler angle representation to small rota-
tions. For this reason, in this thesis, quaternion representation [133,134] is utilized
for spacecraft attitude. An angular displacement can be specified by the Euler pa-
rameters or unit quaternion q¯ = (~q, q0) which is defined as: ~q = [q1, q2, q3]
T , ~a. sin φ
2
and the auxiliary parameter q0 , cos φ2 . In this notation, ~a is a unit vector in the
direction of rotation with coordinate representation [a1, a2, a3]
T , called eigenaxis,
and φ is the rotation angle about ~a. By definition, unit quaternion is subject to the
constraint that ~qT~q + q20 = 1. Note that a unit quaternion is not unique since q¯ and
−q¯ represent the same attitude. However, uniqueness can be achieved by restricting
φ to 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi so that q0 ≥ 0.
Furthermore, given a vector ~v = [v1, v2, v3]








which represents the fact that ~v × ~ω = ~v×~ω. The product of two unit quaternion p¯
and q¯ is defined as:
p¯q¯ =
 q0~p+ p0~q + ~q × ~p
q0p0 − ~qT~p
 (3.2)
which is a unit quaternion as well. The conjugate of q¯ is defined as q? =
[−~qT , q0]T .
The multiplicative identity quaternion is denoted by 1 = [0, 0, 0, 1]T , where, q¯?q¯ =
q¯q¯? = 1 and q¯1 = 1q¯ = q¯. If q¯d and q¯ represent desired and actual attitude
respectively, then the attitude error is given by q¯e = q¯
d?q¯, which represents the
attitude of the actual frame F with respect to the desired frame F d. Finally, the
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rotational dynamics of a spacecraft relative to the inertial frame F0 are as follows:
~˙q = −1
2






J~˙ω = −~ω × (J~ω) + ~τ
where, ~ω = [ωx, ωy, ωz]
T represents the angular velocity of the satellite, ~q is the vector
and q0 is the scalar part of the quaternion, J is the inertia matrix and τ = [τx, τy, τz]
T
are the torques associated with the spacecraft.
3.2.1 Leader-Follower Formation Attitude Control
It is assumed in this thesis that the 5 (five) satellites in the formation under
the assumed mission scenario (as discussed in Section 3.1) would perform syn-
chronous/collaborative attitude maneuvers. Since the follower satellites circle around
the Leader at the orbital rate, in order to ensure contact or line-of-sight with the
followers, the leader rotates around the X axis at the same rate. In addition, it also
rotates around the Z axis for the Earth pointing. Now, according to the leader-
follower formation control architecture, the followers are required to maintain their
position as well as the attitude with respect to the leader. As mentioned in Section
3.1, a fixed formation configuration is assumed. Therefore, in this case the follow-
ers are required to maintain the same attitude as that of the leader relative to the
inertial frame F0.
For control and especially for diagnosis purpose, it is reasonable to utilize Eu-
ler angles. The reason for utilizing Euler angles is that attitude control performance
specifications are usually available in terms of error in the Euler angles and the
ground support personnel responsible for fault diagnosis are more comfortable deal-
ing with Euler angles. Since the spacecraft attitude dynamics is specified in inertial
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frame, PID controllers [135, 136] (with ±5V limit or saturation for the control sig-
nal) are implemented for each axis of the leader based on “errors in terms of Euler
angles” w.r.t. inertial frame obtained by performing the quaternion to Euler angle
transformation (as discussed in Section 3.2). Followers’ PID controllers (with ±5V
limit or saturation for the control signal) have been designed based on “errors in
term of the Euler angles” w.r.t. Leaders body-fixed frame obtained by performing
the quaternion to Euler angle transformations.
3.2.2 Subsystem Component Model
In the model for synthetic data generation, the high fidelity mathematical model
of the Ithaco Type-A reaction wheel that is available in [123] is utilized. As shown
with a simplified schematic diagram in Figure 3.2, the model consists of detailed
mathematical representation of a reaction wheel containing relationships to repre-
sent motor driver/torque control mechanism, motor disturbances such as cogging
and ripple torques, Coulomb and viscous friction, torque noise that results due to
lubricant dynamics, the “EMF torque limiting” phenomenon at high speed, safety
mechanism for limiting speed, and torque bias discontinuity. Detailed discussion on
the model and the reaction wheel parameter values are available in [123] and is not
presented here. Under fault-free conditions, the reaction wheel is capable of deliver-
ing a maximum of ±40mN-m torque in response to a ±5V torque command input
voltage and operates within the speed range of ±5100rpm. For this research, the
reaction wheel model has been modified to accommodate and support fault injection
capabilities.
Ideal dynamics for attitude sensors are assumed; i.e., signals from sun sensors,
horizon scanners, magnetometers, etc. have been assumed to be fed back to the
attitude controller without any error or time delay.
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Figure 3.2: A simplified schematic diagram of a reaction wheel (adopted from [123]).
3.2.3 Environmental Disturbance Models
Satellites in a LEO orbit are subjected to different types of environmental distur-
bance torques such as magnetic, gravity gradient, aerodynamic, and solar radiation.
The following disturbance models and parameters have been selected based on the
information that is available in [137] and the mission specifications presented in
Section 3.1.
Magnetic: The maximum magnetic torque that occurs in a polar orbit is given by:
Tmag = DB; where D is the residual dipole of the spacecraft and B is the Earth
magnetic field. B can be approximated as B = 2M
R3
; where, M is the magnetic
moment of the Earth (M = 7.96 × 1015 tesla-m2) and R is the radius of the orbit
(in our case, R = 6928 × 103 m). Note that the magnetic torque is cyclic over
the spacecraft orbit (as selected in Section 3.1) with peak value at the poles and
half of the peak value at the equator. Consequently, the frequency of this cycle is
twice that of the orbit. In this thesis the following is assumed, i.e.: D = 0.8 A-m2
(ampere-turn-m2). Therefore, in this case, Tmag = 3.83× 10−5 N -m.
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Izz| sin(2θ); where µ is the Earth’s gravity constant (3.986 × 1014 m3/sec2), θ is
the maximum deviation of x-axis (radial direction) from local vertical in radians,
and Ixx and Izz are the spacecraft inertia as provided in Section 3.1. In this thesis
θ = 0.1 degree is assumed. Therefore, in this case, Tgrg = 6.28× 10−9 N -m.
Aerodynamic: The maximum aerodynamic torque is given by: Taero = F (cpa−cg);
where F is the force. F is approximated by F = 0.5ρCdAV
2; where cpa is the center
of aerodynamic pressure, cg is the center of gravity, ρ is the atmospheric density,
Cd is the drag coefficient (2 − 2.5), A is the surface area, and V is the spacecraft
velocity. In the selected 550 km orbit, V = 7585.2 m/s. In this thesis, the following
values are assumed: (cpa − cg) = 0.3 m, ρ = 1.04 × 10−13 kg/m3, Cd = 2.3, A = 1
m2. Therefore, in this case, Taero = 2.06× 10−6 N -m.
3.3 Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) Model
A simplified satellite electrical power subsystem (EPS) model has been incorporated,
with the ACS model for each satellite. The EPS model [124], which is available
in [125] and is developed in the virtual test bed (VTB) environment [124, 138], has
been modified to incorporate fault injection capabilities and to ensure the supply of
desired bus voltage to the ACS reaction wheels. A functional diagram of the EPS
model of an individual satellite is shown in Figure 3.3, which consists of a solar array
illumination model, solar array model, the controller or simplified power distribution
and control unit (PDCU), a battery model, and a voltage regulator that delivers
regulated bus voltage to the load; i.e., in our case, the reaction wheels.
It is important to mention that in the numerical simulations of the ACS, the
pre-generated EPS bus voltage data that corresponds to the orbital characteristics
(altitude, inclination, eclipse period, etc.) of the satellites are utilized. Therefore,
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Figure 3.3: Functional diagram of the electrical power subsystem (EPS) (adopted
from [124, 125]) depicting the locations of fault injections under the assumed EPS
fault scenarios.
the interaction between the ACS and EPS is of the leader-follower type in the sense
that any fault in the EPS may manifest in the ACS but the converse is not true.
Such simulation setup is justified by the fact that the target ACS fault severities do
not lead to excessively large deviations in the satellite attitude that may significantly
affect the Sun pointing of the solar arrays, and hence the performance of the EPS.
3.4 Typical Simulation Results
In this section some sample simulations of the formation flight model that is utilized
in this thesis are provided. Figure 3.4 shows the reference control signals to the ACS
in quaternion over a 2-orbit period. Figures 3.4(b), 3.4(c), and 3.4(d) show the Euler
angle representation of the reference signal where the angles corresponding to the X
and the Z axes consist of some discontinuities. Figure 3.5 shows the actual attitude
(in quaternion) of the leader satellite (Sat-1) and a follower satellite (Sat-3) relative
to the inertial frame over an 2-orbit period. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the
attitude control performance specifications are usually available in terms of error in
the Euler angles and the ground support personnel responsible for fault diagnosis
are more comfortable dealing with Euler angles.
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(a) The reference quaternion. (b) X-axis Euler angle representation of the ref-
erence.
(c) Y -axis Euler angle representation of the ref-
erence.
(d) Z-axis Euler angle representation of the ref-
erence.
Figure 3.4: Reference attitude of the leader (Sat-1) relative to the inertial frame
over 2-orbit period. In (a), the solid line represents q1, the dashed line represents q2,
the dotted line represents q3, and the dashed-dotted line represents the constraint
~qT~q + q20 = 1.
(a) Sat-1 attitude (b) Sat-3 attitude
Figure 3.5: Attitude (in quaternion) of the leader (Sat-1) and a follower (Sat-3)
relative to the inertial frame over 2-orbit period. The solid line represents q1, the
dashed line represents q2, the dotted line represents q3, and the dashed-dotted line
represents the constraint ~qT~q + q20 = 1.
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Figure 3.6 shows the attitude error (in Euler angles) of the leader (Sat-1) and
a follower (Sat-3) in the inertial frame over 2-orbit period in terms of Euler angles
with respect to the inertial frame F0. The implemented 3-axis active PID control
with reaction wheels provides RMS accuracy (1-sigma) [139] within 0.03 degree for
the leader and 0.06 degree for the followers near zero reaction wheel speed over
half-orbit period in steady state.
Figure 3.7 shows the relative attitude (in Euler angles) of a follower satellite
(Sat-3) with respect to the leader (Sat-1), as well as with respect to another follower
satellite (Sat-4) over a 2-orbit period. Note that in the simulated formation flight
system the leader maintains a pre-specified attitude with respect to the inertial
frame, and all the followers maintain the same attitude as that of the leader in the
leaders body-fixed frame. Consequently, the steady state relative attitude that is to
be maintained by the satellites are the same; i.e., [0, 0, 0]. Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and
3.11 show the reaction wheel (RW) actuator motor current, the motor torque, the
control (torque command voltage), and the wheel speed, respectively of the leader
(Sat-1) and a follower (Sat-3) over a 2-orbit period. Figure 3.12 shows some
selected Electrical Power Systems (EPS) variables of a follower (Sat-3). Similar
responses are observed for the leader as well as the other follower satellites in the
formation, and the responses are not shown here in order to avoid redundancy.
3.5 Fault Simulation and Synthetic Data Gener-
ation
In this thesis, faults are injected when the formation flight is in steady state condi-
tions (station-keeping mode) which implies that the orbital dynamics has negligible
impact on the ACS fault diagnosis. Within the ACS, two types of intermittent faults
are considered and are injected at the subsystem component (reaction wheel) level,
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(a) Sat-1, error in the X-axis. (b) Sat-3, error in the X-axis.
(c) Sat-1, error in the Y -axis. (d) Sat-3, error in the Y -axis.
(e) Sat-1, error in the Z-axis. (f) Sat-3, error in the Z-axis.
Figure 3.6: Attitude error (in Euler angles) of the leader (Sat-1) and a follower
(Sat-3) in the inertial frame over a 2-orbit period.
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(a) Sat-3 attitude (X-axis) relative to Sat-1. (b) Sat-3 attitude (X-axis) relative to Sat-4.
(c) Sat-3 attitude (Y -axis) relative to Sat-1. (d) Sat-3 attitude (Y -axis) relative to Sat-4.
(e) Sat-3 attitude (Z-axis) relative to Sat-1. (f) Sat-3 attitude (Z-axis) relative to Sat-4.
Figure 3.7: Relative attitude (in Euler angles) of one follower (Sat-3) with respect
to the leader (Sat-1), and with respect to another follower (Sat-4) over a 2-orbit
period.
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(a) Sat-1, Z-axis RW (b) Sat-3, Z-axis RW
Figure 3.8: Reaction wheel (RW) motor current of the leader (Sat-1) and a follower
(Sat-3) over a 2-orbit period.
(a) Sat-1, Z-axis RW (b) Sat-3, Z-axis RW
Figure 3.9: Reaction wheel (RW) motor torque of the leader (Sat-1) and a follower
(Sat-3) over a 2-orbit period.
(a) Sat-1, Z-axis RW (b) Sat-3, Z-axis RW
Figure 3.10: Reaction wheel (RW) control (torque command voltage) of the leader
(Sat-1) and a follower (Sat-3) over a 2-orbit period.
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(a) Sat-1, Z-axis RW (b) Sat-3, Z-axis RW
Figure 3.11: Reaction wheel (RW) speed of the leader (Sat-1) and a follower (Sat-3)
over a 2-orbit period.
(a) Bus voltage. (b) Battery voltage.
(c) Regulator output current. (d) Regulator output voltage.
Figure 3.12: Selected electrical power systems (EPS) variables of a follower (Sat-3)
under healthy condition.
55
Figure 3.13: Changes of a component parameter k(t) under different types of faults
namely, abrupt permanent fault, abrupt intermittent fault, and non-abrupt inter-
mittent fault.
namely: (a) friction fault (increase in the viscous friction), and (b) reaction wheel
motor current fault (decrease in the motor gain). The reason behind considering
these two faults is that anomalies in reaction wheels often lead to ACS failure in
satellites [140]. The friction fault may occur due to the wear and tear of the wheel
bearing material over time or due to some problems in the lubricant flow. The motor
current fault may occur because of some electronic hardware malfunctions in the
motor driver unit (MDU) of the reaction wheel.
Each fault is injected with 3 (three) severity levels: gradually increasing from
the lowest to the maximum severity and then gradually decreasing before a complete
fault removal. Note that the faults are intermittent and non-abrupt in nature.
Figure 3.13 shows the changes in a component parameter, denoted by k(t), under
different types of faults, where after fault injection k(t) deviates from its nominal
value differently under each type of a fault.The fault injection locations in the ACS
reaction wheels are shown in Figure 3.2. For all the reaction wheel faults discussed
above the attitude accuracy decreases: the pointing accuracy measure (1-sigma)
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decreases beyond the assumed specification; i.e., 0.03 degree for the leader and 0.06
degree for the followers as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.
Figure 3.14 shows the Z-axis reaction wheel (RW) torque command voltages
(Ct), motor currents (Im) and wheel speeds (ωw) of a follower (Sat-3) in the presence
of a motor current fault and a friction fault that are injected in the Z-axis reaction
wheel of Sat-3 between t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s. Note that the nominal behaviors
are presented in Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11. Figure 3.15 shows the X and Y
axes reaction wheel (RW) torque command voltages (Ct), motor currents (Im) and
wheel speeds (ωw) of a follower (Sat-3) in the presence of a motor current fault
and a friction fault that are injected in the Z-axis reaction wheel of Sat-3 between
t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s. It is observed from this figure that the motor current
fault in the Z-axis RW does not manifest in the RWs in the X and Y axes. Similar
observation was made for the friction fault which is not shown here in order to avoid
redundancy.
Figure 3.16 shows the fault manifestations in the relative attitude (in Euler
angles) of one follower (Sat-3) with respect to the leader (Sat-1), and with respect
to another follower (Sat-4) when a motor current fault is injected between t = 7500
s and t = 9810 s in the Z-axis reaction wheel of Sat-3.
Within the EPS, two types of faults are considered at the subsystem level,
namely: (a) an intermittent bus voltage drop due to the voltage regulator malfunc-
tioning, and (b) an intermittent bus voltage drop due to anomaly in the battery.
Each fault is injected by introducing undesired resistances at the battery output
and voltage regulator output, respectively (fault injection locations are shown in
Figure 3.3) with 3 (three) severity levels: gradually increasing from the lowest to the
maximum severity and then gradually decreasing before a complete fault removal.
Therefore, the faults are intermittent and non-abrupt in nature. Note that although
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(a) Sat-3, Ct under current fault. (b) Sat-3, Ct under friction fault.
(c) Sat-3, Im under current fault. (d) Sat-3, Im under friction fault.
(e) Sat-3, ωw under current fault. (f) Sat-3, ωw under friction fault.
Figure 3.14: The Z-axis reaction wheel (RW) torque command voltages (Ct), motor
currents (Im) and wheel speeds (ωw) of a follower (Sat-3) in the presence of a motor
current fault and a friction fault in the Z-axis reaction wheel of Sat-3 (both faults
injected between t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s).
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(a) Sat-3, Ct of X-axis RW. (b) Sat-3, Ct of Y -axis RW.
(c) Sat-3, Im of X-axis RW. (d) Sat-3, Im of Y -axis RW.
(e) Sat-3, ωw of X-axis RW. (f) Sat-3, ωw of Y -axis RW.
Figure 3.15: The X and Y axes reaction wheel (RW) torque command voltages (Ct),
motor currents (Im) and wheel speeds (ωw) of a follower (Sat-3) in the presence of a
motor current fault in the Z-axis reaction wheel of Sat-3 (injected between t = 7500
s and t = 9810 s).
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(a) Sat-3 attitude (X-axis) relative to Sat-1. (b) Sat-3 attitude (X-axis) relative to Sat-4.
(c) Sat-3 attitude (Y -axis) relative to Sat-1. (d) Sat-3 attitude (Y -axis) relative to Sat-4.
(e) Sat-3 attitude (Z-axis) relative to Sat-1. (f) Sat-3 attitude (Z-axis) relative to Sat-4.
Figure 3.16: Relative attitude (in Euler angles) of one follower (Sat-3) with respect
to the leader (Sat-1), and with respect to another follower (Sat-4) in the presence
of a motor current fault in the Z-axis reaction wheel of Sat-3 (injected between
t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s).
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(a) Bus voltage. (b) Battery voltage.
(c) Regulator output current. (d) Regulator output voltage.
Figure 3.17: Selected electrical power subsystem (EPS) variables of a follower (Sat-
3) under a regulator fault (injected between t = 6500 s and t = 6860 s).
component level faults are being considered within the ACS, the faults correspond-
ing to the EPS are at the subsystem level due to the lack of detailed understanding
and a prior knowledge of the EPS components within the EPS. Consequently, the
EPS fault diagnosis is performed only up to the subsystem level (the different levels,
namely component, subsystem, system, and formation will be defined formally in
Section 4.1).
Figure 3.17 shows some selected electrical power subsystem (EPS) variables
of a follower (Sat-3) under a regulator fault that is injected between t = 6500 s and
t = 6860 s. Note that the fault causes the bus voltage to drop during the entire
fault injection period.
Figure 3.18 shows the same selected electrical power subsystem (EPS) variables
of a follower (Sat-3) under a battery fault that is injected between t = 6500 s and
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(a) Bus voltage. (b) Battery voltage.
(c) Regulator output current. (d) Regulator output voltage.
Figure 3.18: Selected electrical power subsystem (EPS) variables of a follower (Sat-
3) under a battery fault (injected between t = 6500 s and t = 6860 s).
t = 6860 s. Note that unlike the regulator fault, the battery fault does not cause
the bus voltage to drop during the entire fault injection period.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the model that was implemented in this thesis for generating syn-
thetic formation flight data is presented. Detailed descriptions of the two satellite
subsystems, namely the attitude control subsystem (ACS) and the electrical power
subsystem (EPS) are provided. Some typical simulation data for the two subsys-
tems as well as some relative attitude data of the satellites in a formation flight
are presented under both healthy and faulty conditions of the space platform. The
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utilization of synthetic formation flying system data was necessary due to the un-






In this chapter first a hierarchical fault diagnosis framework that is proposed in
this thesis for ground-based formation flight health monitoring and fault diagnosis
is presented. Next, a generic fault diagnosis model is discussed which is utilized
throughout the thesis.
4.1 Development of a Hierarchical Fault Diagno-
sis Framework
The proposed fault diagnosis strategy aims to perform diagnostic reasoning in com-
plex systems such as a “formation flight system” by decomposing its complex struc-
ture hierarchically into simpler modules or components. The decomposition is driven
by the need, from project management perspective, for supporting the development
of the components/subsystems of the overall system by a number of teams and per-
forming integration at the end. Though the proposed framework is generic in nature
and includes various spacecraft subsystems, in this thesis the discussion is mostly
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confined within the attitude and orbital control subsystem and electrical power sub-
system. Furthermore, the availability of some fault detection mechanisms at each
level in the hierarchy is assumed and the proposed framework is discussed mostly
from fault diagnosis or isolation perspective.
Figure 4.1 shows the proposed 4-layer hierarchical decomposition from the
perspective of the attitude and orbital control of the satellites in a formation flight.
In Figure 4.1, fault diagnosis at level 1 (subsystem component level) corresponds to
Figure 4.1: Proposed fault diagnosis framework for a multi-platform space system.
sensor and actuator fault diagnosis. Note that often it is not necessary to identify
fault causes beyond this level because recovery actions or redundancies are not
applied within these components. In the case of the attitude and orbital control
subsystem (AOCS), reaction wheels, thrusters, earth-sensors, star trackers, relative
position and attitude sensors, etc. are the components. It is important to note
that as pointed out in [141], the runtime contingencies in spacecraft are usually the
hardware/subsystem component failures (though it is also possible to have flaws in
planning, and to have unexpected outcomes in execution).
Fault diagnosis at level 2 (subsystem level) corresponds to different subsystems
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such as attitude, orbital, power, etc. Fault diagnosis is performed for different sub-
systems by utilizing the health state information available from different subsystem
components. However, strict partitioning of FDI for different subsystems may not be
possible in many cases because spacecraft operation is characterized by concurrent
activities across a relatively large number of different subsystems [141,142].
Level 3 (system level) diagnosis is performed by utilizing the health state infor-
mation available from different subsystems (for example, attitude control subsystem
(ACS), thermal subsystem, power subsystem, etc.), their interactions and expected
behaviors/behavior specifications. In level 4 (formation level) diagnosis, individual
spacecraft in the formation are considered as different “components” of the forma-
tion flying system. This level is unique to multi-platform missions. Therefore, at this
level fault detection refers to a decision making about the existence of an anomaly
in the formation components, i.e., in one or more satellites in the formation. The
objective of fault diagnosis or isolation is to identify particular spacecraft that are
faulty. Note that the system level diagnosis in a specific spacecraft does not consider
the existence of other spacecraft in the formation.
4.2 Level l Fault
First, we take into consideration that even if a fault is originated in a subsystem
component, the fault is assumed to have different levels of manifestations in the hier-
archy. In other words, for performing diagnosis at different levels, it is assumed that
fault symptoms/manifestations are available. As an example, consider the specific
fault of “increase in friction” in the pitch reaction wheel (subsystem component).
At the subsystem component level, one of the fault manifestations would be “high
current drawn by the wheel motor”. In the attitude control subsystem (ACS) level,
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one of its manifestations would be “deviation from expected pitch angle”. The sys-
tem level manifestations can be described in terms of deviations of the ACS behavior
specifications relative to other subsystems. Finally, at the formation level the most
important fault manifestations will be “deviation from expected relative attitude
with respect to other satellites”. This is because the main purpose of formation
flying is to form a virtual structure such as a telescope in space for which precision
control of the relative positions and attitudes of the satellites are a requirement.
Therefore, there is a need for identifying faults differently at various levels
in the hierarchy based on the “level of abstraction” at a particular level and the
manifestation of a fault at that particular level. On the other hand, in the case
of a system level anomaly that leads to a situation in which a wrong command is
sent to the actuator, the subsystem component, or even the subsystem, would follow
the “wrong” command without being aware of the anomaly. Based on the above
observations, the definition of an “level l fault” [143] is formally stated as follows:
Definition 4.2.1 (Level l Fault [143]). A fault occurring in a system that is
hierarchically decomposed into L levels is said to be an “level l fault” (l = 1, 2, ..., L)
and is denoted by fault f lk (k-th fault mode) if and only if its manifestations are
only observable in the fault signatures that belong to level l and in higher levels for
the fault severity level(s) under consideration.
In Definition 4.2.1, the term “observable” is not associated with the notion
of “observability” that is used in control theory. In this thesis, features that are
extracted from process states and/or variables are utilized as diagnostic signals. A
fault manifestation corresponding to a specific fault is considered to be some pre-
identified value(s) of a diagnostic signal that indicates the presence of that fault.
The fault signature is represented in the form of rule(s) that identifies all the fault
manifestations of interest for that specific fault (discussed in detail in Chapter 5).
Distinguishing faults at different levels based on the above definition would
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allow one to avoid cycles in a directed graph-based diagnostic reasoning model; i.e,
by utilizing the concept of different levels of fault one can develop an acyclic directed
graph model for diagnosis.
4.3 Generic Directed Graph Representation
The proposed hierarchical decomposition, shown in Figure 4.1, is represented with
a generic directed acyclic graph as shown in Figure 4.2. The entire system under
consideration is represented with a single node at the highest level that consists of
subcomponents located at the lower levels. A directed arc between two components
represents the influence of the health state of one component on that of another.
The p-th component at level l in the hierarchy is denoted as C lp. For example, in the
Figure 4.2: Directed graph representation of the proposed hierarchical fault diagno-
sis.
case of a multi-platform space system, for l = 1, C1p would correspond to a sensor
or an actuator whereas for l = L, CL1 would correspond to the “satellite formation
component”. Let the set of all components located in two levels, namely l1 and l2,
in the proposed hierarchical organization be denoted as C l1p and C
l2
q , respectively;
where p = 1, 2, ..., Pl1 ; q = 1, 2, ..., Ql2 ; l1, l2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}; with L denoting the total
number of hierarchy levels. Therefore, when l1 = l2 = l, two different components
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located at the same level l are represented as C lp and C
l
q, assuming Pl = Ql as shown
in Figure 4.2. For any C lp, the sets of components that are parents of C
l
p are denoted
by pa(C lp). A node C
l
p is a leaf node if pa(C
l
p) = ∅. Based on this generic directed
graph representation the problem of fault diagnosis is divided into two stages:
First, fault diagnosis schemes for identifying faults at different nodes of Fig-
ure 4.2 are developed. In Chapter 5, a hierarchical fault diagnosis model (HFDM)
is developed. In the proposed HFDM, fuzzy rule-based reasoning is employed to
identify the health states at different nodes, and a hierarchical diagnosis algorithm
is proposed for identifying the origin of the fault. Fuzzy rules are developed for
fault diagnosis at different levels in the hierarchy by taking into account the uncer-
tainties in the fault manifestations in a given component. However, in this model
the component interaction are quantified without taking the uncertainties in the
component health state dependencies into account. This may be realistic in many
practical situations. In the second stage, this limitation is overcome by developing
a component dependency model (CDM) which is discussed next in the subsequent
paragraph.
In Chapter 6, a Bayesian network-based component dependency model (CDM)
is developed. In the model, component dependencies are quantified by the condi-
tional probability distributions that are associated with the CDM nodes. Note
that at a given node fuzzy rule-based diagnosis is still applied although the CDM
is flexible to accommodate other fault diagnosis methodologies at different nodes.
Furthermore, although the development of the proposed methodology is based on
the health management of satellites formation flight, the methodology is generic
enough to be applicable to other systems or a fleet of systems that require health
monitoring decision support systems (DSS).
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4.4 Fault Propagation
When a fault is detected in a system, the objective of diagnosis is to identify its cause
or location. When diagnosis is not hierarchical and performed only for one specific
component or system, the standard way to evaluate performance is to construct a
confusion matrix and compute accuracy, misclassification rate, etc. The diagnosis
of a single component corresponds to the diagnosis at a node of the proposed di-
rected graph model shown in Figure 4.2. However, in hierarchical diagnosis fault
identifications at different nodes are required to be related in order to determine the
propagation and the node where the fault originated.
Now consider a general scenario where in the directed graph-based represen-
tation a faulty state of a node C lp is detected and identified, and the node is located
at an intermediate level; i.e., 1 < l < L. If pa(C lp) 6= ∅, the fault did not originate
at that node. Therefore, the objective of diagnosis translates to the identification
of the node where the fault originated. Furthermore, it is of interest to identify the
components that are affected by the fault. A fault propagation path identifies the
origin of a fault and all the components that are affected by the fault.
Let C l2p2 be the node at an intermediate level l2 with some identified faulty
state X l2p2 = x¯0. Let C
l1
p1
be a leaf node (pa(C l1p1) = ∅) where the fault has originated.
Further, let pi(C l2p2) and σ(C
l2
p2
) denote the sets of predecessors and successors of node
C l2p2 , respectively in the CDM (or HFDM). Therefore, C
l1
p1
∈ pi(C l2p2); where l2 > l1.
A candidate (possible) fault propagation path is defined as follows.
Definition 4.4.1 (Candidate Fault Propagation Path). A candidate fault
propagation path is a directed path that identifies all the affected components as-
sociated with a fault at a node C l2p2 , and the i-th candidate fault propagation path
is denoted as pathi(C
l2
p2
) = C l1p1 → ...C l2−1q1 → C l2p2 → C l2+1q2 → ...C l3p3.
A path pathi is said to be a fully identified fault propagation path if and only
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if ∀C lp ∈ pathi, faults have been identified. If faults are identified only at some of
the nodes in the pathi, the path is said to be a partially identified fault propagation
path. Note that the nodes in the path segment C l1p1 → ...C l2−1q1 belong to pi(C l2p2), and
the nodes in C l2+1q2 → ...C l3p3 belong to σ(C l2p2). The set of all such candidate fault
propagation paths associated with the identified faulty state of C l2p2 is denoted as
PATH(C l2p2).
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a fault diagnosis framework for a multi-platform space system is
developed. The concept of level l fault is introduced and formally defined. Next,
a generic directed graph-based fault diagnosis model is presented which will be
utilized in the next two chapters of the thesis. Finally, the identification of the fault
propagation in a hierarchically decomposed system is discussed. In the next chapter,
fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis is investigated for multi-platform space systems.
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Chapter 5
Fuzzy Rule-Based Fault Diagnosis
In this chapter fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis is investigated at different levels of
the proposed hierarchical decomposition that was presented in Chapter 4.
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, the proposed hierarchical framework for multi-platform space systems
and specifically for satellites formation flight fault diagnosis was discussed in de-
tail. The proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis was represented by a generic directed
graph model. In this chapter, the framework and the associated generic directed
graph model is formalized in terms of fuzzy rule-based reasoning. Fuzzy rule-based
reasoning is investigated because of its well-known ability for accommodating un-
certainties in fault symptoms, and performing diagnosis by utilizing rules that are
transparent to human operators or users. As discussed in Section 1.3, when the
system or the application domain is very large, rule-based representation of the en-
tire system leads to a large and inefficient knowledge base, causing a poor quality
in diagnosis. However, in this thesis we decompose the system under consideration
into multiple levels and components. Such decomposition allows the use of fuzzy
rule-based reasoning separately in the components of a large and complex system
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such as a formation flight system. The organization of this chapter is as follows: In
Section 5.2 the proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis framework is formalized and
a fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis methodology within the proposed framework is
presented. In Section 5.3, the proposed scheme is demonstrated by using synthetic
data from the formation flight system model that was presented in Chapter 3. The
performance evaluation results are presented in Section 5.4, and advantages as well
as the limitations of the scheme are discussed in Section 5.5. Finally, the chapter is
summarized in Section 5.6.
5.2 Development of a Hierarchical Fault Diagno-
sis Model (HFDM)
This section is divided into five parts: In Section 5.2.1, the proposed hierarchical
structure is formally presented and the key terminologies and definitions that are
necessary for the proposed scheme are presented. The properties of the proposed
hierarchical structure are stated in Section 5.2.2. In Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4, fuzzy
rule-based fault diagnosis is investigated for independent and dependent components
(as defined in Section 5.2.1), respectively. A hierarchical fault diagnosis algorithm
is presented in Section 5.2.5.
5.2.1 HFDM Structure, Terminologies and Basic Definitions
The proposed hierarchical decomposition is represented with a generic directed
acyclic graph structure as shown in Figure 5.1 where the entire system under con-
sideration is represented with a single node at the highest level that consists of
subcomponents located at the lower levels. In this chapter, we identify this struc-
ture as a hierarchical fault diagnosis model (HFDM). We denote the p-th component
at level l in the hierarchy as C lp. For example, in the case of a multi-platform space
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Figure 5.1: Directed graph representation of the proposed hierarchical fault diagno-
sis model (HFDM).
system, for l = 1, C1p would correspond to a sensor or an actuator whereas for
l = L, CL1 would correspond to the “satellite formation component”. Let the set
of all components located in two levels namely, l1 and l2, in the proposed hierar-
chical organization be denoted as C l1p and C
l2
q , respectively; where p = 1, 2, ..., Pl1 ;
q = 1, 2, ..., Ql2 ; l1, l2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}; with L denoting the total number of hierarchy
levels. Therefore, when l1 = l2 = l, two different components located at the same
level l are represented as C lp and C
l
q, assuming Pl = Ql as shown in Figure 5.1. For
any C lp, the sets of components that are parents of C
l
p (as represented in Figure 5.1)
are denoted by pa(C lp).
For fault diagnosis/isolation of physical systems, relationships among observed
symptoms and faults are necessary. Symptoms are the manifestations of the faults
in the available diagnostic signals (measured from the process or analytically calcu-
lated). In other words, symptoms are obtained by monitoring some pre-identified
diagnostic signals that are of one of the following types [19]: (1) residuals that are
generated based on the system models, (2) binary or multi-valued signals that are
resulting from residual classification/quantification, (3) statistical parameters or fea-
tures that are describing signal properties, and (4) process states and/or variables
(measured or calculated).
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In this thesis, we utilize features that are extracted from process states and/or
variables as diagnostic signals. Furthermore, a fault manifestation corresponding
to a specific fault in this thesis is considered to be some pre-identified value(s) of
a diagnostic signal that indicates the presence of that fault. The fault signature
is represented in the form of rule(s) that identifies all the fault manifestations of
interest for that specific fault. A fault signature model of a component refers to a set
of rules that corresponds to all the faults that are to be identified in that component.
Diagnostic signals, fault manifestations, and fault signatures are formally specified
in Section 5.2.3.
The set of Pl components located at level l is denoted as C
l. The compo-
nents, manifestable faults, diagnostic signals, fault manifestations, and fault signa-







FSM lp, respectively; where p = 1, 2, ..., Pl. The fault signature model (FSM
l
p) of
C lp consists of fault signatures that correspond to both types of faults — the ones
that are originated at C lp and the ones that are originated at some lower level but
manifested at C lp. It should be noted here that if pa(C
l
p) 6= ∅, a fault f lk ∈ F lp and
its corresponding fault signature in FSM lp may represent more than one fault that
originates at some lower levels which will be formally stated in Proposition 5.2.2 in
Section 5.2.4.
We distinguish the components within the proposed hierarchical decomposi-
tion according to the following definitions:
Definition 5.2.1 (Independent Component). For any given fault severity level
under consideration, a component C llp is independent of another component C
l2
q ,
where l1 > l2, if a change in the diagnostic signal value(s) in C
l2
q never manifests or
leads to a change in the diagnostic signal value(s) in C l1p due to the presence of any
fault f l3k ; where l2 ≥ l3.
Definition 5.2.2 (Dependent Component). For any given fault severity level
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under consideration, a component C l1p is dependent on another component C
l2
q ,
where l1 > l2, if a change in the diagnostic signal value(s) in C
l2
q always manifests
or leads to a change in the diagnostic signal value(s) in C l1p due to the presence of
some fault f l3k ; where l2 ≥ l3.
The set of all components on which C lp is dependent is denoted as DEP (C
l
p).
Definitions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 imply that we represent the dependencies among the
different components within a particular level l at the next higher level l + 1. Note
that a component C lp is dependent on itself; consequently, C
l
p ∈ DEP (C lp). The
following assumption regarding the component dependencies is now made explicit.
Assumption 5.2.1 (Component Dependency). Component dependencies are
not considered for diagnosis at a component C lp with pa(C
l
p) = ∅.
Note that according to Definitions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, dependencies of components
and fault manifestations are directly related to each other. Furthermore, within an
independent component C lp, it is useful to distinguish faults that are originated at
C lp and those that are originated at some lower level but manifested at C
l
p. We
decompose an independent component C lp into two virtual subcomponents, namely
(1) independent subcomponent of C lp which is denoted by D(C
l
p), and (2) dependent
subcomponent of C lp which is denoted by U(C
l
p) as shown in Figure 5.2. The faults
that are originated at C lp correspond to D(C
l
p) and those that are originated at
lower level(s) but manifested at C lp correspond to U(C
l
p). Once a component C
l
p
is decomposed into the subcomponents D(C lp) and U(C
l
p), the subcomponents are
treated as independent and dependent components, respectively. The dependencies
among components are represented by directed arcs as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
To represent dependencies, where C l1p is dependent on C
l2
q , we add arcs from C
l2
q to
C l1p and represent the arcs with an nK′ × nK link matrix Ll2,l1q,p where nK′ and nK
are the number of manifestable faults in C l2q and C
l1
p , respectively. Each element of
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Figure 5.2: Decomposition of a component into “independent subcomponent” and
“dependent subcomponent”.
the Ll2,l1q,p is denoted by L
l2,l1
q,p (k
′, k), where k′ = 1, 2, ..., K ′ and k = 1, 2, ..., K. In this
chapter, we assume that the dependencies are known with certainty. Consequently,
given that a fault f l2k′ ∈ C l2q manifests in C l1p and identified as f l1k ∈ C l1p , then
Ll2,l1q,p (k




′, k) = 0.
It follows from Definition 4.2.1 and the above discussion that the signature of
an level l fault is not possible to be observed at lower levels, and the origin of an
level l fault is in one of the “independent subcomponents” D(C lp). It is important to
note that in the graphical representation of Figure 5.2, pa(U) 6= ∅ and pa(D) = ∅,
and it is possible that a component C lp where l > 1 does not have any “dependent
subcomponent”. In practical sense this is possible due to lack/unavailability of an
in-depth information about a subsystem or a component.
We propose to perform fault diagnosis at individual components in the hierar-
chical fault diagnosis model (HFDM) which are represented by nodes in Figures 5.1
and 5.2. We now formally define a fault diagnosis module (FDM) that corresponds
to a node or component C lp as follows:
Definition 5.2.3 (FDM of a Component). A fault diagnosis module (FDM)









Alp); where the diagnostic signals Slp are the inputs to the system, the identified
faults F lid,p are the outputs of the system, and the system is characterized by a set of
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rules Rlp,K that describe the relations among the K faults and their corresponding
symptoms, a set of operators Olp that are utilized to compute the rule activation
levels, and a set of assumptions Alp that are made during the rule synthesis.
As described in Section 5.2.3, the rules Rlp,K are obtained from the correspond-
ing fault signature model FSM lp.
5.2.2 Properties of the Proposed HFDM
In this section, the properties of the proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis model
(HFDM) that is presented in Section 5.2.1 are emphasized. We state the properties
of the model in terms of inputs, outputs and system properties of the FDMs (as
defined in Section 5.2.1). The considered properties are as follows:
1. At level l = 1, between any two independent components C1p and C
1
q we have:
a. S1p ∩ S1q = ∅
b. F 1p ∩ F 1q = ∅
c. R1p,K ∩R1q,K′ = ∅
2. At level l (L > l > 1), between any two components C lp and C
l
q we have:
a. Slp ∩ Slq = ∅
b. F lp ∩ F lq = ∅ if C lp ∈ D(C lp) or C lq ∈ D(C lq);
F lp ∩ F lq 6= ∅ if C lp and C lq are dependent, and ∃f l−ik ∈ C l−ir | C l−ir ∈
{DEP (C lp) ∩DEP (C lq)}; l − i ≥ 1
c. Rlp,K ∩Rlq,K′ = ∅
3. At the highest level l = L, only one component exist; i.e., CLp ; p = P1 = 1.
4. At two different levels l1 and l2, where l1 > l2, between any two components
C l1p and C
l2
q the following relations hold:
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a. Sl1p ∩ Sl2q = ∅
b. F l1p ∩ F l2q = ∅ if C l2q /∈ DEP (C l1p );
F l1p ∩ F l2q 6= ∅ if C l2q ∈ DEP (C l1p )
c. Rl1p,K ∩Rl2q,K′ = ∅
5. and finally we have Ll2,l1q,p (k
′, k) ∈ [0, 1].
In the proposed HFDM, all the components C lp with pa(C
l
p) = ∅ are considered
to be the “atomic” in the sense that identification of the location of faults beyond
this level is not either deemed necessary or possible due to lack of the available
information. Consequently, all the subsystem components, i.e., the sensors and the
actuators are “atomic” components. Property-1 states that the diagnostic signals,
manifestable faults, and the rules in two different atomic components are different.
Note that the faults may be similar in two identical components (increase in friction
in two different reaction wheels) but they are treated as different faults from fault
localization perspective as their origins are different.
Property-2a states that the sets of diagnostic signals in two different compo-
nents located at an intermediate level (L > l > 1) in the hierarchy are different (this
is related to the fact that as mentioned above we represent the dependencies among
different components within a particular level l at the next higher level l+ 1). Con-
sequently, the corresponding rule sets are also different (Property-2c). However, as
Property-2b states, if both the components are dependent, sets of the manifestable
faults in the two components may not be completely different if there exist a fault
(originated at some lower level) that manifests in both the components.
Property-3 emphasizes that at the highest level, the entire system under con-
sideration is represented by a single component. Property-4 states that between two
different components located at two different levels, their properties are the same
as that Property-1 of the components that are located at level 1 if the components
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are not dependent on each other. Otherwise, there exist a fault (originated at the
component located at the lower level or some other component(s) located at an
even lower level) that manifests in both the components. Note that if (l1 − l2) = 1,
i.e., in case of the components in two adjacent levels, it is possible— though not
necessary— to have some diagnostic signals that are common to both C l1p and C
l2
q .
Finally, property-5 states that the inter-component fault dependencies are repre-
sented in the HFDM with absolute certainty while the uncertainties related to fault
manifestations are taken into account in each FDM.
Note that in the hierarchical fault diagnosis approach that was presented in
[19], the concept of “level l fault” was not considered in their formulation and the
approach is too restrictive in the sense that it allowed only Property-1 to be true for
any two given components in the hierarchy. Consequently, the overall applicability
of that structure is very limited in the presence of components with higher degree
of interactions.
5.2.3 Diagnosis of Faults in Independent Components at
Level l
The fault diagnosis methodology described below is intended for a single compo-
nent/subsystem C lp (the p-th component at level l) with relatively small or man-
ageable number of diagnostic signals. Furthermore, the assumption of a single fault
(no simultaneous faults) is made which is reasonable if the component/subsystem
is monitored frequently. The problem of multiple faults will be addressed below in
Section 5.2.4 where the single fault assumption is not realistic; for example, in the
formation component at level L, faults may be present in more than one satellite at
any given time.
First, consider the components that are located at the lowest level (level 1)
in the hierarchy. The components C1ps, at level 1, are independent according to
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Proposition 5.2.1 below.
Proposition 5.2.1 (Independence of Level 1 Components). Each component
C1p located at level 1 is independent.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Definitions 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and Assumption 5.2.1
since in this case, pa(C1p) = ∅, ∀p.
According to the properties that are stated in Section 5.2.2, the correspond-
ing sets of diagnostic signals S1p are different from each other and the faults in one
component do not manifest in another component (this also implies that the compo-
nents’ health is monitored frequently enough and the FSMs are designed to identify
faults that are of low severity). For example, a fault occurring at the Y-axis reaction
wheel (subsystem component) in a 3-axes active attitude control subsystem would
manifest within its own diagnostic signals before affecting the performance along
the other two axes.
In the remaining part of this section, we identify the level with l instead of the
fixed value 1 because the methodology, in general, is applicable to any component at
a higher level as long as the component does not have any dependent subcomponents
as described above. Note that in the absence of a dependent subcomponent, the
properties of a component C lp becomes identical to that of an independent component
that is located at level 1 (property 2.b in Section 5.2.2). Consider an independent
component at level l. Let F lp be a finite set of K faults under consideration that
is associated with a component C lp at level l: F
l
p = {fk : k = 1, ..., K}. Also let
Slp = {Slp,j : j = 1, ..., J} be a finite collection of J sets of diagnostic signals. Each
Slp,j is obtained by extracting a feature from the available process states and/or
variables (measured or calculated).
Next, we propose to perform fuzzy rule-based diagnosis [121] by utilizing the
diagnostic signals defined above. In the general case, for a given fault f lk and N
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diagnostic signals sln, the objective is to synthesize fuzzy rule(s) in the following
form:
If (sl1 ∈M l1.k) and (sl2 ∈M l2,k) ... and (slN ∈M lN,k) then f lk (5.1)
where M ln,k is a (set of) value(s) of the n-th diagnostic signal (characterized by the
fuzzy membership function(s)) under the fault fk.
Therefore, for fuzzy rule-based reasoning, we assign finite number of possible
values to each of the above-mentioned diagnostic signal sp,j where each possible
value is characterized by a fuzzy membership function (MF). Consequently, each
diagnostic signal slp,j ∈ Slp can have a set of M possible values (M -valued fuzzy
quantization of a feature) represented by the set Vslp,j = {v1, v2, ..., vM}. Note that
the number of elements in Vslp,j that is associated with each s
l
j need not necessarily
be the same. Each possible value corresponds to a fuzzy set that is characterized
by a membership function, namely µm(s
l
p,j = vm) ∈ (0, 1).
Let M lp,j,k denote the fault manifestation set (in terms of the diagnostic signal
slp,j) associated with the fault f
l
k ∈ F lp. Therefore, M lp,j,k consists of the “values” in




p denote the collection of all
possible fault manifestations; i.e., the values of all diagnostic signals under all the
faults that are being considered.
Relations between faults and symptoms are expressed in the form of if-then
rule sets Rlp,K within which the rule r
l
p,k is represented as:
rlp,k ∈ Rlp,K : If (slp,1 ∈M lp,1,k) and (slp,2 ∈M lp,2,k)
... and (slp,J ∈M lp,J,k) then (f lk) (5.2)
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Premise fulfillment factor [84] is determined as follows:
µ(slp,j ∈M lp,j,k) = µ1(slp,j = v1)⊕ ...⊕ µM(slp,j = vM) | vm ∈M lp,j,k (5.3)
where the symbol⊕ represents the fuzzy sum operator, for example, s-norm operator
such as MAX or drastic sum [121]. The activation level for the rule corresponding
to the k-th fault is given by:
µ(f lk) = µ(s
l
p,1 ∈M lp,1,k)⊗ ...⊗ µ(slp,j ∈M lp,j,k)⊗ ...⊗ µ(slp,J ∈M lp,J,k) (5.4)
where the symbol ⊗ represents the fuzzy conjunction operator, for example, t-norm
operator such as MIN or PROD [19, 121]. The use of a pre-defined rule activation
threshold can be avoided by utilizing an “aggregation” operation to combine the
results of all the rule activations in the FDM. For example, if the well-known “max”
operator is used for aggregation, the fault with the maximum rule activation level
can be considered as the identified fault (the output of C lp’s FDM as defined in
Definition 5.2.3) in the component C lp as follows:
F lid,p = {f lk : µ(f lk) = max
[




Note that in addition to the rules that are associated with different faults, one
or more rules corresponding to the healthy conditions are possible to be included in
the FDM. Finally, note that for two identical components C lp and C
l
q at the same
level l, the sets of possible faults F lp and F
l
q, and the diagnostic signals S
l
p ∈ C lp
and Slq ∈ C lq will be similar. Therefore, the FDMs of the two components can be
constructed by following similar procedures which minimizes the design and devel-
opment efforts, and allows re-use of software codes with minimal changes in the
implementation stage.
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Fault Identifiability: Note that two faults f lk ∈ F lp and f lk′ ∈ F lp are always iden-
tifiable or distinguishable in a given FDM if Slp,j,k ∩ Slp,j,k′ = ∅; i.e., the faults are
diagnosed based on disjunctive sets of diagnostic signals that are sensitive to specific
faults.
However, when limited number of diagnostic signals are available from a com-
ponent (due to the hierarchical decomposition), in the most difficult case where
Slp,j,k = S
l
p,j,k′, the following condition is necessary for isolating or distinguishing
two faults in a FDM:









where vm and vm′ ∈ Vslp,j and “max” determines the maximum possible degree of
membership of a diagnostic signal to the overlapping parts of µm and µm′. Note
that  ∈ (0, 1) and as  → 0, the degree of isolability becomes higher reaching
the maximum level of isolability at  ≈ 0. It should be noted here that if slp,j is
associated with a complex premise (more than one value in Mp,j,k and/or Mp,j,k′)
in the signature of f lk and/or f
l
k′, the union of µs is to be taken into consideration
in (5.6) instead of µm and/or µm′, and the intersection is to be computed on the
union(s). Finally, for K faults in the FSM, each fault is distinguishable from all
other faults if (5.6) holds for any given pair of faults 〈f lk, f lk′〉 ∈ F lp.
5.2.4 Diagnosis of Faults in Dependent Components at Level
l
The fault diagnosis methodology and the conditions for fault isolability presented in
Section 5.2.3 lead to simplicity in the fault isolation process. These are effective for
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a specific component or subsystem with few faults and diagnostic signals. The pro-
posed hierarchical framework allows us to utilize this methodology since we decom-
pose the overall complex formation flying system into different components so that
the problem of fault diagnosis in individual components becomes simpler. Further-
more, the assumption of single or non-simultaneous faults is reasonable especially
at the lower levels in the hierarchy because it is very unlikely that a single compo-
nent (such as an actuator) would develop two different faults at exactly the same
time. When we take into consideration faults occurring at two different components
(multiple faults within a subsystem or system or formation level), the effectiveness
of the methodology in Section 5.2.3 becomes dependent on the extent of interac-
tions between the two components as well as the fault severity which may result in
manifestations (of a fault occurring at one component) in a different component.
Identical components C lp and C
l
q at the same level with higher degree of in-
teractions require special attention. A particular case of one’s interest will be the
highest level L (the “formation” level) where the component consists of individual
satellites within the leader-follower type satellite under consideration. It is impor-
tant to note that one of the main objectives of the satellite formation flight is to
maintain some pre-specified relative attitude/orientations of the satellites in space
so that mission goals can be accomplished. When the interactions of the satellites
are characterized by the well-known leader-follower (LF), or the master-slave control
architecture (refer to Section 3.2.1 for a detailed description), the leader satellite is
commanded by the ground station to maintain some specific attitude with respect
to the Earth-fixed inertial frame, and the followers are commanded by the leader
to maintain some specific attitude with respect to it’s body-fixed reference frame.
Usually, there is no control feedback from the followers to the leader. Furthermore,
the sensors that utilize advanced technologies such as optical metrology are capable
of measuring relative attitude with high precision. Consequently, faults are expected
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to have clearer manifestations in relative measurements. From the fault diagnosis
perspective, when diagnostic signals correspond to the relative measurements, the
above type of control architecture implies that a fault in a follower satellite would
manifest in a set diagnostic signals that is related to the specific follower.
Based on the above discussion, in this thesis the diagnostic signals in dependent
components are the features extracted from the relative state measurements. The
faults that occur in spacecraft are mostly related to the subsystem components. In
the subsequent discussion, we consider a general problem of fault diagnosis where
the origins of faults f lk are at some low level l but have manifestations (denoted by
MLj,k) at the highest level L. It should be clear that the primary fault diagnosis
objective at level L is to identify the formation component(s) (individual satellites)
that is/are faulty.
Let CL = {CLp : p = 1, ..., P} denote a set of P components whose depen-
dencies and interactions are characterized by the well-known leader-follower (LF),
or the master-slave control architecture; where p = 1 corresponds to the single
leader in the set. We assume that P ≥ 3, where for P = 3 follower components
can obtain relative state measurements with respect to each other. Furthermore,
let SLpq = {SLpq,j : j = 1, ..., J} be a finite collection of J sets of diagnostic signals
at level L where each SLpq,j is obtained by extracting a useful feature from relative
state measurements; i.e., sLpq,j ∈ SLpq corresponds to the j-th diagnostic signal that
is obtained from a relative measurement of CLp with respect to C
l
q. Furthermore, let
the manifestation set of a fault f lk occurring at C
l
p in terms of s
L
pq,j ∈ SLpq be denoted
by MLpq,j,k. Manifestations corresponding to a healthy condition is represented by
MLpq,j,0.
Assumption 5.2.2 (Uncertainty in the Diagnostic Signal Values).
Diagnostic signal values corresponding to the healthy and faulty relative state be-
havior are uncertain; i.e., adjacent fuzzy membership functions are overlapped.
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Assumption 5.2.2 implies that we are interested in realistic systems in which
uncertainty is dominant, and fault manifestations are not clear. Note that the
assumption has been made explicit because it is not always the case that the adjacent
fuzzy members are overlapped.
Proposition 5.2.2 (Non-unique Fault Signatures at Higher Levels).
With limited number of diagnostic signals at higher levels, multiple non-simultaneous
faults originated at different lower level components may have the same manifesta-
tion(s) at some higher level component.
Proof. Let a set of lower level components in the proposed HFDM be denoted
by C l1, ..., C
l
Pl
, where l = 1, 2, ..., l + i − 1; and a higher level component be de-
noted by C l+iq . According to the proposed hierarchical structure of HFDM, if
{C l1, ..., C lp, ..., C lPl} ∈ DEP (C l+iq ), there exist an (sequence of) arc(s) from each
C lp to the component C
l+i
q where the arcs represent dependencies in observed fault
signatures. Therefore, manifestations of faults originated at level l can be observed
in C l+iq at level l+ i. Now, if the number of diagnostic signals in C
l+i
q are fewer than
the number of components and the associated faults at level l, construction of an
FSM with rules that can uniquely identify each fault originated at level l will not
be feasible.
Proposition 5.2.3 (Faults in the Leader). If the diagnostic signals at level L
correspond only to the relative state information, the faulty component CL1 , where
CL1 is the leader component, cannot be identified at level L.
Proof. The proof is based on facts that are related to the structure of the proposed
HFDM as well as that of the leader-follower control configuration where the leader
acts as a “reference point”. In the proposed HFDM, interactions among the com-
ponents are represented by a single node at level L. In the presence of an incorrect
reference behavior, the followers simply follow the behavior and the relative states
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are maintained. Consequently, the diagnostic signal values vm remain healthy; i.e.,
vm ∈MLpq,j,0, ∀p, q.
It should be noted that although the faults that originate in the leader compo-
nent are not identifiable at level L by utilizing only the relative state information,
they can be identified either at lower levels FDMs (according to Definition 4.2.1),
or by a human supervisor (can be considered as a supervisory diagnoser at level
L + 1) at ground station by checking if the leader conforms to the pre-determined
specifications.
We propose the following fuzzy inference rule for identifying the faulty follower












∈MLp∗1,j,0) then {f lk} (5.7)
where p 6= 1 and p∗ corresponds to a single follower component that is an active
neighbor to CLp . By “active neighbor to C
L
p ” we imply a follower component with
respect to which the state measurements of CLp are available. Note that the rule
in (5.7) utilizes diagnostic signals that correspond to multiple relative state mea-
surements, and helps restricting the undesired rule activations that would lead to
persistent false and/or missed fault identification (refer to Assumption 5.2.2). Fur-
thermore, the consequent part of the rule in equation (5.7) represents a set of faults
(the output of CLp ’s FDM as defined in Definition 5.2.3) rather than a single fault
because at higher levels fault manifestations may be the same for a set of faults
originated at some lower level (according to Proposition 5.2.2). The activation level
of the rule in (5.7) is computed as that in (5.4).
The above methodology is applicable to any component whose subcomponents’
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interactions are characterized within a leader-follower (LF), or the master-slave con-
trol architecture at a given level l. We propose to utilize the methodology that is
presented in Section 5.2.3 along with the hierarchical fault diagnosis algorithm that
is presented below for fault diagnosis in the dependent subcomponents that are not
subjected to a master-slave type control configuration at a given level l.
Fault Identifiability: By fault identifiability or distinguishability at level L we refer
to the conditions under which faults in multiple satellites can be identified. It is
implicit in (5.7) that (a) the leader CL1 is fault free, and (b) the follower C
L
p∗ is fault
free. However, the assumption (a) can be relaxed for the rule in (5.7) if the following









/∈MLp1,j,k ∀p, p 6= 1 (5.8)
The above condition ensures that leader’s faults are not manifested sufficiently in
the followers. Furthermore, assumption (b) above can be relaxed for the rule in





q (another follower), in other words,
CLp /∈ q∗, CLq /∈ p∗ and {CLp , CLq } /∈ n∗ (5.9)
where p∗, q∗ and n∗ represent the active neighbors of CLp , C
L
q , and a given healthy
satellite, respectively.
5.2.5 Rule-Based Hierarchical Fault Diagnosis
In general, for all the components (both the dependent and the independent sub-
components) in the hierarchy, we propose to execute the following algorithm that
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is designated as the HierarchicalFD in the FDM (per the Definition 5.2.3). Note
that in the algorithm input, HFDM consists of information about the fault signature
models as well as the dependency information of all the components.
Algorithm: HierarchicalFD(HFDM,Detection alarm at C lp)
Initialization: F lid,p(C
l
p) = ∅ for all p and l
ComponentFD(HFDM, p, l)
{
1. Identify the fault f lk by following the procedure in Section 5.2.3 or Section
5.2.4 (if C lp is a follower component).
2. If f lk ∈ D(C lp), add f lk to F lid,p(C lp) and STOP.
Else (f lk ∈ U(C lp))





b. For all Ll−1,lq,p (k
′, k) = 1 and Ll,l+1p,q (k, k
′) = 1,
execute ComponentFD(HFDM, q, l − 1) and
ComponentFD(HFDM, q, l + 1) in order to identify faults f l−1k′ and
f l+1k′ , respectively.
End
}
Output: (1) Updated F lid,p(C
l
p)s of the FDMs that execute the algorithm, and (2)
Fault propagation path(s) C l−ip → C lp → C l+1p (refer to Section 4.4) that is/are con-
structed by taking into account all the components with F lid,p(C
l
p) 6= ∅.
Note that the algorithm finds the origin of a fault by observing the fault signa-
tures in the top-down direction when it executes ComponentFD (HFDM, q, l−1)
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and stops when it observes a fault signature in an independent sub-component.
On the other hand, when it executes ComponentFD (HFDM, q, l + 1) in the
bottom-up direction, it finds the manifestation of the fault in higher levels in order
to determine the impact of the fault at higher levels.
Lemma 5.2.1 (Hierarchical Diagnosis).
When the proposed HFDM is known, the HierarchicalFD algorithm identifies the
origin of the non-simultaneous faults whose signature models are available.
Proof. Let C lp be a component at level l; where L > l > 1, in which a fault detection
alarm is observed. According to the proposed HFDM, the origin of fault (fk) is at
level lo; where l ≥ lo (by Definition 4.2.1). Now, if the origin of the fault is at level
l, then f lk ∈ D(C lp) (originated at an independent subcomponent) and the algorithm
stops after identifying f lk ∈ F lid,p(C lp). Otherwise, ComponentFD(HFDM, q, l−1)
executes based on the fault signatures that are observed at C lp and the dependency
information Ll−1,lq,p . The process continues until a fault signature is observed at level
lo in an independent subcomponent.
It is important to note that an exceptional scenario is possible where a fault
is observed at higher level(s) but not observed at lower level(s) if the FDMs of the
lower level(s) components are not “complete” in terms of observable faults (assuming
dependency information is correct), which is contradictory to the basic definitions
and assumptions (refer to Definition 5.2.2, and the discussion on HFDM in Sections
5.2.1 and 5.2.2) of the proposed HFDM.
5.2.6 Specification of the Fuzzy Membership Functions
The fault diagnosis methodology presented in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 can be ex-
tended for faults with a range of severity if it is possible to construct manifestation
sets (M lp,j,ks or M
l




to a specific severity. This “target severity range” is decided based on a worst-case
analysis as well as by determining a minimum fault severity that is desired to be
isolated and/or have impact on the system performance.
We propose to perform fault diagnosis over some qualitative time-window; for
example by utilizing 1 orbit data and by invoking the proposed rule-based diagnosis
multiple times within this interval. The fault diagnosis methodology presented in
Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 requires that each diagnostic signal (slp,j or s
l
pq,j) be repre-
sented by an M -valued quantization using the fuzzy sets where each value vm (as
discussed in Section 5.2.3) is characterized by a membership function (MF) denoted
by µm. To avoid complete dependency on a human expert’s subjective judgement,
for each diagnostic signal we propose to generate a set of M Gaussian membership
functions whose total number M and the parameters (mean and standard deviations
of each MF) are specified as follows:
1. Decide the “universe of disclosure” over which µms are to be specified: the
target severity range (as discussed above) is determined for all the faults under
consideration and the range of slp,j (or s
l
pq,j) is identified.
2. Specify µm, where m = 1 + ((M − 1)/2) is specified by obtaining its mean
(meannom) and standard deviations (σnom) by utilizing healthy data. Select M
to be a sufficiently large odd number so that the MFs (determined in Step-3)
are spanned over the entire universe of disclosure (as determined in Step-1)
equally toward both increasing and decreasing directions from meannom.
3. Construct µms for m = 1, 2, ...,M (m 6= 1 + ((M − 1)/2)) by specifying (M −
1)/2 Gaussian membership functions that are spanned over the universe of
disclosure (identified in Step-1) toward the increasing direction from meannom
that are δmean = ασnom apart; where α is a design parameter and σm = σnom.
For m = 1 and m = M , µm(x) = 1 for x ≤ mean1 and x ≥ meanM ,
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respectively. Specify the remaining (M−1)/2 Gaussian membership functions
toward the decreasing direction from meannom.
Figure 5.3: A set of Gaussian membership functions representing 13-valued quanti-
zation of the diagnostic signal s11 (“mean of motor current”).
Figure 5.3 shows a set of fuzzy membership functions corresponding to the diagnostic
signal “mean of motor current”, denoted by s11, with M = 13, meannom = 0.0840,
σnom = 0.0044 and δmean = 0.0132 (α = 3).
5.3 Demonstration of the Proposed Approach and
Fault Diagnosis Results
A 4-level hierarchical decomposition of the leader-follower formation flight of 5 satel-
lites, as described in Chapter 3, results in the HFDM that is shown in Figure 5.4
where “Sat-1” ... “Sat-5” represent the five satellites in the formation, and “RW-
X”, “RW-Y”, and “RW-Z” represent the reaction wheels (RW) in the X, Y , and Z
directions, respectively. At level 1 (identified as the “subsystem component level”),
each of the 15 RWs is denoted by C1p ; where p = 1, ..., 15. At level 2 (identified
as the “subsystem level”), each of the 5 attitude control subsystems (ACS) node is
denoted by C2p ; where p = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9. Furthermore, each of the 5 electrical power
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Figure 5.4: The HFDM that resulted from a 4-level hierarchical decomposition of
the formation flight of satellites as described in Chapter 3 (shown in Figure 3.1).
subsystem (EPS) node is denoted by C2p ; where p = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 at level 2. At level
3 (identified as the “system level”), each of the 5 satellites is denoted by C3p ; where
p = 1, 2, ..., 5, and at level 4, the entire formation flying system is represented with
a single node C41 .
In the subsequent paragraphs, we demonstrate the proposed fuzzy rule-based
fault diagnosis (refer to Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4) for the following components of Fig-
ure 5.4, namely the 15 RWs (C11 , ..., C
1











at level 2, and the formation component (C41) at level 4. Note that the RWs and
EPSs are assumed to be the independent components since pa(C1p) = ∅, ∀p and
pa(C2p) = ∅, for p = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. On the other hand, the formation component
C41 is a dependent component. First, we discuss the level 1 faults and the level 2
faults that are injected in the independent components — the RWs and the EPSs
— located at level 1 and level 2, respectively
Faults corresponding to each RW are denoted by F 1p = f
1
k,p; where p = 1, ..., 15
and k = 1, 2. For k = 1, f 11,p represents a friction fault in the p-th RW, and for k = 2,
f 12,p represents a motor current fault in the p-th RW (fault modes are described in
Section 3.5). Faults corresponding to each EPS are denoted by F 2p = f
1
k,p; where
p = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10; k = 1, 2, For k = 1, f 21,p represents a voltage regulation fault in the
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p-th EPS, and for k = 2, f 22,p represents a battery fault in the p-th EPS (fault modes
are described in Section 3.5). Note that the two EPS faults are level 2 faults.
Note that we have not considered any level 2 fault in the ACS. Consequently,





q with p = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and q identifying a RW within a particular ACS.
As an example, according to the HFDM schematic in Figure 5.4, for p = 1, the
corresponding qs are {1, 2, 3}; for p = 5, the corresponding qs are {7, 8, 9}, and so
on. Alternatively, the 6 faults (friction and motor current faults in 3 RWs) of level
1 can be identified as “RW-X fault”, “RW-Y fault” and “RW-Z fault” in the ACS
at level 2, if necessary. Furthermore, at this stage, we have not considered any level
l (l ≥ 3) fault. Consequently, the fault sets corresponding to the higher level (l ≥ 3)
components do not consist of any new fault.
Diagnosis of Faults in Independent Components at Level 1: For subsystem compo-
nent level fault diagnosis in each of the 15 RWs, diagnostic signals are obtained
by extracting features from the following RW measurements: (a) motor current,
(b) torque command voltage, and (c) wheel speed. Based on the earlier experience
with an actual attitude control subsystem telemetry data [43], we have extracted
ten features that include (over an invocation window of 512 seconds; approximately
11 invokes per orbit) mean, standard deviation, minimum value, peak value, energy,
and the first 5 components of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) energy spectrum.
Out of all the features it is found that it is possible to obtain manifestations of the
current fault as well as the friction fault within the target severity range (as indi-
cated in Section 5.2.6) with the following three diagnostic signals: (1) s1p,1: mean
of motor current, (2) s1p,2: mean of torque command voltage, and (3) s
1
p,3: the first
component of the FFT of the wheel speed. The set of diagnostic signals that are
selected for rule-based reasoning is S1p = {s1p,1, s1p,2, s1p,3}; where p identifies a specific
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RW.
By following the procedure that is described in Section 5.2.3, we have assigned
a finite number of possible values to each diagnostic signal in S1p by performing
an M -valued fuzzy quantization where M = 13 for s1p,1 and s
1
p,2, and M = 11






p,3 are: Vs1p,1 =
{v1, ..., v13}, Vs1p,2 = {v1, ..., v13}, and Vs1p,3 = {v1, ..., v11}, respectively. Note that
these possible values, as well as the value of M for each s1p,j, are characterized
by Gaussian membership functions which are specified by following the procedure
outlined in Section 5.2.6. For the possible values µs of the three diagnostic signals
we have selected σm = 0044, 0.0232, 23.75, respectively; and δmean = 0.0132, 0.0696,
71.26, respectively (with α = 3 chosen for all the three signals).
Finally, the fuzzy rules r1p,k (as in equation (5.2)) for the RWs corresponding
to the healthy RW condition as well as to the two faults under consideration are
determined. Note that in r1p,k, p = 1, ..., 15 and k = 0, 1, 2 where p identifies a specific
RW, and k = 0, 1 and 2 represent the “healthy condition”, the friction fault, and the
motor current fault, respectively. Fault manifestation sets M1p,j,k (with j = 1, 2, 3
representing the diagnostic signals s1p,j) corresponding to the healthy as well as under
the two faults are determined as follows:
M1p,1,0 = {v6, v7, v8}, vm ∈ Vs1p,1
M1p,1,1 = {v8, v9, v10}, vm ∈ Vs1p,1
M1p,1,2 = {v11, v12, v13}, vm ∈ Vs1p,1
M1p,2,0 = {v6, v7, v8}, vm ∈ Vs1p,2
M1p,2,1 = {v8, v9, v10}, vm ∈ Vs1p,2
M1p,2,2 = {v11, v12, v13}, vm ∈ Vs1p,2
M1p,3,0 = {v4, v5, v6}, vm ∈ Vs1p,3
M1p,3,1 = {v7, v8, v9}, vm ∈ Vs1p,3
M1p,3,2 = {v10, v11}, vm ∈ Vs1p,3
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The rule activations in each invoke are computed by using equation (5.4) and
the well-known max operator is used to “aggregate” the rule activation results in
order to generate a final diagnostic decision. Some sample rule activation results
are provided at the end of this section.
Diagnosis of Faults in Independent Components at Level 2: The demonstration is
similar to that of the RWs developed above expect for the diagnostic signals and
the faults under consideration. Consequently, we briefly describe the procedure
for the 5 EPSs at level 2. We have obtained the diagnostic signals by extracting
features from the following EPS measurements, namely (a) the bus voltage, and (b)
the regulator output current. We have extracted four features that include (over
the above-mentioned invocation window of 512 seconds) mean, standard deviation,
minimum value, and one selected component of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
energy spectrum. The set of diagnostic signals that was selected for the rule-based
reasoning in EPSs is S2p = {s2p,1, s2p,2, s2p,3, s2p,4, s2p,5, s2p,6}; where s2p,1, s2p,2, and s2p,3
are the mean, standard deviation, and the selected component of FFT of the bus




p,6 are the corresponding features of
the regulator output current.
By following the procedure that is described in Section 5.2.3, we performed
an M -valued fuzzy quantization of the diagnostic signals in S2p (p = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10).
As in the RWs case, the procedure that is outlined in Section 5.2.6 was followed to
determine M and the possible values of each s2p,j; i.e., Vs2p,j = {v1, ..., vM} with j =
1, 2, ..., 6. The values of M are determined as follows: M = 17 for {s2p,1, s2p,2, s2p,4, s2p,5}
and M = 19 for {s2p,3, s2p,6}. Fault manifestation sets M2p,j,k are identified (not shown
here) and the fuzzy rules r2p,k (as in equation (5.2)) for the EPSs corresponding to
the healthy EPS condition as well as to the two faults under consideration are de-
termined. We have, p = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and k = 0, 1, 2 where p identifies a specific EPS,
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and k = 0, 1 and 2 represent the “healthy condition”, the voltage regulation fault
and the battery fault, respectively. As in the case of the RWs, the rule activations
in each invoke are computed for EPSs by using equation (5.4) and the well-known
max operator is used to “aggregate” the rule activations results in order to generate
a final diagnostic decision. Some sample rule activation results are provided at the
end of this section.
Diagnosis of Faults in the Dependent Component at Level 4: For component fault
diagnosis of the formation (C41), mean of the relative attitude measurements over an
invocation window is utilized as the diagnostic signal and the rule in equation (5.7)
is implemented for each follower satellite based on the formation configuration that
is shown in Figure 3.1. Since the main objective of the formation level diagnosis is
to identify the satellite(s) that is/are faulty, and since we have not considered any
level 4 fault (as indicated above), we represent all the faults that are originated at
lower levels with the finite set F 41 ={f2, ..., f5}, where f2,...,f5 stand for “satellite-2
fault”,...,“satellite-5 fault”, respectively (as explained in Section 5.2.4, the leader
satellite is assumed to be fault free). The diagnostic signals are the relative attitude
measurements. For example, the diagnostic signals s4pq,j that are used in the rule for
“satellite-2 fault” are:
1. s421,1: mean of the relative roll angle of Sat-2 with respect to Sat-1 (leader)
2. s421,2: mean of the relative pitch angle of Sat-2 with respect to Sat-1
3. s421,3: mean of the relative yaw angle of Sat-2 with respect to Sat-1
4. s423,4: mean of the relative roll angle of Sat-2 with respect to Sat-3 (active
neighbor)
5. s423,5: mean of the relative pitch angle of Sat-2 with respect to Sat-3
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6. s423,6: mean of the relative yaw angle of Sat-2 with respect to Sat-3
7. s431,7: mean of the relative roll angle of Sat-3 with respect to Sat-1
8. s431,8: mean of the relative pitch angle of Sat-3 with respect to Sat-1
9. s431,9: mean of the relative yaw angle of Sat-3 with respect to Sat-1
For each diagnostic signal, an M = 13-valued fuzzy quantization is performed and




p∗1,j,0 of the rules in equation
(5.7) are determined. As an example, for “satellite-2 fault”, the fault manifes-




31,j,0 correspond to the sets of diagnostic signals
{s421,1, s421,2, s421,3}, {s423,4, s423,5, s423,6}, and {s431,7, s431,8, s431,9}, respectively. Again, for
simplicity, fuzzy MIN and MAX [121] operators are used as t-norm operator (⊗)
and s-norm operator (⊕), respectively.
Sample Rule Activation Results: To demonstrate the proposed approach, we present
below a case where we have injected the two faults in the subsystem component level
simultaneously between t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s, namely (1) friction fault in the
Z-axis reaction wheel of Sat-3, and (2) motor current fault in the Z-axis reaction
wheel of Sat-5; within their “target severity range”. Note that although the faults
are simultaneous, they are injected at two different satellites. Therefore, this case is
consistent with the assumption of a single fault in subsystem components that was
made in Section 5.2.3.
First, we present some sample rule activation results of level 1 components.
Figure 5.5 shows the rule activations corresponding to the Sat-3 Z-axis reaction
wheel under friction fault (injected between t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s) where µ(f 11 )
and µ(f 12 ) represent rule activation levels for the friction fault (f
1
1 ) and the motor
current fault (f 12 ), respectively, and µ(H) represents the rule activation correspond-
ing to the healthy RW condition. It is important to note that, as indicated above,
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we extract features from data and perform fault diagnosis by using 512-second non-
overlapping time window (approximately 11 invocations per orbit). Consequently,
the width of each bar-graph in Figure 5.5 is 512 seconds. Similar rule activations
Figure 5.5: Rule activations in the Z-axis RW of Sat-3 under friction fault (the
width of each bar-graph is 512 seconds).
are observed for the simultaneously injected motor current fault (injected between
t = 7500 s and t = 9810 s) in the Sat-5 Z-axis reaction wheel as shown in Figure
5.6 with misidentification of faults (the friction fault is misidentified as the cur-
rent fault) during the fault transients (the overall performance of fault diagnosis is
quantified in the “performance evaluation” subsection provided in the subsequent
discussions below). The rules associated with the remaining 13 reaction wheels did
not (with a few exceptions which are discussed under “performance evaluation” in
the subsequent discussion) fire to sufficient degrees that would lead to a “faulty”
status after the “aggregation” (used for determining which rule has the maximum
activation) of the rule firing results.
Next, we present some sample formation level rule activation results; i.e.,
rule activations at a dependent component. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the formation
level rule activations under the above-mentioned simultaneous faults (injected at the
subsystem component level) in Sat-3 and Sat-5 where µ(F ) and µ(H) represent the
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Figure 5.6: Rule activations in the Z-axis RW of Sat-5 under motor current fault
(the width of each bar-graph is 512 seconds).
Figure 5.7: Rule activations that identify a “Sat-3 fault” (the width of each bar-
graph is 512 seconds).
rule activations corresponding to a faulty and a healthy condition for a given satellite
(formation component). The rule activations in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 demonstrate
high level manifestations of low level faults and emphasize the usefulness of the
“level l fault” concept.
Finally, we present some sample rule activation results for the independent
components at level 2. Figure 5.9 shows the rule activations corresponding to the
Sat-5 EPS under the battery fault (injected between t = 6500 s and t = 6860 s)
where µ(f 21 ) and µ(f
2
2 ) represent the rule activation levels for the voltage regulator
fault (f 21 ) and the battery fault (f
2
2 ), respectively, and µ(H) represents the rule
activation corresponding to a healthy EPS condition.
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Figure 5.8: Rule activations that identify a “Sat-5 fault” (the width of each bar-
graph is 512 seconds).
Figure 5.9: Rule activations in the EPS of Sat-5 under battery fault.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed fault diagnosis scheme
by utilizing confusion matrices. The terms “confusion matrix” and “detection ma-
trix”/“decision matrix” are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature. In
this thesis we distinguish between the two matrices. As defined in [56] and [57], a
detection matrix is square matrix of dimension 2 that is related to binary decision
making or fault detection. Such matrices directly show the “false positives” (false
alarms), “false negatives” (missed detection), etc. On the other hand a confusion
matrix is a typically square matrix of dimension n that is utilized to evaluate fault
identification or classification, where n is the number of health states. The healthy
or “no-fault” cases can also be included in the confusion matrix. In the subsequent
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Table 5.1: Confusion Matrix for the Subsystem Component Level
Identified → Healthy Friction Current Ambiguity
Actual ↓ Fault Fault
Healthy 169 3 0 0
Friction Fault 11 29 0 0
Current Fault 2 13 25 0
paragraphs we have added another extra column with the confusion matrices to ac-
commodate ambiguous cases. For comparing two fault identification algorithms on
a given data set, “kappa coefficients” [56,57] are computed from confusion matrices
which is a measure of an algorithm’s ability to correctly classify a fault and takes
into account the expected number of correct classifications occurring by chance. In
this thesis our focus is on fault diagnosis or identification, and we are not going to
compare the performances of two different algorithms on a given data set. Con-
sequently, in this section we use overall accuracy [144] that is computed from a
confusion matrix as a measure of performance.
It is important to note that in the subsequent paragraphs we construct 2× 2
dimensional “one-versus-all” decision matrices in order to compute overall accuracy
in fault identification. However, it should be clear that the information that these
“one-versus-all” decision matrices provide are very different from what is available
from a typical detection matrix or decision matrix that are used to evaluate fault
detection performance. This is because the decision matrices that we construct in
this thesis are “one-versus-all” as opposed to “healthy-versus-faulty”.
To quantify the performance of the proposed scheme confusion matrices are
constructed corresponding to the rule activation results in the highest (formation
level) and the lowest (subsystem component level) with unseen data. The data also
included some cases where the fault severities were lower than the “target severity
range” (as specified in Section 5.2.6).
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 represent the confusion matrices corresponding to the
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Table 5.2: Confusion Matrix for the Subsystem Level
Identified → Healthy Regulator Battery Ambiguity
Actual ↓ Fault Fault
Healthy 224 0 0 0
Regulator Fault 0 32 0 0
Battery Fault 0 0 24 0
Table 5.3: Confusion Matrix for the Formation (Followers) Level
Identified → Sat-2 Sat-3 Sat-4 Sat-5 Healthy Ambiguity
Actual ↓ Fault Fault Fault Fault
Sat-2 Fault 11 0 0 0 0 1
Sat-3 Fault 0 39 0 0 11 3
Sat-4 Fault 0 0 11 0 0 1
Sat-5 Fault 0 0 0 17 0 1
Healthy 0 2 0 2 281 0
subsystem component, subsystem, and the formation levels, respectively where the
numbers correspond to the “number of invocation” over the above-mentioned 512
seconds time window. An “ambiguity” corresponds to a situation where two different
rules (one corresponding to a healthy status and the other corresponding to a faulty
status) have equal activation levels. In the subsystem component level, aggregated
rule firing results are utilized to construct Table 5.1. In the formation level, the
aggregation is performed within the individual satellite’s rule firing results. Table 5.4
shows the accuracy of the proposed scheme in the three levels under consideration.
The accuracies have been computed by following the procedure that is available
in [144]; i.e. first by decomposing the confusion matrices in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
Table 5.4: Overall Fault Identification Accuracy
Formation Level 98.31%
Subsystem Level 100%
(Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS))
Subsystem Component Level 92.33%
(Reaction Wheels (RW))
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into n numbers (n = 3 for Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and n = 5 for Table 5.3) of “one-
versus-all” decision matrices and then summing the matrices to obtain a confusion
matrix that represents the overall classification accuracy which is described next.
Let Ccon denote an (N + 1) × (N + 1) confusion matrix that is associated
with N + 1 health states (the healthy state and the N number of faulty states) of a
component at level l in which the actual and the identified health states are along
the rows and the columns, respectively. To compute the accuracy in identifying the
n-th state, a 2×2 dimensional “one-versus-all” decision matrix Cn is constructed as
follows. Let ci,j denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of Ccon, and
c′i,j denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of Cn. The elements of the











1,1 =(sum(Ccon) − c′2,2−c′2,1−c′1,1). The accuracy of identifying the n-th
state at level l is now defined as an = trace(Cn)/sum(Cn). On the other hand, the
overall accuracy is computes as follows. First the sum of the n number of “one-
versus-all” decision matrices is computed as Cov =
∑n
i=1 Cn. Then the overall fault
identification accuracy at level l is defined as aov = trace(Cov)/sum(Cov).
It is observed in Tables 5.2 and 5.4 that fault identification accuracy at level
2 is 100% which may appear to be unrealistic. This high accuracy is due to the fact
that the controller or simplified power distribution and control unit (PDCU) of the
EPS is found to be very sensitive to the faults that are considered in this thesis.
Consequently, fault manifestations were much clearer as compared to those in the
subsystem component level or the formation level.
Comparing the formation level and the subsystem component level, the fault
identification accuracy in the formation level is found to be higher (98.31%) than
that of the subsystem component level (92.33%). The reason behind the higher fault
identification accuracy in the formation level is that in cases of low severity faults,
the formation level diagnosis is found to perform better than that of the subsystem
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component level. This is due to the fact that faults are found to have clearer
manifestations in relative measurements (as mentioned in Section 5.2.4) that are
used to generate diagnostic signals in the formation level. For example, Figure 5.10
shows the rule activations in the Z-axis RW of Sat-3 under low severity (outside the
target severity range as specified in Section 5.2.6) motor current fault that is injected
between t = 5800 s and t = 8110 s. It is observed that the rules corresponding to
both the friction fault and the motor current fault are activated in the subsystem
component level. Therefore, the exact source of the fault cannot be identified. To
investigate if these are false alarms, one can refer to Figure 5.11 which shows the
formation level rule activations in the Sat-3 during the above-mentioned low severity
motor current fault in the Z-axis RW of Sat-3. The rule activation is consistent and
clear which confirms the presence of a fault in Sat-3 even though the source of the
fault is not identified in the subsystem component level.
Figure 5.10: Rule activations in the Z-axis RW of Sat-3 under low severity motor
current fault (the width of each bar-graph is 512 seconds).
Note that around t = 6050 s, the healthy rule activation µ(H) in Figure 5.11
is much lower than the “Sat-3 fault” rule activation µ(F ).
Since the formation level diagnosis provides clearer identification of faults,
it can certainly be utilized as a supervisory diagnosis system for the formation
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Figure 5.11: Formation level rule activations in the Sat-3 under low severity motor
current fault injected at the Z-axis RW (the width of each bar-graph is 512 seconds).
flight which would prompt the operators to have closer look at the potential faulty
components to determine and investigate the source of a fault. This approach is
particularly useful when it is not possible to monitor a large number of low level
components continuously.
The purpose of the above performance evaluation has been to determine if the
proposed fuzzy rule based reasoning, combined with proposed directed graph-based
hierarchical decomposition of the system can achieve acceptable accuracy (close to
95%, as specified in Section 1.4). The results show that it is possible to achieve the
desired accuracy by using the proposed HFDM scheme. It is expected that other well
known fault diagnosis schemes may achieve similar accuracy in fault identification.
However, it is very likely that the other schemes would not address the fault diagnosis
problem (as stated in Section 1.4) that is investigated in this thesis. The performance
of the traditional ground-based satellite fault diagnosis that is performed via data
plotting, trend analysis and limit checking depends heavily on the operator’s level of
expertise, and there is no standard or universal procedure to perform such analysis.
Consequently, a performance comparison of proposed approach with respect to such
traditional approaches is not performed in the thesis.
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5.5 Advantages and Limitations
A discussion on the advantages and limitations of the proposed methodology is
provided below.
Advantages: The proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis model (HFDM) allows one
to decompose a complex system systematically in order to perform coherent fault
diagnosis. The proposed hierarchical diagnosis algorithm facilitates the identifica-
tion of the origin of a fault. Fault signatures are represented in the form of fuzzy
rules that are transparent and understandable by expert humans. Furthermore, the
proposed approach allows integration of fault diagnosis that are performed in var-
ious components within a system. The fault dependencies among the components
are specified with absolute certainty by using ones and zeros to indicate connectiv-
ity/dependency. This simplistic representation of dependencies with link matrices
Ll2,l1q,p helps us to avoid complicated and time demanding model construction. The
model allows the incorporation of domain experts’ qualitative and imprecise knowl-
edge in the structure of the model as well as in the fuzzy rules that are specified at
given node/component, if necessary.
Limitations: The main limitation of the proposed hierarchical fault diagnosis
model (HFDM) is that it is possible to specify the dependencies only with abso-
lute certainty by using ones and zeros to indicate connectivity/dependency. Such
representation of dependencies may be too simplistic in nature to capture the inter-
action among various components in the system. Another disadvantage is that once
a fault is identified at a component, it is necessary to investigate (as in the proposed
HierarchicalFD algorithm) rule activations in all the components that are connected
to the faulty component (as specified by the associated link matrix) — there is no
way to prioritize which components are more probable to be faulty except in cases
where a human expert’s expertise are available.
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5.6 Summary
A hierarchical fault diagnosis methodology that is based on fuzzy rule-based rea-
soning for satellite formation flight is developed within a novel hierarchical fault
diagnosis framework. Fuzzy reasoning-based fault diagnosis is investigated at dif-
ferent levels in the hierarchy for a leader-follower type formation flight of satellites.
Intermittent, non-abrupt faults in the attitude control subsystem (ACS) compo-
nents as well as in the electrical power subsystem (EPS) components with different
severity levels have been considered. Fuzzy rules are proposed for identifying faulty
components in the satellites formation flight and conditions for fault distinguisha-
bility are provided.
The proposed fault diagnosis methodology is demonstrated by utilizing syn-
thetic formation flight data of 5 satellites. The data has been generated via nu-
merical simulations of a satellite formation flight that consists of two subsystems —
attitude control subsystem and electrical power subsystem — for each satellite in
the formation. Performance evaluation results that correspond to different levels of
the hierarchy are also presented. For a given component, performance evaluation
was performed by generating a confusion matrix which is a well known and standard
procedure for such evaluation. The formation level fault diagnosis is found to be
more accurate than the subsystem component level. Consequently, formation level
fault diagnosis can be utilized as a supervisory diagnosis system for the formation
flight which would prompt the operators to have closer look at the potential faulty
components to determine the source of a fault, which is particularly useful when
it is not possible to employ continuous monitoring of a large number of low level
components. It should be noted there that the performances have not been evalu-
ated in terms of the identification of the fault propagation paths (refer to Section
4.4) because the component dependencies were specified with the link matrix Ll2,l1q,p
(refer to Section 5.2.1) which is simplistic in nature. Such performance evaluation
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is left for the next chapter where the dependencies are quantified in terms of con-






In this chapter Bayesian network-based fault diagnosis is investigated at different
levels of the proposed hierarchical decomposition that was presented in Chapter 4.
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis was investigated at different lev-
els of the proposed hierarchical decomposition that was presented in Chapter 4.
A hierarchical fault diagnosis model (HFDM) was developed. In this chapter a
Bayesian network-based fault diagnosis model namely, a component dependency
model (CDM) is investigated. It is important to recall from the discussions in
Chapter 1 that in the case of satellites that operate in near-Earth orbits, it has been
possible to manage and operate these systems through additional design margins
and extensive ground-based monitoring and control efforts. Fault diagnosis and
health monitoring in the Earth orbiting single spacecraft missions are mostly ac-
complished by human operators at ground through around-the-clock limit-checking
and trend analysis on large amount of telemetry data by utilizing software tools. As
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explained in chapter 1, this approach does not scale well for multiple space platform
missions, and at the same time, it is often desired that expert human operators be
involved in the spacecraft operations and diagnosis processes. Therefore, it is desired
that the diagnosis model would provide decision support to human experts, and it
is reasonable to investigate a Bayesian network (BN)-based (whose capability for
human-like reasoning under uncertainties are well-known) fault diagnosis model to
relate the faults that are occurring at various subcomponents. This is the rationale
behind developing a Bayesian network (BN) type model in the thesis. The proposed
Bayesian network-based diagnosis model is generic in the sense that it does not
impose any restrictions on the type of diagnosis algorithms that one may employ
at a given node of the model as long as its performance evaluation matrix (this is
discussed in Section 6.2.3 in detail) is available. In other words, in this chapter
we are basically generalizing the HFDM by replacing the link matrices Ll2,l1q,p (k
′, k),
which were utilized to represent dependency, by some conditional probability tables
(CPT) that are commonly used in Bayesian models.
The organization of the remaining parts of this chapter is as follows: In Section
6.2, we start developing a generic BN-based CDM by discussing the scope of the
research of this chapter. Next, we discuss the purpose of our model, explain how the
health states are defined at different nodes, develop procedure for specifying model
parameters, and discuss how evidences are generated at different nodes. In Section
6.3, the proposed scheme is demonstrated by using synthetic data from the formation
flight system model that was presented in Chapter 3. The performance evaluation
results are presented in Section 6.4, and advantages as well as the limitations of the
scheme are discussed in Section 6.5. Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section
6.6.
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6.2 Development of a Component Dependency
Model (CDM)
It is well-known that elicitation of conditional probabilities for a given Bayesian
network-based model is the most difficult aspect of the model development. An
overview of the methods that are commonly employed for probability elicitation ex-
haustively from domain experts is available in [145]. The main drawback of these
methods is their biased assessments by experts although various methods for in-
terviewing experts have been developed in literature to reduce such biases. These
include probability-scale method [146], gamble-like method [147], and the probabil-
ity wheel method [148]. Other methods are available in [52] and [53].
The methodology that is presented in this chapter for quantifying the CDM
parameters is the result of and is being motivated by the inapplicability of the
existing methods (for example, the ones in [52,53]) to the system under consideration
in this thesis. Although noisy-OR [55] is a well established method, it applies only to
boolean nodes. The method available in [52] utilizes domain-dependent constraints
that are not relevant to our problem. The method that is available in [53] is also not
applicable because it was developed for ranked nodes whose states are expressed on
an ordinal scale which is mapped to a continuous, monotonically ordered, bounded
numerical scale. Note that several belief or evidence propagation methods in BN are
available in the literature [54,55], and the methods require that the BN parameters
of the nodes be specified numerically. Our focus in this chapter is on the BN-based
fault diagnosis model development (structure and parameters) as opposed to the
development of a belief propagation method.
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6.2.1 Objective of the Proposed Bayesian Network Model
First, it is important to describe the main objective of the proposed hierarchical fault
diagnosis and health monitoring approach in detail. We intend to utilize this scheme
as follows: when the faulty or healthy state of a node is observed by executing a
diagnosis algorithm, the evidence (refer to Section 6.2.4 for the specific approach
adopted in this thesis) is introduced to our proposed CDM by instantiating that
node. The evidence is then propagated in the CDM by utilizing a standard propa-
gation algorithm (such as the junction tree algorithm [54,55], recursive conditioning
algorithm [55], etc.). In the nodes that have updated health states corresponding
to the faulty states with high probabilities, diagnosis algorithms are executed to
confirm the hypotheses. When a fault evidence is determined at some intermediate
level in the hierarchy, the evidence is propagated downwards to identify the com-
ponent in which the fault has originated from. On the other hand, the evidence is
propagated upwards to identify components that are probably affected by the fault,
and to determine if higher level specifications are still possible to be accomplished
since the diagnosis algorithms at higher levels are usually based on certain rules that
check the system (or, system of system) level specifications.
It is possible to encounter situations where there is no identification of a faulty
state at a higher level, whereas a low level fault is actually identified at a lower level.
However, in such cases, it is worthwhile to propagate the evidence upwards in the
hierarchy to identify the high level components that are possibly impacted by the
identified fault. On the other hand, when the diagnosis at a higher level is accurate,
it is worthwhile to propagate the evidence downwards in the hierarchy to identify
the components where one should expect to observe fault manifestations eventhough
fault identification cannot be performed at the current instant.
It should be noted that there are certain cost that is associated with perform-
ing fault diagnosis at each node in terms of data processing, algorithm development,
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validation and performance evaluation. Furthermore, in case of having a large num-
ber of components, it is natural from the users’ resource considerations that the
number of nodes that are to be actively/round the clock monitored is as few as
possible. Consequently, it is possible that diagnosis algorithms are not employed
at some of the intermediate nodes but it is desired that the nodes be included in
the diagnosis model to determine which subsystem or system a faulty node at lower
levels belongs to. Such representation allows a systematic fault cause identification.
In subsequent sections, we will investigate a general case of an L level hier-
archical decomposition. Before proceeding to the next section it is important to
note that the definition of “level l fault” (Definition 4.2.1) plays a significant role in
determining the structure of our proposed CDM. Distinguishing faults at different
levels based on the above definition allows one to avoid cycles in the CDM.
6.2.2 Proposed Bayesian Network Model Structure and Node
States
In this chapter, we represent our proposed hierarchical decomposition with a novel
Bayesian network-based Component Dependency Model (CDM) [149] as shown in
Figure 6.1. The following notations are consistent with those in Chapters 4 and 5,
namely the entire system under consideration is described by a single node at the
highest level and which consists of sub-components that are located at lower levels.
We denote the p-th component at level l in the hierarchy as C lp. For example, if
we consider a 4-level decomposition of a fleet of systems as shown in Figure 4.1, for
l = 1, C1p would correspond to the p-th sensor or actuator (subsystem component)
whereas for l = 4, C41 would correspond to the “fleet”. For the intermediate levels,
i.e., l = 2 and l = 3, a component C lp would correspond to the p-th subsystem and
system, respectively. Let L denote the total number of levels in the hierarchy, and
for any C lp, the set of components that are parents of C
l
p (as represented in Figure
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6.1) is denoted by pa(C lp).
Figure 6.1: Bayesian network representation of an L level hierarchical decomposi-
tion.
Node Health States: The possible states of a given node in our proposed CDM
represent the health states of the corresponding component. It should be clear,
according to the Definition 4.2.1 that the origin of a fault (level l fault) is at one of
the nodes C lp (refer to Figure 6.1) for which pa(C
l
p) = ∅. If pa(C lp) 6= ∅, the states
of the parent nodes have impact on the states of C lp, and the fault may manifest at
C lp after originating from some other node at lower levels. Depending on whether
a node C lp has parent nodes or not, we assign its health state as follows: given a
component C lp and its parents pa(C
l
p) = {C l−11 , ..., C l−1m , ..., C l−1M }, the possible health
states X lp of C
l
p are represented as X
l
p = {x0, ..., xm, ..., xM}; where x0 corresponds
to the state “healthy C lp” and xm corresponds to the state “component C
l−1
m fault
in C lp”. If pa(C
l
p) = ∅, the possible health states X lp of C lp are represented as
X lp = {x0, ..., xk, ..., xK}; where xk corresponds to the level l fault f lk that originates
at C lp.
Note that it is possible to represent an anomaly in a node that corresponds to
multiple simultaneous faults by a health state of the node. However, the diagnosis
algorithm that is employed at that node must be capable of distinguishing among
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say, two single faults and their simultaneous occurrences. In such a case, from fault
identification perspective, the anomaly involving multiple faults can be treated as
a “single fault” while generating a node performance evaluation matrix such as a
confusion matrix [56]. For sake of simplicity, in this thesis we do not consider health
states xm ∈ X lp (or xk ∈ X lp) that correspond to multiple fault scenarios.
It is worthwhile to note that in Bayesian modeling, it is required that the
possible node’s states are exhaustive and mutually exclusive to ensure that the
entire state space is under consideration and the node is in a single state at a given
instant. These requirements are satisfied in a practical environment by taking into
account all the possible, or at least the dominant, faults corresponding to that node
that are determined through the well-known Failure Mode Effect and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) procedures.
As mentioned above, node states are observed by executing appropriate fault
diagnosis algorithms at that node. Therefore, evidence should be introduced to the
network nodes when the states are identified by the diagnosis algorithms without
ambiguity. In this chapter fuzzy Rule-Based Reasoning (RBR) (as developed in
Chapter 5) is employed to identify the states of a node and to generate evidences
(this will be discussed in detail in Section 6.2.4) that are introduced to the node.
However, our proposed hierarchical approach is generic for accommodating any type
of reasoning algorithm; i.e., at a particular node, Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) or
Model-Based Reasoning (MBR) algorithms may be employed as well.
6.2.3 Determination of Model Parameters
Parameters of our proposed Bayesian network-based CDM are the conditional prob-
abilities that are specified in the form of Conditional Probability Tables (CPT). It is
well-known that the CPT that is specified at C lp has a number of parameters (condi-
tional probabilities) that are exponential in the number of parents pa(C lp); i.e., one
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must specify P (X lp|pa(X lp)) for each configuration of the parents. An overview of
the methods that are commonly employed for probability elicitation from domain
experts is available in [145], and the limitations of eliciting probabilities exhaus-
tively with domain experts are well-known. Detailed discussions on the benefits and
drawbacks of these methods are available in [145], and reviewing them is therefore
beyond the scope of this thesis.
In our case, elicitation of CPTs from the domain expert opinions will be diffi-
cult because as the possible number of faults becomes large in the parent nodes of
a given node, the number of parent configurations will become too specific for the
expert to specify a distribution of the node’s health state. Furthermore, it is not
reasonable to assume that real data corresponding to different faults and all of their
combinations are available. Generating synthetic data for combinations of fault oc-
currences will be cost prohibitive and challenging, if not impossible, eventhough a
high fidelity simulator is available.
Therefore, a requirement for parameter learning from data is likely to impose
a significant barrier in model development and deployment. Furthermore, as men-
tioned in Section 6.2, the existing methods for generating CPTs are not useful in
our case. The above-mentioned difficulties in eliciting probabilities from experts and
the unavailability of sufficient data that are always barriers in deploying diagnostic
schemes for real systems, have motivated us to investigate alternative methods for
generating CPTs.
Uncertainty Information: Recall that our central problem at hand is to manage
and utilize the health observations that are available from different subsystems and
components. A framework and methodology was proposed in Chapter 4 for system
health monitoring where it is desired that diagnostic decisions are made by taking
into account the uncertainty that is associated with health state observations at
different nodes in the hierarchy. The uncertainty is quantified by the conditional
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probabilities that, as indicated above, are commonly elicited by utilizing information
from the various sources [150] such as: (a) physical or numerical models, (b) results
of experiments or passive observations, and (c) opinions of domain experts.
In the area of health monitoring, the performance metrics for fault detection
and identification/isolation are specified separately for both temporal and static per-
formance evaluations [119,151]. Since this chapter is concerned with fault identifica-
tion by using a probabilistic reasoning model we concentrate on confusion matrices
that are used to evaluate static performance of isolation algorithms, and which also
provide statistical or probabilistic information.
In the proposed CDM, the health state of a given node is observed by first
employing the most appropriate fault diagnosis algorithms that are feasible. Despite
the fact that these algorithms are developed by different teams separately and are
often proprietary to the teams, it is expected that the diagnosis algorithms that
are employed at different nodes have their respective performance evaluation data
available, in the form of confusion matrices [56].
A confusion matrix consists of the elements representing the proportion of
correct and incorrect classification rates. It is possible to obtain the following con-
ditional probabilities from the confusion matrix that is associated with a given
node: P (X lp = xk|I lp = xn); where N is the maximum possible value of k (and n),
k = 0, ..., N , n = 0, ..., N , and I lp is the health state identification at the node. By
utilizing these local conditional probabilities, one can derive the conditional proba-
bilities that are necessary to specify P (X lp|pa(X lp)), and qualify the uncertainty in
our proposed CDM as described in the subsequent paragraphs.
Overview of the Proposed Procedure: In [152], it is argued that the care with
which any given probability distribution needs to be elicited in a BN model de-
pends strongly on the structure of the model and the queries that are intended to
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be processed. The procedure for CPT generation that is proposed in the subse-
quent paragraphs focuses on a set of initial distributions that are easily verifiable
by a human expert. The idea is to construct a set of initial distributions from the
information that is available in the confusion matrices, and provide a flexibility to a
human expert for modifications, if necessary [149]. There may not be a need for any
modification if the expert agrees with the initial distributions. Therefore, instead
of asking an expert to provide a new distribution, a procedure is developed to con-
struct distributions that the expert can modify, if necessary, according to his/her
belief.
These initial distributions correspond to non-simultaneous sub-component (par-
ent node) faults within a component (child node). Another rational for providing
the non-simultaneous sub-component faults significance is due to the fact that most
diagnosis algorithms are designed by incorporating this assumption. Furthermore, it
is reasonable to assume that the probability of occurring simultaneous n component
faults in a set of components decreases as the number of faults n increases. Once the
initial distributions are determined, remaining distributions are derived from these
initial ones.
Initial Distributions: Consider a generic segment of our proposed model as shown
in Figure 6.2, where the child node C lp at level l has N parent nodes at level l−1; i.e.,
pa(C lp) = {C l−11 , ..., C l−1n , ..., C l−1N } and their corresponding number of health states
are (m1 +1), ..., (mn+1), ..., (mN +1). Consequently, the possible health sates of C
l
p
are X lp = {x0, ..., xn, ..., xN} and the possible health sates of the n-th parent node
are X l−1n = {xi}; i = 0, 1, ...,mn. In other words, the possible number of parent
configurations is
∏N
n=1(mn + 1). Our objective is to determine a CPT that specifies
P (X lp|X l−11 , ..., X l−1N ).
Let I lp denote the output of the health state identification algorithm that is
employed at the node C lp. Hence, the possible outputs of I
l
p correspond to the
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Figure 6.2: Health states of a child node at level l and its parent nodes at level l−1.
possible node health states X lp; i.e., I
l
p = {x0, ..., xn, ..., xN}. From the confusion
matrix it is possible to obtain the following information: P (X lp = xk|I lp = xn);
where, k = 0, ..., N , and n = 0, ..., N . Similarly, at level l − 1, the information
available at the n-th sub-component of C lp are: P (X
l−1
n = xk|I l−1p = xi); where
k = 0, 1, ...,mn and i = 0, 1, ...,mn.
In order to determine the
∏N
n=1(mn + 1) belief or probability distributions
P (X lp|X l−11 , ..., X l−1N ) from the conditional probabilities above, first we focus on the
distributions that correspond to single (non-simultaneous) component faults at level
l−1 and the one that corresponds to the healthy states of all the components at level
l−1. Our objective is to determine Nλ+1 initial distributions over X lp, where Nλ =∑N
j=1mj. Note that these distributions correspond to the parent configurations
which can be verified relatively easily by a human expert. The Nλ initial distri-
butions that correspond to the fault occurrences at level l − 1 are in the following
general form:
P (X lp|X l−11 = x0, ..., X l−1n−1 = x0, X l−1n = xi, X l−1n+1 = x0, ..., X l−1N = x0) (6.1)
where n = 1, ..., N and i = 1, ...,mn. The remaining one initial distribution is as
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follows:
P (X lp|X l−11 = x0, ..., X l−1n = x0, ..., X l−1N = x0) (6.2)
Computation of Initial Distributions: First, it should be noted that there is
a systematic pattern by which the health states at level l − 1 are mapped to the
health states X lp at level l in our proposed CDM which is as follows:
Observaton 6.2.1 (Health State Mapping). The health states X lp of a compo-
nent at level l and its sub-components at level l − 1 are mapped as follows:
• X l−1n = xi; i = 1, ...,mn are mapped to the state X lp = xn for a given compo-
nent at level l − 1.
• X l−1n = x0;n = 1, ..., N (non-faulty states of multiple components) are mapped
to a single state X lp = x0.
It is important to note that according to the way node health states are mapped in
our modes, and as stated in Observation 6.2.1, X lp = x0 is to be considered “true”
only when all the parent nodes are healthy; i.e., X l−1n = x0;∀n. It is now reasonable
to state the following assumption.
Assumption 6.2.1 (Independent Influences of Parent Nodes). Faults or
faulty states of the components at level l− 1 influence the component health states
at level l independently.
Assumption 6.2.1 is particularly valid if the target severity range (refer to the
Definition 4.2.1) is low and the components are monitored frequently enough so that
the occurrences of faults in one component do not affect the fault identification in
other components [143]. Based on this independence assumption, the distribution
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in (6.1) is approximated as follows:
P (X lp|X l−11 = x0, ..., X l−1n−1 = x0, X l−1n = xi, X l−1n+1 = x0, ..., X l−1N = x0)
≈
(
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = x), P (X lp = x1|X l−1n = xi),
..., P (X lp = xn−1|X l−1n = xi), P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = xi),
P (X lp = xn+1|X l−1n = xi), ..., P (X lp = xN |X l−1n = xi)
)
(6.3)
where the first term is conditioned on the health states of all the parent sub-
components at level l − 1 with x 6= x0 for the n-th sub-component, and x = x0
otherwise. Since P (X lp) = 1, the distribution in (6.3) is subjected to the constraint
N∑
j=1
P (X lp = xj|X l−1n = xi) = 1 (6.4)
As indicated above, the conditional probabilities that are available from the
confusion matrices at levels l and l − 1 are local to the nodes at a given level. On
the other hand, our problem here is to quantify dependencies between levels l and
l − 1. The difficulty is that due to different sensitivities of the diagnostic signals at
the two levels there is no guarantee that whenever a fault is identified at level l− 1
at a given instant, its manifestation at level l − 1 is also identified at that instant
as well or vice versa.
One way to determine the dependencies is to conduct extensive experiments
to observe the relative diagnostic performances of the nodes at the two levels for
obtaining each CPT which is quite difficult, if not impossible. Alternatively, ac-
cording to the way the health state mapping is set up in our model it is easy to see
that whenever a faulty state X l−1n = xi is identified at level l− 1, the component C lp
becomes faulty (since C l−1n is a sub-component of C
l
p) — whether the health state
of C lp is identified as X
l
p = xn or not. In the case where the fault is not identified al
level l, the fault is latent in the sub-component C l−1n within C
l
p. Based on the above
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observations, one can make approximations that if a state at level l−1 is faulty, the
state at level l is the corresponding faulty state as well.
Consequently, one can utilize the conditional probabilities that are available
from the confusion matrices at level l − 1 to specify the distributions in (6.1) and
(6.2). Therefore, to practically overcome an unrealistic requirement of conduct-
ing extensive experiments, we propose to quantify dependencies by introducing the
notion of hierarchical health state agreement as follows:
Definition 6.2.1 (Hierarchical Health State Agreement). Given the health
state mapping in the Observation 6.2.1, and an identified fault that is manifested
as X lp = xn, (n 6= 0) at level l and X l−1n = xi, (i 6= 0) at level l− 1, the health state
identifications are in agreement if whenever I lp = xn at level l, I
l−1
n = xi, at level
l − 1.
Based on the Definition 6.2.1, if I lp and I
l−1
n are known to be in agreement,




n are the same. However, it is
necessary to specify the “degree of agreement” to quantify the Definition 6.2.1 in
presence of the above-mentioned uncertainties. The following policy is proposed to
quantify the degree of agreement by a belief adjustment factor that is denoted by
hp,nn,i as follows:
hp,nn,i =
 al−1xi /alxn if al−1xi < alxnalxn/al−1xi if al−1xi > alxn (6.5)
where alxn is the accuracy with which the health state xn is identified at level l. The
notion of accuracy is computed by constructing a “one-versus-all” decision matrix
(as discussed in [143, 149]) from the confusion matrix by following the procedure
that is described next.
Let Ccon denote an (N + 1)× (N + 1) confusion matrix that is associated with
N + 1 health states of a node at level l in which the actual and the identified health
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states are along the rows and the columns, respectively. To compute the accuracy
in identifying the n-th state, a 2 × 2 dimensional “one-versus-all” decision matrix
Cn is constructed as follows. Let ci,j denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th
column of Ccon, and c
′
i,j denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of Cn.









k=1 ck,n) − cn,n, and c′1,1 =(sum(Ccon) − c′2,2−c′2,1−c′1,1). The accuracy of
identifying the n-th state is now defined as alxn = trace(Cn)/sum(Cn).
Similar procedure is followed to determine al−1xi . The superscripts p, n in h
p,n
n,i
correspond to the p-th component C lp and its n-th health state. The subscripts
n, i correspond to the n-th sub-component of C lp and its i-th health state. It is
important to note that the belief adjustment factor provides one’s degree of belief
(in terms of probabilities) about the health states that should be decreased when
the level l is changed. Therefore, if the probability of X l−1n is known given certain
condition I, to find the probability of X lp given the same condition I, P (X
l−1
n |I)
should be multiplied by the belief adjustment factor. We consider (1 − hp,nn,i ) to be
a representative of the degree of disagreement.
It is not unusual that in most cases a diagnosis algorithm that is employed
at a specific module or component meets the user specified accuracy (say, γspec) in
identifying the component health states by using the test data. For example, in [56],
the acceptance criteria for fault isolation/identification given a detection is recom-
mended as γ = 0.95 in a major component; i.e., the deployed fault identification
algorithms should be capable of identifying 95% of the faults that are detected by
the fault detection mechanism. Consequently, γspec ≤ alxn ≤ 1, γspec ≤ al−1xi ≤ 1,
and it follows that 0 < hp,nn,i ≤ 1; where hp,nn,i = 1 represents the highest degree of
hierarchical agreement.
Note that at any two consecutive levels it is possible to have low accuracies
but high belief adjustment factors. Furthermore, it is important to point out that
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the above policy is not precise, since as stated in Observation 6.2.1 all the faulty
health states of the n-th sub-component at level l − 1 are mapped to one health
state X lp = xn at level l. Consequently, a
l
xn does not entirely correspond to the
health state X l−1n = xi, (i 6= 0). However, it should be clear that with the accuracy
γspec ≤ al−1xi ≤ 1 in identifying X l−1n = xi, i = 1, ...mn, the policy is expected to
be well-behaved. Next, we determine the probability values that are corresponding
to the approximated distribution in (6.3) which are categorized into the following
three cases:
Case 1: Computation of P (X lp = xk|X l−1n = xi) for k = n
This is the probability that the state X lp is in its n-th faulty state given that the fault
has been identified in its n-th subcomponent; i.e., X l−1n = xi. Since all faulty states
of a particular parent node are mapped to a single faulty state of the child node (refer
to Observation 6.2.1), as long as the fault is identified at the n-th subcomponent
(X l−1n 6= x0), it is desired that the state at level l be X lp = xn. Therefore, one must
take into account both the correctly classified faults and the misclassified (with other
faults in the subcomponent) faults at level l−1 while computing P (X lp = xn|X l−1n =
xi).
The probability P (X lp) is conditioned on a faulty state which is identified
by observing the output of I l−1n . Therefore, assuming a hierarchical health state
agreement (Definition 6.2.1) with the belief adjustment factor hp,nn,i , in this thesis we
propose the following:
P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = xi) ≈ P (X lp = xn|I l−1n = xi)
= hp,nn,i
(
P (X l−1n = xi|I l−1n = xi) +
mn∑
j 6=i,j=1
P (X l−1n = xj|I l−1n = xi)
) (6.6)
It may be worthwhile to emphasize that the last term in (6.6) is necessary since
when a fault is misclassified as another fault (but not as “healthy”) in a component
126
at level l − 1, the health state of the child component remains the same (faulty).
Case 2: Computation of P (X lp = xk|X l−11,...,N = x) for k = 0
The probability P (X lp = x0|X l−1n = xi) is the probability that level l is at a healthy
state given that it’s n-th sub-component at level l − 1 is at a faulty state xi. Since
this is a case of disagreement between the two levels, we use the belief adjustment
factor (1−hp,nn,i ) in our following computations. Furthermore, since the state X lp = x0
is dependent on all the parent sub-components (Observation 6.2.1), we need to take
into account the probabilities that are related to all the sub-components’ healthy
states as follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = x)
≈ P (X lp = x0|I l−1n = xi)
N∏
j 6=n,j=1
P (X lp = x0|I l−1j = x0)





j = x0|I l−1j = x0)
(6.7)
Case 3: Computation of P (X lp = xk|X l−1n = xi) for k 6= 0 and k 6= n
As in Case 2 above, this is a case of disagreement as well. However, in this case since
k 6= 0 and k 6= n, when the level l is at the state xk there is no dependency that
is represented in the dependency model (Observation 6.2.1) through which xk can
be related to the health state of the n-th sub-component at level l − 1. Therefore,
the set of probabilities P (X lp = xk|X l−1n = xi), k = 1, ..., N (k 6= 0 and k 6= n)
represent uncertainties that are related to un-modeled dependencies. Given that
the distribution in (6.3) has to satisfy the constraint in (6.4), we now propose to
distribute beliefs equally among the set:





1− P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = xi)− P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = x)
) (6.8)
127
where k 6= 0 and k 6= n. The procedure for computing P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = xi) and
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = x) are described in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively.
Next, in order to determine the distribution in (6.2) we observe that X lp = x0
only when all the parent sub-components are healthy. To avoid any ambiguity, we
denote the distribution in (6.2) by P (X lp|X l−11,...,N = x0). By Assumption 6.2.1, we
now propose to compute the distribution as follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = x0)




(1− hp,0j,0)P (X l−1j = x¯0|I l−1j = x0)
(6.9)
where x¯0 corresponds to the set {X lp}\x0 or {X l−1n }\x0 depending on the level
in the hierarchy. The remaining probabilities in the distribution in (6.2), i.e.,
P (X lp = xk|X l−11,...,N = x0) where k = 1, ..., N , represent un-modeled dependencies
since according to Observation 6.2.1, non-faulty states at level l−1 are not mapped
to faulty states at level l. In such a situation, as in Case 3 above, we propose to
distribute beliefs equally among the set as follows:




1− P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = x0)
)
(6.10)
Computation of Initial Distributions When Nodes Are Not Actively Monitored: As
mentioned in Section 6.2.2, it may be the case that some nodes in our proposed
CDM are not monitored actively. Consequently, fault diagnosis algorithms are not
deployed in those nodes. However, since our proposed node health state assignments
follow a systematic pattern (refer to Section 6.2.2 and Observation 6.2.1), it is easy
to observe that the distributions in (6.1) or (6.3) are expected to be maximum at
X lp = xn assuming that the accuracy of the diagnosis algorithm satisfies the user
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specification γspec. Similarly, the distribution in (6.2) is expected to be maximum





 xn for the distributions in (6.1)x0 for the distribution in (6.2) (6.11)
In order to satisfy the above conditions, in the case of missing information
first we assume a near-maximum hierarchical agreement and set hp,nn,i (in (6.6) and
(6.7)), and hp,0j,0 (in (6.7) and (6.9)) a value that is close to 1. Next, we assume “ideal”
probabilities by setting P (X l−1n = xi|I l−1n = xi) = β11 (in (6.6)), P (X l−1n = x0|I l−1n =
xi) = β01 and P (X
l−1
j = x0|I l−1j = x0) = β00 (in (6.7)), and P (X l−1j = x¯0|I l−1j =
x0) = (1− β00) (in (6.9)); where β11 = γspec, β01 = (1− γspec), β00 = γspec, and γspec
is the desired (design specification) probability of the correct health state given an
identification in the parent nodes if suitable diagnosis algorithms were employed.
Finally, in the case of a component C l−1p that does not have a confusion matrix
available, but has a similar component C l−1q with the same health states (for exam-
ple, the reaction wheel actuators in a three-axis active attitude control subsystem)
and a common child node C lp, the confusion matrix of C
l−1
p may be considered to
be the same as that associated with C l−1q in order to specify the distributions in the
CPT at the child node C lp. For such a set of similar components, it is also possible
to construct a common confusion matrix by including data from the components.
Computation of the Remaining Distributions: Once the initial distributions
are determined, we now propose to compute the remaining distributions by using a
weighted-sum of the initial distributions, as in (6.1) and (6.2), as follows:







where P (X lp|X l−11,...,N) represents P (X lp|X l−11 , X l−12 , ..., X l−1N ), Pj is an initial distribu-
tion, wj ∈ W , and W is an (Nλ + 1) dimensional weight vector that is subjected
to the constraint
∑Nλ+1
j=1 wj = 1. It is suggested that the human experts are pro-
vided with the initial distributions and are asked to decide the weights wj based on
their judgements. Therefore, given the initial distributions, the proposed procedure
would require that the number of weight parameters wj grows linearly with the total
number of the parent nodes’ health states.
It is worthwhile to note that as pointed out in [53], it is easy for the human
experts to express their opinions in terms of such weight assignments. Therefore,
eventhough our procedure is simple, it is consistent with how human experts develop
their beliefs by starting from some “anchor” values and adjusting them to specify
probabilities (adjustment and anchoring heuristics) [153]. Alternatively, one may
choose to develop a weight assignment policy that is based on prior probabilities
of the faults in the initial distributions under consideration. However, in order to
minimize biases towards certain types of faults that are frequently identified, the
policy should include other considerations such as component operating hours since
some faults may develop only toward the end of life of the component whereas others
may develop at the early stages. Development of such a policy is not investigated
in this thesis, and has been left as part of the future work.
6.2.4 Evidence Generation
By evidence generation at a node C lp with health states xk ∈ X lp, k = 0, 1, ..., K we
refer to the construction of a K dimensional vector elp = {x0 = 0, ..., xk = 1, ..., xK =
0} of zeros and ones that is used to instantiate the node when its health state is
identified as xk by employing a suitable fault diagnosis algorithm. As mentioned in
Section 6.2.3, component/node health states are identified by employing appropri-
ate/available fault diagnosis algorithms in our CDM nodes. It is possible to obtain
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fault evidences by utilizing a fuzzy Rule-Based Reasoning (RBR) method, as de-
veloped in Chapter 5, at various nodes of our proposed CDM. The methodology
for performing fuzzy RBR at different levels of the hierarchy was presented in our
earlier work [143,154].
It may be recalled from Chapter 5 that it is possible to specify one or more rules
for each possible health state xk ∈ X lp of C lp. In the general case, for a given health
state xi and Nd diagnostic signals s
l
n, we synthesize fuzzy rule(s) in the following
form (similar to the general if-then rule in Chapter 5):
If (sl1 ∈M l1,k) and (sl2 ∈M l2,k), ..., and (slNd ∈M lNd,k) then xk
where xk ∈ X lp, and M ln,k ∈ M lp is a (set of) value(s) of the n-th diagnostic signal
(characterized by the fuzzy membership function(s)) when the component health
state is xk. The health state with maximum rule activation level is considered as
the identified fault in the node.
It is important to note that the fuzzy rule activation values are not considered
as probabilities since they are fundamentally different from each other. As discussed
in detail in Chapter 5, if pa(C lp) = ∅, the rules corresponding to the faulty states of C lp
identify faults that originate in C lp with some common and reasonable assumptions
in diagnosis, such as non-simultaneous faults within a time step over which the
health state of C lp is identified and introduced to our proposed CDM.
On the other hand, if pa(C lp) 6= ∅ (as discussed in detail in Chapter 5), the
health state of C lp is identified by the rules that are synthesized based on the relative
behavior specifications of pa(C lp) (sub-components of C
l
p) assuming that the inter-
actions of the sub-components are characterized by a leader-follower or master-slave
control configuration and ensuring that the master component is in its healthy state
before determining the rule activation levels of the slave sub-components.
Once the health state xk ∈ X lp of C lp is identified by employing the above
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procedure (or any other reasoning algorithm that is employed at C lp) at a given
instant, an evidence over the K possible states of C lp is generated as follows: e
l
p =
{x0 = 0, ..., xk = 1, ..., xK = 0}, and is subsequently introduced to the C lp node of
the proposed CDM.
6.3 Demonstration of the Proposed Approach and
Fault Diagnosis Results
In a leader-follower formation flight, since the leader acts as a reference point, and
the formation flying mission is subjected to a single-point failure of the leader satel-
lite, we propose to reduce the health management workload for only the follower
satellites by utilizing our proposed solution. In other words, it is assumed that the
leader satellite is healthy as far as our analysis is concerned. This can be ensured if
we assume that the components of the leader satellite are monitored and diagnosed
frequently enough to ensure that the leader is fault free before carrying out the
monitoring and diagnosis of the follower satellites.
Implementation of the Proposed Model: A 4-level Bayesian network-based
Component Dependency Model (CDM) has been implemented for the formation
flight of 5 satellites that was described in Chapter 3. The open source BN tool that
is available from [155] has been utilized for belief propagation and updating using the
well-known recursive conditioning algorithm [55]. Figure 6.3 shows the implemented
CDM where “Sat-1” ... “Sat-5” represent the five satellites in the formation, and
“RW-X”, “RW-Y”, and “RW-Z” represent the reaction wheels (RW) in the X, Y ,
and Z directions, respectively.
First, we assign the states of the components C lp with pa(C
l
p) = ∅ by following
the procedure that was described in Section 6.2.2. Each of the 15 RWs, denoted as
132
Figure 6.3: A 4-level Bayesian network-based component dependency model (CDM)
for hierarchical fault diagnosis.
C1i ; where i = 1, ..., 15 at level 1 (identified as the “subsystem component level”) is
assigned with the following 3 health states: X1i = {Healthy, frictionfault, current
fault} (the fault models are discussed earlier). Each of the 5 electrical power
subsystem (EPS) nodes, denoted as C2i ; where i = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 at level 2 (iden-
tified as the “subsystem level”) is assigned with the following 3 health states:
X2i = {Healthy, regulatorfault, batteryfault} (the fault models are discussed ear-
lier). We assume that at the beginning of the formation operation, the system is
healthy and assign prior probabilities X1i = {0.9, 0.05, 0.05}; where i = 1, ..., 15, and
X2i = {0.9, 0.05, 0.05}; where i = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, that represent the above assumption.
We assign the states of the components with pa(C lp) 6= ∅ by following the pro-
cedure that was specified in Section 6.2.2. Each of the 5 attitude control subsystems
(ACS) nodes, denoted as C2i ; where i = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 at level 2 is assigned with the
following 4 health states: X2i = {Healthy,RW.Xfault, RW.Y fault, RW.Zfault}.
Each of the system level (level 3) nodes or satellites is assigned with the follow-
ing 3 health states: X3i = {Healthy, ACSfault, EPSfault}. In the case of the
formation component (C41), note that |pa(C41)| = 5 and each parent has 3 states
which would lead to a large (35) number of parent configurations. Consequently,
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first we have implemented 5 intermediate nodes between the levels 3 and 4 which
we denote as “C41 , C
3




i ” nodes 2
states {Healthy, Sat.ifault}. Finally, we assign to the formation component (C41)
3 health states: X41 = {Healthy, Leaderfault, followerFault}. Since the health
states of the nodes “C41 , C
3
i ” and C
4
1 are binary, we have implemented a noisy-OR
model (as mentioned in Section 6.2) above level 3. In the nodes with pa(C lp) 6= ∅,
we specify CPTs by following our proposed procedure in Section 6.2.3.
In the subsequent discussion, we demonstrate how the CPTs in the ACS nodes
in Figure 6.3 are specified by using our proposed procedure. Since we are consid-
ering identical satellites, we constructed a single confusion matrix for the 15 RWs
(C11 , ..., C
1
15). Therefore, in this case, the CPTs that are specified in each of the
5 ACS nodes C2i (i = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9) are the same. For demonstration purposes and
without loss of generality, we consider the ACS of only Sat-1, i.e., the node C21 in
the subsequent discussion.
Specification of the CPTs: To specify the CPT node C21 , first note that the
parent nodes are three RWs; i.e., pa(C21) = {C11 , C12 , C13}. Therefore, the number
of parent nodes is N = 3. Consequently, the possible number of health states of
C21 is N + 1 = 4, which are given by X
2
1 = {x0, x1, x2, x3} = {Healthy, C11fault,
C12fault, C
1
3fault}. The possible number of the health states of the parent nodes
are (m1 + 1) = (m2 + 1) = (m3 + 1) = 3. The possible states of each of the parent
nodes, as mentioned above, are X1i = {x0, x1, x2} = {H, ff , fc}; where i = 1, 2, 3, H
represents “Healthy”, ff represents a “friction fault”, and fc represents a “current
fault”.
The total number of distributions that are required to be specified is
∏N
n=1(mn+





j=1mj = 6. The Nλ + 1 = 7 initial distributions over X
2
1 are given as
follows:
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(a) P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x0)
(b) P (X21 |X11 = x1, X12 = x0, X13 = x0)
(c) P (X21 |X11 = x2, X12 = x0, X13 = x0)
(d) P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x1, X13 = x0)
(e) P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x2, X13 = x0)
(f) P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x1)
(g) P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x2)
Note that the initial distribution (a) above corresponds to equation (6.2) and
the remaining distributions correspond to equation (6.1). To specify the distribution
(a) above, we need to compute the following conditional probabilities: (a.1) P (X21 =
x0|X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x0), (a.2) P (X21 = x1|X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x0), (a.3)




Note that we have employed fuzzy rule-based component fault diagnosis (refer
to Section 6.2.4) in the following nodes of Figure 6.3 that is the 15 RWs (C11 , ..., C
1
15),








10), and the formation component (C
4
1). For comput-
ing the conditional probability (a.1), we refer to equation (6.9). Since the confusion
matrices that are associated with the three parent nodes C11 , C
1
2 , and C
1
3 are the
same, the corresponding belief adjustments factor are the same. In addition, since
we do not have any diagnosis algorithm deployed in C21 , the information (the val-
ues a2xn ;n = 0, 1, 2, 3; refer to the policy that is related to the belief adjustment
factor as mentioned in Section 6.2.3) necessary to determine the belief adjustment
factor is not available. However, in this case, we have a1xi ; i = 0, 1, 2. We assume
a2xn = 0.95; for n = 0, 1, 2, 3 (close to 1 as mentioned in Section 6.2.3), and from the
“one-versus-all” decision matrices (as described in Section 6.2.3) that are obtained
from the confusion matrices (associated with the employed rule-based reasoning at
nodes C11 , C
1
2 , and C
1
3 , and not shown here), we have, a
1
x0
= 0.937, a1x1 = 0.893, and
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a1x2 = 0.941.















3,2 = 0.941/0.95 = 0.991. Since
all the parent nodes are associated with the same confusion matrix, as indicated
earlier from the confusion matrix we obtain, P (X11 = x¯0|I11 = x0) = P (X12 =
x¯0|I12 = x0) = P (X13 = x¯0|I13 = x0) = 0.071. With these values, the conditional
probability (a.1) is computed as follows: P (X21 = x0|X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x0) =
1− {(1− h1,01,0)P (X11 = x¯0|I11 = x0) (1− h1,02,0)P (X12 = x¯0|I12 = x0) (1− h1,03,0)P (X13 =
x¯0|I13 = x0)} = 0.999.
For computing the conditional probabilities (a.2), (a.3), and (a.4) we refer to
equation (6.10) and compute the following probabilities: P (X21 = xi|X11 = x0, X12 =
x0, X
1
3 = x0) = (1/N)
(
1− P (X21 = x0|X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x0)
)
= 0.0003.
Therefore, the initial distribution (a) is computed as P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 =
x0, X
1
3 = x0) = (0.999, 0.0003, 0.0003, 0.0003). Next, to specify the distribution (b),
we need to compute the following probabilities: (b.1) P (X21 = x0|X11 = x1, X12 =
x0, X
1
3 = x0), (b.2) P (X
2
1 = x1|X11 = x1, X12 = x0, X13 = x0), (b.3) P (X21 = x2|X11 =
x1, X
1
2 = x0, X
1
3 = x0), and (b.4) P (X
2
1 = x3|X11 = x1, X12 = x0, X13 = x0).
For computing the conditional probability (b.2), we refer to equation (6.6).
The value P (X11 = x1|I11 = x1) = 0.644 is obtained from the confusion matrix.
Using the value of the belief adjustment factor that was computed earlier as h1,11,1 =
0.940, the conditional probability is obtained as follows: P (X21 = x1|X11 = x1) =
h1,11,1
(
P (X11 = x1|I11 = x1) + P (X11 = x2|I11 = x1)
)
= 0.877.
For computing (b.1), we refer to equation (6.7) and use the conditional proba-
bilities that are available from the confusion matrix according to the following com-




1 = x0|I1j = x0)
= (1 − h1,11,1)P (X11 = x0|I11 = x1)h1,02,0P (X12 = x0|I12 = x0) h1,03,0P (X13 = x0|I13 = x0)
= 0.003.
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For computing (b.3) and (b.4), we refer to equation (6.8) and compute the
conditional probabilities as follows: P (X21 = xk|X11 = x1) = (N − 1)
(
1 − P (X21 =
x1|X11 = x1)− P (X21 = x0|X11 = x1)
)
= 0.060.
Therefore, the initial distribution (b) is obtained as P (X21 |X11 = x1, X12 =
x0, X
1
3 = x0) = (0.003, 0.877, 0.060, 0.060). By following the same procedure, the
initial distribution (c) is computed as P (X21 |X11 = x2, X12 = x0, X13 = x0) =
(0.000, 0.991, 0.0045, 0.0045). Now, since we have a single confusion matrix for all
the three parent nodes, in this particular case the remaining initial distributions,
i.e., (d), (e), (f), and (g) are obtained as P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x1, X13 = x0) =
(0.003, 0.060, 0.877, 0.060), P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x2, X13 = x0) = (0.000, 0.0045, 0.991,
0.0045), P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x1) = (0.003, 0.060, 0.060, 0.877), and
P (X21 |X11 = x0, X12 = x0, X13 = x2) = (0.000, 0.0045, 0.0045, 0.991), respectively.
The remaining distributions in the CPTs are generated by using equation
(6.12). As an example, the distribution associated with two different faults (a “fric-
tion fault” in the RW-1 and a “current fault” in the RW-3) is computed by assigning
weights (this should be assigned by the human expert) as P (X21 |X11 = x1, X12 =
x0, X
1
3 = x2) = w2(b) +w7(g) = (0.0015, 0.4407, 0.0323, 0.5255); where w2 = 0.5 and
w7 = 0.5 (the two faults are believed to be equally possible), and the remaining
weights are set to zero. The computation of the distribution (g) and that of the
other distributions are quite similar and are not shown here.
Node Health State Identification and Evidence Generation: In order to
generate the health state evidences that are to be introduced at different nodes of
our CDM, we have performed a fuzzy rule-based component fault diagnosis (refer
to Section 6.2.4) for the following components of Figure 6.3. Specifically, we have
the 15 RWs (C11 , ..., C
1










10), and the formation
component (C41).
For the health state identification of the RWs (C11 , ..., C
1
15), we have obtained
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the diagnostic signals by extracting features from the following reaction wheel (RW)
measurements, namely (a) the motor current, (b) the torque command voltage, and
(c) the wheel speed. Based on our earlier experience with an actual attitude con-
trol subsystem telemetry data [43], we have extracted simple features that include
(over an invocation window of 512 seconds; that is approximately 11 invokes per
orbit) mean, standard deviation, minimum value, peak value, energy, and the first
5 components of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) energy spectrum. The rules
corresponding to the healthy RW condition as well as to the two faults under con-
sideration are determined (the general form of the rules is given in equation (5.1) and
the details are available in [143] and are not discussed here), and the rule activations
in each invocation are computed.









we have obtained the diagnostic signals by extracting features from the following
EPS measurements, namely (a) the bus voltage, (b) the regulator output current,
and (c) the battery current. We have extracted simple features that include (over
the above-mentioned invocation window of 512 seconds) mean, standard deviation,
minimum value, and the one component of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) energy
spectrum. Rules corresponding to the healthy EPS condition as well as to the two
faults under consideration are determined by utilizing the above features.
For the health state identification of the formation (C41), mean of the relative
attitude measurements over an invocation window is utilized as a diagnostic signal.
As in the case of RWs, the rule activations in each invocation are computed for EPSs
and for the formation level. Note that the health state evidences corresponding to
the formation node are introduced at the intermediate nodes as mentioned earlier.
Hierarchical Diagnosis: At this stage fault evidences at different levels to the
CDM are introduced, the evidences are propagated, and belief distributions of the
CDM nodes are updated by using the well-known recursive conditioning algorithm
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(a) Before the presence of the fault. (b) During the presence of the fault.
Figure 6.4: P(X33 ) of Sat-3 when an evidence of a fault is introduced at the subsystem
component level.
[55]. In most cases, the computed distributions clearly justified the existence of
faults. For example, when the fault evidence e19 = {0, 1, 0} (friction fault at Sat-3
RW-Z) is introduced, the probability distributions over the health states of Sat-3
under the fault free condition as well as under the injected friction fault at Sat-3
RW-Z are shown in Figure 6.4. The distributions clearly justify the existence of
a fault in the ACS. The distributions corresponding to the other fault scenarios
are not graphically presented here. Instead, the accuracy of the hierarchical fault
diagnosis results are summarized under various scenarios in the next section.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our proposed CDM by using a set of fault scenarios
under which the actual health states of all the nodes in the CDM are known. The
accuracy is computed in terms of the % of nodes in the CDM that are “represen-
tative” of their true known health states. The representativeness is determined as
follows: let a fault evidence el1p1 be introduced at node C
l1
p1
and the known actual
health state of a component C l2p2 be x
∗ ∈ X l2p2 . Furthermore, let pi(C l1p1) and σ(C l1p1)
denote the sets of predecessors and successors of node C l1p1 , respectively in the CDM.
We consider the health state of C l2p2 to be representative of its true health state x
∗
when the following specifications or conditions hold:
1. Let C l2p2 ∈ σ(C l1p1), then belief about X l2p2 = x∗ increases with the introduction
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of the evidence; i.e., P (X l2p2 = x
∗|el1p1) > P (X l2p2 = x∗|∅).
2. Let C l2p2 ∈ pi(C l1p1) and the actual known state be faulty (x∗ 6= x0), then belief
about X l2p2 = x
∗ increases with the introduction of the evidence, and the belief
is higher than (or, at least equal to) that of other fault states at level l2; i.e.,
P (X l2p2 = x
∗|el1p1) > P (X l2p2 = x∗|∅) and P (X l2p2 = x∗|el1p1) ≥ P (X l2p = xj|el1p1);
where xj 6= x0, xj 6= x∗ and p represents the component at level l2 at which
no evidence has been introduced.
3. Let C l2p2 ∈ pi(C l1p1) and the actual known state be healthy (x∗ = x0), then the
belief about the faults in C l2p2 are lower than that in the faulty components at
level l2; i.e., P (X
l2
p2
= x|el1p1) < P (X l2p = xj|el1p1); where x ∈ {X l2p2\x∗}, xj 6= x0
and p represents the faulty component, if any, at level l2 at which no evidence
has been introduced.




l1 < l3 < l2), then the belief distribution over X
l2
p2
is maximum at x∗ and
P (X l2p2 = x|el1p1) < P (X l3p3 = xj|el1p1); where x ∈ {X l2p2\x∗} and xj 6= x0.
4. Let C l2p2 /∈ {pi(C l1p1 ∪ σ(C l1p1)}, then the belief distribution over X l2p2 remains
unchanged with the introduction of the evidence; i.e., P (X l2p2|el1p1) = P (X l2p2|∅).
It is obvious that given a fault evidence at a node, when the CDM node states
are representative of their true known health states as per the condition stated
above, the fault propagation path(s) (refer to Section 4.4) is/are identified. In other
words, a path is formed with a set nodes at which probability of the fault state
(corresponding to the introduced evidence) becomes higher when the evidence is
introduced at the node.
Table 6.1 shows the computed accuracy under various scenarios with single as
well as multiple fault evidences that are introduced in the follower satellites in the
CDM as shown in Figure 6.3. By “conflicting” evidence in Table 6.1 it is implied that
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Table 6.1: Performance Evaluation of the Implemented CDM
Number Number Maximum Minimum Average Comments
of of Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
Evidences Scenarios (in % Nodes) (in % Nodes) (in % Nodes)
Single Fault in a Follower Satellite
1 16 100% 83.33% 97.91% None
2 20 100% 100% 100% Evidences introduced
at different levels
2 8 91.67% 86.11% 90.28% Conflicting evidence
at levels 1 or 2
2 8 100% 100% 100% Conflicting evidence
at formation level
Two Simultaneous Faults in Two Follower Satellites
2, 3, 4 72 100% 77.78% 90.43% Different evidence types
and combinations
for the two evidences that are available in two nodes connected through a directed
path, one evidence indicates a healthy state while the other indicates a faulty state.
Such a scenario is possible when, for example, a fault evidence in a node at the high
level is obtained but at the low level the fault is not identified or vice-versa.
Note that although the scenarios are not the only possible cases, they represent
some of the most common cases that may occur in practice. The average accuracy
is computed over all the scenarios under consideration. Row 1 represents scenarios
where a single fault evidence is introduced at a given node and the accuracy is
computed for each scenario (by using the conditions above). It is observed that
when one additional evidence is introduced (refer to row 2), the average accuracy
increases. However, if the additional evidence is conflicting and the mis-identification
is at the low level, the average accuracy decreases (refer to row 3). Furthermore,
if the additional evidence is conflicting but the mis-identification is at the high
level, the accuracies remain unchanged (refer to row 4). Finally, the last row shows
accuracies for two simultaneous faults in two different follower satellites where the
scenarios consist of both conflicting and non-conflicting evidences.
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The purpose of the above performance evaluation has been to determine if
the proposed CDM can achieve acceptable accuracy (close to 95%, as specified in
Section 1.4). The results show that it is possible to achieve the desired accuracy
by using the proposed CDM scheme. It is expected that other well known fault
diagnosis schemes may achieve similar accuracy in fault identification. However, it
is very likely that the other schemes would not address the fault diagnosis problem
(as stated in Section 1.4) that is investigated in this thesis. As mentioned before,
the performance of the traditional ground-based satellite fault diagnosis that is
performed via data plotting, trend analysis and limit checking depends heavily on
the operator’s level of expertise, and there is no standard or universal procedure
to perform such analysis. Consequently, a performance comparison of proposed
approach with respect to such traditional approaches is not performed in the thesis.
6.5 Advantages and Limitations
As in any large Bayesian network model, building a BN-based hierarchical fault
diagnosis model as proposed in this thesis involves a careful trade-off between a
rich hand-crafted model versus generic dependency model. The design considera-
tions to take into account are model parameters and result accuracies, the cost of
construction (including the demand for human experts’ time), maintenance (includ-
ing the cost of model updating), and the complexity of the probabilistic inference.
Consequently, in practice, building such a model requires multiple iterations over
these tasks until a satisfactory model and solution is achieved. A discussion on the
advantages and limitations of the proposed methodology is provided below.
Advantages and Comparison with HFDM: First it should be noted that the
proposed component dependency model (CDM) is a generic model that can be
used to decompose a complex system hierarchically in order to perform coherent
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fault diagnosis. The model is generic in the sense that (a) the health states of a
given component is not defined subjectively, rather they are identified by the known
dominant fault modes of the component, and (b) the proposed method does not
impose any restrictions on the type of diagnosis algorithms that one may employ at
a given node of the model as long as its performance evaluation matrix is available.
Furthermore, our proposed method for obtaining model parameters overcomes the
limitations of the other probability elicitation methods [52, 53, 145] as discussed in
Section 6.2.3.
Second, the proposed approach requires less demand on domain experts’ time
for obtaining the model parameters, which is known to be a costly commodity. In-
stead of entirely depending on interviewing domain experts, the initial distributions
are obtained from node fault diagnosis performance data and known health state
dependencies. This minimizes the well-known limitations of eliciting probabilities
exhaustively with domain experts.
Third, the model parameters are easy to update when node performance ma-
trix changes due to the availability of new data and improved versions of the node
fault diagnosis algorithm. In this case, the initial distributions can be re-computed
by following our proposed well-defined procedure (this avoids the repetition of the
time consuming interview of domain experts), and the weights, if necessary, may be
updated.
Finally, for formation flight fault diagnosis, the proposed CDM enables one to
hierarchically decompose a complex system in order to use the data that are avail-
able from different system components systematically, and to perform diagnostic
reasoning coherently. By propagating fault evidences from a node in the CDM, one
is able to update the probable health state of the other nodes, and perform in-depth
investigation of the nodes of interest only (based on the updated health states). This
avoids exhaustive plotting and trend analysis across a large number of components
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manually which requires extensive effort by human operators. Therefore, the ap-
proach has the potential for reducing the size of the operations team. Furthermore,
since the performance evaluation matrix data represents an expert human’s observa-
tions to a great extent, and the method obtains model parameters by utilizing such
matrices, less-experienced personnel will be benefited while performing monitoring
and diagnosis tasks at ground stations by utilizing our proposed model.
Note that there will always be a trade-off between a rich/detailed hand-crafted
model versus a generic dependency model. It is clear from the above discussion that
our proposed model will reduce the cost of model construction (the demand for
human experts’ time) and maintenance (the cost of model updating).
With the HFDM approach that was developed in Chapter 5, it was possible
to specify the dependencies only with absolute certainty by using ones and zeros to
indicate connectivity/dependency as opposed to using BN-based models and CPTs.
Consequently, if a fault evidence is found at a given node, fuzzy rule activations had
to be computed at all the parent nodes, and it was not possible to propagate beliefs
to update and estimate health states without computing the rule activations. Given
the fault evidence(s) and updated belief distributions, in this chapter we compute
the rule activations at only those nodes that have high fault probabilities to confirm
the identification of a fault.
Limitations: The main limitation of the proposed method is that the faults that
originate in a component at a particular level are implicitly assumed to be non-
interfering with the diagnostic signals of other components (that have a common
child node) at the same level. This assumption is reasonable when the fault diagnosis
algorithms that are deployed in those nodes are designed to identify faults with
a severity range that is low enough not to affect the performances of the other
nodes in the same level. Consequently, their influences on the child nodes are to
be considered as independent. Note that this limitation arises from the type of
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information that is made available to the proposed model development. Specifically,
according to our problem in hand, the node fault diagnosis algorithms are developed
in isolation, and are often proprietary to the development teams. Nevertheless, one
should investigate the validity of the independence assumptions by using design
information and experimental data. Another limitation may be the belief adjustment
factor that is denoted by hp,nn,i in equation (6.5). The policy may be too simple for
some systems.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, a hierarchical fault diagnosis methodology was developed which al-
lows systematic and coherent fault diagnosis in different components or subsystems
of a complex formation flight of satellites. The general idea is to decompose a com-
plex system hierarchically into simpler modules or nodes, and perform diagnostic
reasoning hierarchically by utilizing the fault diagnosis algorithms that are deployed
at different nodes and which are connected via the proposed Bayesian network-based
Component Dependency Model (CDM). The model structure was developed from
the knowledge of the component health state dependencies. A methodology for de-
termining model parameters was developed which demands considerably less effort
from the domain experts, and easy to update when node fault diagnosis perfor-
mances change. To determine the probability distributions that are required and
that need to be specified in the Conditional Probability Tables (CPT), the proposed
method obtains certain initial probability distributions from the node fault diagno-
sis performance matrices. Subsequently, by taking the domain experts’ opinion into
account, the remaining probability distributions are specified.
The effectiveness of our proposed methodology has been demonstrated by uti-
lizing synthetic formation flight data of 5 satellites that was described in Chapter 3.
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, the data generation model consists of two subsystems,
namely the attitude control subsystem and the electrical power subsystem for each
satellite in the formation. The proposed CDM was implemented by decomposing
the formation flying system hierarchically into 4 levels. Fault evidences that are
generated via fuzzy rule-based reasoning of faults at different levels in the hierarchy
were introduced in the CDM nodes. The fault diagnosis results show that when fault
evidences are introduced at a node, the states of the remaining nodes of the imple-
mented CDM are updated to reflect the correct health states of the corresponding
components. The performance of the developed CDM was quantified which corre-
sponds to the identification of fault propagation path that was defined in Chapter
4. In the next chapter, verification and validation of the fault diagnosis models that
have been proposed in this thesis are investigated.
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Chapter 7
V&V of Hierarchical Fault
Diagnosis
In this chapter, the verification and validation (V&V) of the Bayesian network-based
fault diagnosis model namely, CDM that was developed in Chapter 6 is primarily
investigated. The V&V of the fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis model namely, HFDM
that was developed in Chapter 5 is also briefly discussed.
7.1 Introduction
V&V of artificial intelligence models and algorithms is a challenging area where quite
limited research have been pursued [156–159]. Validation ensures that a product (in
this thesis, a model) actually meets the user’s needs, and that the specifications
were correct in the first place, while verification ensures that the product has been
built according to the requirements and design specifications.
In this thesis, the term “V&V of a fault diagnosis model” implies that the
verification of the model does satisfy a generic requirement, namely that “the model
shall be capable of identifying the health states of the system under consideration”.
Furthermore, V&V of the hierarchical fault diagnosis is divided into two levels: (1)
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the overall model level, and (2) the node level. The former is related to the problem
of the V&V of Bayesian knowledge bases. The later is dependent on what type of
algorithm is deployed at a given node. In our case, this investigation is related to
the V&V of fuzzy rule bases since fuzzy rule-based reasoning is employed at different
nodes of the implemented CDM and HFDM.
Formal verification of fuzzy rule bases are usually performed by utilizing petri-
net models to ensure that certain properties of rules in the rule base are satisfied.
Such rule base V&V approaches have already been investigated in the literature to
a large extent [160]. However, there has been very few published work [150,161–163]
on the verification of Bayesian knowledge bases.
The overall fault diagnosis algorithm development and V&V process that is
proposed in this thesis is depicted in Figure 7.1. which essentially summarizes the
Figure 7.1: Development and validation process of the proposed fault diagnosis
models.
fault diagnosis model development process that was discussed in Chapter 6, and
adds the V&V of the model with the process. In Figure 7.1, the overall process is
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divided into three stages: (1) diagnosis of individual components at multiple levels,
(2) BN-based hierarchical model development, and (3) model V&V. Note that at
stage 2, it is necessary to validate independent assumptions that are made while
determining the model structure or node conductivities (as mentioned in Section
6.5). Such validation should be performed at early stage in order to avoid major
changes in the model at the “model V&V” stage where ideally only model parameter
tuning should take place. In this thesis, it was assumed that the model structure
and the component interactions are known for the given formation flight model, and
such direct validation of the independence assumption is considered to be beyond
the scope of the thesis.
It is evident from Chapters 5 and 6 that fuzzy rule base reasoning can be
employed at the first stage, namely “diagnosis of individual components at multiple
levels” of CDM development. In that case, the verification of fuzzy rule base can
be performed at each node/component separately, whereas the V&V of the CDM
corresponds to the overall model and takes into account interaction of various nodes
in the model.
In the subsequent sections first, the verification of the Bayesian network-based
fault diagnosis model namely CDM that was developed in Chapter 6 is investigated
in detail. Next, the V&V of the fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis model namely
HFDM that was developed in Chapter 5 is briefly discussed.
7.2 Development of a Verification Approach for
CDM
Sensitivity analysis (SA) is a well-known and standard method for verifying Bayesian
networks which allows systematic investigation of influences of the model parameters
on its outputs. The general objective of the sensitivity analysis is to investigate
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how one or more hypothesis variables in a network varies with the variation of
one or more parameters (a parameter is an entry in a conditional probability table
(CPT)) in the network. Sensitivity analysis helps one to ensure that the constructed
Bayesian network is not too sensitive to small variations in network parameters. A
brute-force method for varying the parameters involves the variation of every single
conditional probability, and such sensitivity analysis is both highly time-consuming
and computationally intensive process. Therefore, a systematic SA approach is
required for the V&V of a Bayesian network model.
As reviewed in Section 2.2.3, the most common approach for sensitivity anal-
ysis assumes proportional scaling. Under this assumption, if X has n states, and x1
is a parameterized state, it is assumed that P (X|pi) = (t, (1 − t)x2, ..., (1 − t)xn),
where
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. It is possible to deal with several parameters in the same dis-
tribution. If, for example, the first two states are parameterized, one would require
P (X|pi) = (t, s, (1 − t − s)x3, ..., (1 − t − s)xn). Then, s does not scale when t is
changed. By varying a (set of) network parameters in the above-mentioned ap-
proach one is interested to know how P (h|e) varies with the parameter variation;
where H is a hypothesis variable and h is a particular state of H which is the focus
of interest.
The above method for varying the network parameters is primarily useful in
situations when one is interested to investigate the sensitivity of the network out-
put due to a change in parameter(s) that is caused by probability elicitation (from
domain experts) error. However, in the component dependency model (CDM) that
is proposed in Chapter 6, the conditional probabilities are obtained from confu-
sion matrices. Therefore, one must investigate how a change in a confusion matrix
impacts the network performance. Therefore, the objective here is to investigate
how a change in the fault diagnosis performance at a given node affects the network
outputs.
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In other words, our objective is to perform the verification that the CDM
satisfies a more specific requirement, namely that “the model shall be negligibly
sensitive to small changes in its parameters” (this requirement is clearly related to
the generic requirement that was stated in Section 7.1). The term “negligibly” is
however somewhat subjective here which can be clarified by quantifying it in terms
of the changes in probability values, if necessary.
It is not difficult to realize that the above procedure which assumes propor-
tional scaling is not suitable for the component dependency model (CDM) that is
proposed in Chapter 6. This is due to the fact that a change in a confusion matrix
impacts the computation of initial probability distributions (as proposed in Section
6.2.3) – and consequently, almost the entire CPT – in a way that does not satisfy the
proportional scaling assumption. In the subsequent sections, a sensitivity analysis
procedure for the proposed CDM will be investigated. The investigation is divided
into two parts: (a) the analysis of parameter variation in CDM, and (b) the proposed
verification steps.
7.2.1 Parameter Variation in the CDM
First, we investigate how the parameters in the proposed CDM are varied due to a
change in the associated confusion matrix. In other words, we will consider a specific
change in a confusion matrix that corresponds to a fault mode identification at a
node of the CDM, and investigate how this change would affect the CDM parame-
ters. We consider a general case of such parameter variation which is investigated
in the subsequent paragraphs.
Let C lp be a node in the CDM, and C
l−1
1 , ..., C
l−1
N are the parent nodes of C
l
p.
According to the notations in Chapter 6, the states of X lp =x0, x1, ..., xn, ..., xN ; xn 6=
x0 correspond to the faulty subcomponents of C
l
p and x0 corresponds to the state
of C lp when all the subcomponents of C
l
p are healthy. For the sake of convenience
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Table 7.1: The Change in the Confusion Matrix at the Node C l−11 Caused Due to a
Change of the Performance of the Diagnosis Algorithm Deployed at the Node
Identified → f0 f1 f2 ... fK1
Actual ↓
f0 c0,0 c0,1 c0,2 ... c0,K1
f1 c1,0 + ρ0δ c1,1 − δ c1,2 + ρ2δ ... c1,K1 + ρK1δ
f2 c2,0 c2,1 c2,2 ... c2,K1
... ... ... ... ... ...
fK1 cK1,0 cK1,1 cK1,2 ... cK1,K1
in notation, and without loss of generality, let us assume that the states of the n-th
parent node are X l−1n = f0, f1, ..., fk, ..., fKn , where fk 6= f0 corresponds to the faults
in C l−1n and f0 corresponds to the healthy state of the node.
Without any loss of generality, we consider a change in the confusion matrix
of C l−11 that corresponds to the identification of the first fault mode f1 in C
l−1
1 .
Specifically, let us consider the change in the confusion matrix of C l−11 which is
caused due to a change of performance of the diagnosis algorithm deployed at the
node, as shown in Table 7.1. Note that prior to the change in c1,1 number of cases
the fault mode or state f1 was identified correctly as shown in Table 7.1. Now, due
to the change in performance of the diagnosis algorithm that is deployed in C l−11 , the
number reduces to c1,1−δ. This implies that in the δ number of cases the faulty state
f1 is now misidentified as other states of the node which are represented in terms
of ρkδ, where k = 0, ..., K1, k 6= 1 and
∑Kn
k 6=1,k=0 ρk = 1. We denote the parameter
of our interest by θ =P (X l−11 = f1|I l−11 = f1) which signifies the probability of C l−11
being in its state X l−11 = f1 given an identification f1 by the diagnosis algorithm
deployed at C l−11 . In terms of the changed confusion matrix elements in Table 7.1,
the parameter of our interest is θ =(c1,1 − δ)/((
∑K1
j=0 cj,1)− δ).
Recall from the CDM parameter computation procedure that was proposed
in Section 6.2.3, the above change in the confusion matrix of C l−11 will impact the
CDM parameters (the entries of the CPT) that are stored in C lp. Since the CPT is
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computed from the initial distributions, one first need to identify how the change
impacts the initial distributions. Therefore, the changes in the following general
cases of the Nλ + 1 (in this case, Nλ =
∑N
n=1Kn, as explained in Section 6.2.3)
initial distributions over X lp require attention, specifically for:
Case 1: P (X lp|X l−11 = f1, X l−12 = f0, ..., X l−1N = f0)
Case 2: P (X lp|X l−11 = fk, X l−12 = f0, ..., X l−1N = f0), where k = 2, ..., K1
Case 3: P (X lp|X l−11 = f0, ..., X l−1n = fk, ..., X l−1N = f0), where n = 2, ..., N and
k = 1, ..., Kn
Case 4: P (X lp|X l−11 = f0, X l−12 = f0, ..., X l−1N = f0)
To investigate the above initial distributions the following results are required.
Proposition 7.2.1 (Accuracy Change). Let the change in the confusion matrix
of a node C l−11 , caused due to a change of performance of the diagnosis algorithm
deployed at the node, is according to Table 7.1. Let θ = (c1,1− δ)/((
∑K1
j=0 cj,1)− δ).
Then, the accuracy of identifying the faulty state f1 can be expressed according to
al−1f1 = a1θ + b1, where a1 and b1 are real-valued numbers.
Proof. Recall that for computing hierarchical agreement factors in Chapter 6, the
accuracy al−1f1 (with which the health state f1 is identified at level l−1) is computed
by constructing a 2×2 dimensional “one-versus-all” decision matrix C1 (as discussed
in Section 6.2.2). Let Ccon denote an (K1 + 1)× (K1 + 1) confusion matrix that is
associated with K1 + 1 health states of the node C
l−1
1 as shown in Table 7.1. Let ci,j
denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of Ccon, and c
′
i,j denote the
element in the i-th row and the j-th column of C1. The elements of the C1 matrix
are computed as follows:





− (c1,1 − δ)
=
(∑K1
k 6=1,k=0(c1,k + ρkδ)
)






+ δ = κ21 + δ; since
∑Kn
k 6=1,k=0 ρk = 1
c′1,2 =
∑K1
k 6=1,k=0 c1,k = κ12
c′1,1 =sum(Ccon)− c′2,2−c′2,1−c′1,1= κ11
where κ21 = (
∑K1




, and κ11 are real numbers that
are independent of δ and ρks. Furthermore, ρ1 = 1 as per Table 7.1.
The accuracy of identifying the 1-st fault state is computed as follows:
al−1f1 = trace(C1)/sum(C1)
= (c1,1 − δ + κ11)/(c1,1 + κ11 + κ12 + κ21)
= κ(c1,1 − δ) + κκ11
where κ = 1/(c1,1 + κ11 + κ12 + κ21). Dividing and multiplying the first term by
(
∑K1
k=0 ck,1)− δ, and approximating for a small change δ the term κ((
∑K1
k=0 ck,1)− δ)
≈ κ(∑K1k=0 ck,1), the accuracy can be expressed in the form:
al−1f1 = a1θ + b1
where a1 = κ(
∑K1
k=0 ck,1) and b1 = κκ11 are real numbers that are independent of δ
and ρk.
Corollary 7.2.1 (Accuracy Change). Let the change in the confusion matrix
of a node C l−1n , caused due a change of performance of the diagnosis algorithm




j=0 cj,k) − δ). Then, the accuracy of identifying the state fk can be
expressed in the form al−1fk = akθ
′ + bk; where ak and bk are real-valued numbers.
Proof. The proof is only a generalization of the Proposition 7.2.1 that follows along
the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 7.2.1 for fk with a confusion matrix
where δ is associated with fk, and ρkδ is associated with the other health states.
It is clear that for a change δ in any mode fk (instead of the 1-st fault mode f1)
at any component at a given level l, the accuracy alfk can be expressed in the form
akθ
′ + bk; where ak and bk are real numbers that are independent of δ and ρk.
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Proposition 7.2.2 (Accuracy Change). Let the change in the confusion matrix
of a node C l−11 , caused due a change of performance of the diagnosis algorithm
deployed at the node is according to Table 7.1. Let θ = (c1,1 − δ)/((
∑K1
j=0 cj,1)− δ).
Then, the change in the accuracy of identifying the health state fk, where fk 6= f1,
is negligible for a sufficiently small δ.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of the Proposition 7.2.1. The key difference
between the above two propositions is that here we are interested in the accuracy
of fk compared to f1 while the change δ is still associated with f1. Recall that
for computing hierarchical agreement factors in Chapter 6, the accuracy al−1f1 with
which the health state f1 is identified at level l − 1 is computed by constructing
a 2 × 2 dimensional “one-versus-all” decision matrix Ck (as discussed in Section
6.2.2), where k 6= 1. Let Ccon denote an (K1 + 1)× (K1 + 1) confusion matrix that
is associated with the K1 + 1 health states of the node C
l−1
1 as shown in Table 7.1.
Let ci,j denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of Ccon, and c
′
i,j
denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of C1. The elements of the









− ck,k= κ21 remains unchanged despite the change in the
confusion matrix,
• c′1,2 =κ12 + ρkδ where κ12 = (
∑K1
j=0 cj,k) − ck,k is the value of c′1,2 when δ = 0
(without any change in the confusion matrix), and
• c′1,1 = sum(Ccon)− c′2,2 − c′2,1 − c′1,1 = κ11 − ρkδ where κ11 is the value of c′1,1
when δ = 0 (without any change in the confusion matrix).
Note that sum(Ccon) remains the same despite the change in the confusion
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matrix. The accuracy of identifying the k-st health state is computed as follows:
al−1fk = trace(C1)/sum(C1)
=
κ11 + ck,k − ρkδ
κ11 + ck,k + κ12 + κ21
Since (κ11 +ck,k +κ12 +κ21) >> ρkδ, the accuracy is reduced by a negligible amount
(ρkδ)/(κ11 + ck,k + κ12 + κ21).
We are now in a position where in the remainder of this section we investigate
the four general cases 1 to 4 corresponding to the initial distributions that are stated
earlier.
Case 1: The initial distribution that corresponds to the faulty state f1 of C
l−1
1 .
From Equation (6.3), the probability distribution over X lp is computed as
follows:
P (X lp|X l−11 = f1, X l−12 = f0, ..., X l−1N = f0)
≈
(
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f), P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1),
P (X lp = x2|X l−11 = f1), ..., P (X lp = xN |X l−11 = f1)
) (7.1)
where the first term is conditioned on the health states of all the parent sub-
components at level l − 1 with f 6= f0 for the 1-st sub-component, and f = f0
otherwise.
From Equation (6.6), the probability P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1) is expressed as
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follows:
P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1) ≈ P (X lp = x1|I l−11 = f1)
= hp,11,1
(
P (X l−11 = f1|I l−11 = f1) +
K1∑
j=2
P (X l−11 = fj|I l−11 = f1)
)
= hp,11,1






























where κ0 is a parameter independent of δ and ρk. By the definition of θ, (
∑K1
j=0 cj,1)−
δ can be expressed as (c1,1 − δ)/θ. Consequently, P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1) above
becomes:













In Equation (7.3), κ0 = 0 if none of the f1 fault cases are misidentified as
other faults in the confusion matrix. Usually, c1,1 >> κ0 and for small change in δ,
c1,1 >> δ. Therefore, the effects of δ are to be considered as negligible in Equation
(7.3). Furthermore, since the hierarchical agreement factor hp,11,1 in Equation (7.3) is
a ratio of two accuracies (as described in Chapter 6), and the decreased accuracy at
level l − 1 satisfies Proposition 7.2.1, the probability P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1) can be
expressed as follows:
P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1) = a1θ2 + b1θ + c1 (7.4)
where a1, b1, and c1 are real numbers.
Next, from Equation (6.7), the probability P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) is expressed
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as follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f)
≈ P (X lp = x0|I l−11 = f1)
N∏
j=2
P (X lp = x0|I l−1j = f0)















j = f0|I l−1j = f0)
(7.5)
The probabilities inside the product in Equation (7.5) are determined from the
unchanged confusion matrices of the other parent nodes of C lp, and the product is a
real number κ1. Hence, Equation (7.5) becomes:





























= 1− θ − κ2
(7.7)
where κ2 is real number that is independent of δ and ρk. Therefore, combining
Equations (7.6) and (7.7) we get,
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) = (1− hp,11,1)κ1(1− θ − κ2) (7.8)
As explained above, hp,11,1 has the form in Proposition 7.2.1 and κ1 is a real
number. Consequently, P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) in Equation (7.8) can be expressed
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as follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) = a0θ2 + b0θ + c0 (7.9)
where a0, b0, and c0 are real numbers. Next, from Equation (6.8), the remaining
probabilities P (X lp = xn|X l−11 = f1), where n = 2, ..., N , are expressed as follows:





1− P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = f1)− P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f)
) (7.10)
From Equations (7.4) and (7.9), the probability P (X lp = xn|X l−11 = f1) in
Equation (7.10) can be expressed as follows:
P (X lp = xn|X l−11 = f1) = anθ2 + bnθ + cn (7.11)
where an, bn, and cn are real numbers.
Remark 7.2.1 (Parameter Variation). From Equations (7.4), (7.9), and (7.11),
the probability distribution of Equation (7.1) can be expressed in the form:




2 + b0θ + c0), (a1θ
2 + b1θ + c1), ..., (aNθ
2 + bNθ + cN)
)
Case 2: The initial distribution that corresponds to the other faulty state fk of C
l−1
1 ,
where k = 2, ..., K1.
From Equation (6.3), the probability distribution over X lp is computed as
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follows:
P (X lp|X l−11 = fk, X l−12 = f0, ..., X l−1N = f0)
≈
(
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f), P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk),
P (X lp = x2|X l−11 = fk), ..., P (X lp = xN |X l−11 = fk)
) (7.12)
where the first term is conditioned on the health states of all the parent sub-
components at level l − 1 with f 6= f0 for the 1-st sub-component, and f = f0
otherwise.
From Equation (6.6), the probability P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk) is expressed as
follows:
P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk) ≈ P (X lp = x1|I l−11 = fk)
= hp,11,k
(
P (X l−11 = fk|I l−11 = fk) +
K1∑
j 6=k,j=2






j=0 cj,k) + ρkδ
+





j=0 cj,k) + ρkδ
)
= hp,11,k
((∑K1j=1 cj,k) + ρkδ
(
∑K1
j=0 cj,k) + ρkδ
)
= hp,11,k
((∑K1j=0 cj,k)− c0,k + ρkδ
(
∑K1
j=0 cj,k) + ρkδ
)
(7.13)
It is easy to see that
∑K1
j=0 cj,k >> ρkδ, as δ represents a small change and ρkδ is a
fraction of δ. Therefore, the effects of the change in the confusion matrix at node
C l−11 is negligible on the second factor in Equation (7.13). By Proposition 7.2.2, the
factor hp,11,k in Equation (7.13) is considered to be negligibly affected by the change
in δ as well.
From Equation (6.7), the probability P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) is expressed as
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follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f)
≈ P (X lp = x0|I l−11 = fk)
N∏
j=2
P (X lp = x0|I l−1j = f0)





j = f0|I l−1j = f0)
(7.14)
The last term that consists of the product in Equation (7.14) is computed from the
unchanged confusion matrices of the other parent nodes of C lp, and the product is a
real number that is unaffected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
As found above, hp,11,k is considered to be negligibly affected by the change in the
confusion matrix. Consequently, the term (1 − hp,11,k) is considered to be negligibly
affected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 . Now,




j=0 cj,k) + ρkδ
As found in the analysis of P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk) above,
∑K1
j=0 cj,k >>
ρkδ, and consequently, the probability P (X
l−1
1 = f0|I l−11 = fk) is considered to be
negligibly affected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
From Equation (6.8), the remaining probabilities P (X lp = xn|X l−11 = fk),
where n = 2, ..., N , are expressed as follows:





1− P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk)− P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f)
) (7.15)
From the analysis of the probabilities P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk) and P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N =
f) above, it follows that the probability P (X lp = xn|X l−11 = fk) in Equation (7.15)
is negligibly affected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
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Remark 7.2.2 (Parameter Variation). From the analysis of the probabilities
P (X lp = x1|X l−11 = fk), P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) and P (X lp = xn|X l−11 = fk) above,
it follows that the probability distribution in Equation (7.12) is negligibly affected
by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
Case 3: The initial distributions that correspond to the faults in the other parent
nodes of C lp.
From Equation (6.3), the probability distribution over X lp is computed as
follows:
P (X lp|X l−11 = f0, ..., X l−1n = fk, ..., X l−1N = f0)
≈
(
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f), P (X lp = x1|X l−1n = fk),
...P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = fk), ..., P (X lp = xN |X l−1n = fk)
) (7.16)
where n = 2, ..., N ; k = 1, ..., Kn; and the first term is conditioned on the health
states of all the parent sub-components at level l − 1 with f 6= f0 for the n-th
sub-component that is faulty, and f = f0 otherwise.
From Equation (6.6), the probability P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = fk) is expressed as
follows:
P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = fk) ≈ P (X lp = xn|I l−1n = fk)
= hp,nn,k
(
P (X l−1n = fk|I l−1n = fk) +
Kn∑
j 6=k,j=1
P (X l−1n = fj|I l−1n = fk)
) (7.17)
All the probabilities on the right-hand side of Equation (7.17) correspond to the
parent nodes of C lp whose confusion matrices remain unchanged. Therefore, the
probability P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = fk) is unaffected by the change in the confusion
matrix at node C l−11 .
From Equation (6.7), the probability P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) is expressed as
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follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f)
≈ P (X lp = x0|I l−1n = fk)
N∏
j 6=n,j=1
P (X lp = x0|I l−1j = f0)





j = f0|I l−1j = f0)
(7.18)
Equation (7.18) can be rearranged as:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) = (1− hp,nn,k)P (X l−1n = f0|I l−1n = fk)
hp,01,0P (X
l−1





j = f0|I l−1j = f0)
(7.19)
In Equation (7.19), all the factors, except hp,01,0 and P (X
l−1
1 = f0|I l−11 = f0),
correspond to the parent nodes of C lp whose confusion matrices remain unchanged,
and are unaffected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 . By Proposi-
tion 7.2.2, there are negligible effects of the change in the confusion matrix at node
C l−11 on h
p,0
1,0. Furthermore,







j=0 cj,0 >> ρ0δ. Therefore, there is a negligible effect of the change in
the confusion matrix at node C l−11 on P (X
l−1
1 = f0|I l−11 = f0).
From Equation (6.8), the remaining probabilities P (X lp = xn′ |X l−11 = fk),
where n′ represents all the healthy subcomponent of C lp except C
l−1
n , are expressed
as follows:





1− P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = fk)− P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f)
) (7.20)
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From the analysis of the probabilities P (X lp = xn|X l−1n = fk) and P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N =
f) above, it follows that the probability P (X lp = xn′|X l−11 = fk) in Equation (7.20)
is negligibly affected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
Remark 7.2.3 (Parameter Variation). By the analysis of the probabilities P (X lp =
xn|X l−1n = fk), P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f) and P (X lp = xn′|X l−11 = fk) above, it fol-
lows that the probability distribution in Equation (7.16) is negligibly affected by
the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
Case 4: The initial distribution that corresponds to the situation when all parent
nodes of C lp are healthy.
From Equation (6.3), the probability distribution over X lp is computed as
follows:
P (X lp|X l−11 = f0, X l−12 = f0, ..., X l−1N = f0)
≈
(
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0), P (X lp = x1|X l−11,...,N = f0),
P (X lp = x2|X l−11,...,N = f0), ..., P (X lp = xN |X l−11,...,N = f0)
) (7.21)
where each term is conditioned on the healthy states of all the parent sub-components
at level l − 1.
From Equation (6.9), the probability P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0) is expressed as
follows:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0)




(1− hp,0j,0)P (X l−1j = f¯0|I l−1j = f0)
(7.22)
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where x¯0 and f¯0 correspond to the set {X lp}\x0 and {X l−1n }\f0, respectively depend-
ing on the level in the hierarchy. Equation (7.22) can be re-written as:
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0)
= 1−
(
(1− hp,01,0)P (X l−11 = f¯0|I l−11 = f0)
N∏
j=2
(1− hp,0j,0)P (X l−1j = f¯0|I l−1j = f0)
) (7.23)
In equation (7.23), all the factors, except (1−hp,01,0) and P (X l−11 = x¯0|I l−11 = f0),
correspond to the parent nodes of C lp whose confusion matrices remain unchanged,
and are unaffected by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 . From
Proposition 7.2.2, there are negligible effects of the change in the confusion matrix
at node C l−11 on h
p,0
1,0. Furthermore,








j=0 cj,0 >> ρ0δ, there is a negligible effect of the change in the confusion
matrix at node C l−11 on P (X
l−1
1 = f¯0|I l−11 = f0).
From Equation (6.10), the remaining probabilities P (X lp = xn|X l−11,...,N = f0),
where n = 1, ..., N , are expressed as follows:




1− P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0)
)
(7.24)
From the analysis of the probability P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0) above, it follows
that the probability P (X lp = xn|X l−11,...,N = f0) in equation (7.24) is negligibly affected
by the change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
Remark 7.2.4 (Parameter Variation). From the analysis of the probabilities
P (X lp = x0|X l−11,...,N = f0) and P (X lp = xn|X l−11,...,N = f0) above, it follows that the
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probability distribution in Equation (7.21) is negligibly affected by the change in
the confusion matrix at node C l−11 .
The following results utilize the notion of a probability potential φ that was
reviewed in Section 2.2.1.
Lemma 7.2.1 (Parameter Variation). Let φ(V ) denote a potential over the
variables V . Let X ∈ V , and let v∗ be a set of configurations over V \{X}. Let all
entries in φ(V ) be real numbers except for φ(X,v∗) which is in the form (α0θ2 +
β0θ + γ0, ... , αNθ
2 + βNθ + γN). Then
∑
V
φ(V ) = αθ2 + βθ + γ
where α, β, and γ are real numbers.











The first term is equivalent to a real number γ∗, and the second term is the sum
of the (α0θ
2 + β0θ+ γ0) ... (αNθ





















= αθ2 + βθ + γ
where α, β, and γ are real numbers.
Theorem 7.2.1 (P (e) as a function of a parameter). Let the CDM be a
Bayesian network over the universe U . Let θ be a parameter and let e denote
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the evidence that is entered in the CDM. Then assuming that some distributions
are in the form (α0θ
2 + β0θ + γ0, ... , αNθ
2 + βNθ + γN), we have
P (e)(θ) = αθ2 + βθ + γ
where α, β, and γ are real numbers.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.2.1 in Chapter 2. Let U = {X} ∪
{X1, ..., Xn}, fa(X) = {X} ∪ pa(X) and let pi denote a set of parent configurations
for which P (X|pii) = (α0θ2 + β0θ + γ0, ... , αNθ2 + βNθ + γN). Let the evidence
































j ej is a potential, denoted by φ(fa(X)),





The product P (X|pa(X))φ(fa(X)) is a potential satisfying the conditions in Lemma
7.2.1, and we can conclude that
P (e)(θ) = αθ2 + βθ + γ
where α, β, and γ are real numbers.
Corollary 7.2.2 (P (X|e) as a function of a parameter). Let the CDM be
a Bayesian network over the universe U . Let θ be a parameter and let e denote
the evidence that is entered in the CDM, and let u∗ be a set of configurations over
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U\{X}. Let xi be a state of X ∈ U . Then assuming a set of φ(X,u∗)-configurations
in the form (α0θ
2 + β0θ + γ0, ... , αNθ
2 + βNθ + γN), P (X = xi|e) has the form:
P (X = xi|e) = αθ
2 + βθ + γ
aθ2 + aθ + c
where α, β, γ, a, b, and c are real numbers.
Proof. The proof follows along the similar lines as in the Theorem 7.2.1, and then
follows from the fundamental rule for variables P (X = xi|e) = P (X=xi,e)P (e) .
7.2.2 Proposed Verification Steps
It is obvious from Remarks 7.2.1 to 7.2.4 of the initial distributions that due to the
change in the confusion matrix at node C l−11 the entries of the CPT that is stored at
node C lp are either in the form aθ
2 + bθ + c, or are real numbers that are negligibly
changed. This is due to the fact that since the remaining distributions in the CPT
are computed by using a weighted-sum of the initial distributions (from Equation
(6.12)), the entries corresponding to those distributions are also either in the form
aθ2 + bθ + c, or are real numbers that are negligibly changed. Given the above
observations and Corollary 7.2.2, one can validate a CDM via a sensitivity analysis
procedure which allows one to evaluate the behavior of the output(s) of the CDM
when a CDM parameter θ (as defined in Section 7.2.1) changes. The sensitivity
analysis is a standard procedure for verifying Bayesian networks, and by utilizing
Corollary 7.2.2, the procedure becomes straight-forward as described below:
Step 1. Choose 3 values of δ, namely δ0, δ1, and δ2 such that the chosen range of
δ would cause a small variation in θ in Step 2. The term “small variation”
is somewhat subjective and as an example, one may quantify the term by
assuming that approximately 0.05 change in the probability θ over the chosen
range of δ is a small variation. As an alternative, the variation can also be
168
quantified easily in terms of the change in the identification accuracy of the
fault that is associated with δ.
Step 2. Find the values of θ (as defined in Section 7.2.1), namely θ0, θ1, and θ2 that
correspond to the three chosen values of δ (here ρk values are assumed to be
the same, however, one may choose to select different values).
Step 3. For the obtained θ0 value,
• Compute initial distributions.
• Compute the CPT by using the initial distributions.
• Compute P (e)(θ0).
• Introduce and propagate the evidence e under consideration to the net-
work (with the computed CPT) to obtain P (X = x1, e)(θ0)
Step 4. Repeat step 3 for θ1 and θ2.
Step 5. Form the following two sets of equations to solve for α, β, γ, a, b, and c:
To determine the coefficients α, β, and γ solve the following:
αθ20 + βθ0 + γ = P (X = xi, e)(θ0)
αθ21 + βθ1 + γ = P (X = xi, e)(θ1)
αθ22 + βθ2 + γ = P (X = xi, e)(θ2)
To determine the coefficients a, b, and c solve the following:
aθ20 + bθ0 + c = P (e)(θ0)
aθ21 + bθ1 + c = P (e)(θ1)
aθ22 + bθ2 + c = P (e)(θ2)
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Step 6. Plot P (X = xi|e) as a function of θ by using the relationship:
P (X = xi|e) = αθ
2 + βθ + γ
aθ2 + aθ + c
Determination of Sensitivity: The plot is interpreted as follows. As discussed
in Section 7.2, our objective is to perform the verification that the CDM satisfies
a more specific requirement, namely that “the model shall be negligibly sensitive
to small changes in its parameters”. The term “negligibly” is however somewhat
subjective here which can quantified it in terms of the changes in probability values.
For any two plotted (refer to Step 6 above) conditional probabilities P (X = x1|e)
and P (X = x2|e), where P (X = x1|e) > P (X = x2|e) (without any variation in
model parameters), we consider the model to be negligibly sensitive if the same
inequality P (X = x1|e) > P (X = x2|e) remains true over entire range of θ under
consideration.
It is important to note that in the above steps, while computing the CPTs
by using the computed initial distributions, the weights in the weighted-sum (refer
to Equation (6.12)) are kept unchanged. The underlying assumption is that any
small change in the sensitivity parameters δ should not affect the way the initial
distributions are combined to compute the remaining distributions in the CPT.
7.3 CDM Verification Results
In this section, a number of sample CDM verification results are provided which
demonstrate that the sensitivity of the implemented CDM to parameter changes
with different fault evidences is negligible. Table 7.2 shows the confusion matrix
that corresponds to the node Sat-3 Y -axis RW (C18) of the CDM shown in Figure
6.3 of Chapter 6. Table 7.2 is obtained from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5) by removing the
“Ambiguity” column. Here, we consider that there is a change in the performance of
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Table 7.2: Confusion Matrix at Sat-3 RW-Y (C18)
Identified → Healthy Friction Current
Actual ↓ Fault Fault
Healthy 169 3 0
Friction Fault 11 + ρ0δ 29− δ 0 + ρ2δ
Current Fault 2 13 25
the diagnosis algorithm at node C18 , and consequently, in δ cases, the “friction fault”
is mis-identified as either the “healthy” case or the “current fault” case. Note that
for a given δ, there are various ways in which ρks may be varied. In this investigation
we assume that all the ρks are the same, i.e., the number changed/misidentified cases
(δ) are distributed evenly among the other health states. Therefore, ρ0 = 0.5 and
ρ2 = 0.5. Note that there are infinite possible ways to distribute the number δ
mis-identified fault into other health states, and an exhaustive investigation of all
such cases is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The results that are presented in the remainder of this section have been
obtained by using the Symbolic Math Toolbox in MATLAB (for solving the two
sets of equations for sensitivity analysis and for computing the CPTs), and the open
source BN tool that is available from [155] (for belief propagation and updating).
Note that the same BN tool was utilized for implementing the CDM in Chapter 6).
Three possible values of δ are chosen: δ0 = 0, δ1 = 3, and δ2 = 6. The three values
of δ were selected such that the chosen range of δ would cause a small variation
of approximately 0.05 in θ. Recall that the parameter of our interest is defined
as θ =(c1,1 − δ)/((
∑K1
j=0 cj,1) − δ) = (29 − δ)/(45 − δ). Therefore, for the three
chosen values δ0 = 0, δ1 = 3 and δ2 = 6, corresponding values of θ are obtained
as θ0 = 0.6444, θ1 = 0.6190, and θ2 = 0.5897, respectively. Table 7.3 quantifies
the parameter variations under consideration in terms of the accuracy changes.
Note that the approximately 0.05 variation in θ corresponds to approximately 2.4%
decrease in the accuracy in identifying the friction fault.
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Table 7.3: Fault Identification Accuracy Changes at Sat-3 RW-Y (C18)
Accuracy → Healthy Friction Current
δ ↓ Fault Fault
δ0 93.65% 89.29% 94.05%
δ1 93.06% 88.10% 93.45%
δ2 92.46% 86.90% 92.86%
First, let us investigate the outputs/the probabilities P (X = xi|e), where
xi is a state of Sat-3 ACS in the implemented CDM (refer to Figure 6.3). Let e
denote the evidence of the friction fault in Sat-3 Y -axis reaction wheel (RW). Re-
call from Chapter 6 that the possible states of the ACS are {Healthy,RWXfault,
RWY fault, RWZfault}, which are denoted here by x0, x1, x2 and x3, respectively.
Furthermore, recall that the three possible states of a RW are {Healthy,frictionfault,
currentfault}, which are denoted here by f0, f1, and f2, respectively.
The following results are obtained by executing the Steps 1 to 4 of the verifi-
cation procedure that is presented in Section 7.2.2.
For θ0 = 0.6444 we obtain:
The initial distributions:
P (ACS|RWy = f1) = (0.0034, 0.0597, 0.8772, 0.0597)
P (ACS|RWy = f2) = (0.0000, 0.0050, 0.9900, 0.0050)
P (ACS|RWx = f1) = (0.0034, 0.8772, 0.0597, 0.0597)
P (ACS|RWx = f2) = (0.0000, 0.9900, 0.0050, 0.0050)
P (ACS|RWz = f1) = (0.0034, 0.0597, 0.0597, 0.8772)
P (ACS|RWz = f2) = (0.0000, 0.0050, 0.0050, 0.9900)
P (ACS|RWx = f0, RWy = f0, RWz = f0) = (0.9970, 0.0010, 0.0010, 0.0010)
After recomputing the entire CPT that is stored at Sat-3 ACS node, and
propagating the evidence with probability P (e)(θ0) = 0.05, the following results are
obtained (note that the P (X = xi, e)(θj) values have been normalized to obtain the
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sum of the probabilities over the health states xi equal to 1):
P (ACS = x0, e)(θ0) = 0.0042
P (ACS = x1, e)(θ0) = 0.1003
P (ACS = x2, e)(θ0) = 0.7952
P (ACS = x3, e)(θ0) = 0.1003
For θ1 = 0.6190 we obtain:
The initial distributions:
P (ACS|RWy = f1) = (0.0044, 0.0673, 0.8611, 0.0673)
P (ACS|RWy = f2) = (0.0000, 0.0081, 0.9837, 0.0081)
P (ACS|RWx = f1) = (0.0034, 0.8772, 0.0597, 0.0597)
P (ACS|RWx = f2) = (0.0000, 0.9900, 0.0050, 0.0050)
P (ACS|RWz = f1) = (0.0034, 0.0597, 0.0597, 0.8772)
P (ACS|RWz = f2) = (0.0000, 0.0050, 0.0050, 0.9900)
P (ACS|RWx = f0, RWy = f0, RWz = f0) = (0.9964, 0.0012, 0.0012, 0.0012)
After recomputing the entire CPT that is stored at Sat-3 ACS node, and
propagating the evidence with probability P (e)(θ1) = 0.05, the following results are
obtained (note that the P (X = xi, e)(θj) values have been normalized to obtain the
sum of the probabilities over the health states xi equal to 1):
P (ACS = x0, e)(θ1) = 0.0051
P (ACS = x1, e)(θ1) = 0.1071
P (ACS = x2, e)(θ1) = 0.7807
P (ACS = x3, e)(θ1) = 0.1071
For θ2 = 0.5897 we obtain:
The initial distributions:
P (ACS|RWy = f1) = (0.0055, 0.0750, 0.8444, 0.0750)
P (ACS|RWy = f2) = (0.0000, 0.0113, 0.9774, 0.0113)
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P (ACS|RWx = f1) = (0.0032, 0.8772, 0.0598, 0.0598)
P (ACS|RWx = f2) = (0.0000, 0.9900, 0.0050, 0.0050)
P (ACS|RWz = f1) = (0.0032, 0.0598, 0.0598, 0.8772)
P (ACS|RWz = f2) = (0.0000, 0.0050, 0.0050, 0.9900)
P (ACS|RWx = f0, RWy = f0, RWz = f0) = (0.9957, 0.0014, 0.0014, 0.0014)
After recomputing the entire CPT that is stored at Sat-3 ACS node, and
propagating the evidence with probability P (e)(θ2) = 0.05, the following results are
obtained (note that the P (X = xi, e)(θj) values have been normalized to obtain the
sum of the probabilities over the health states xi equal to 1):
P (ACS = x0, e)(θ2) = 0.0061
P (ACS = x1, e)(θ2) = 0.1141
P (ACS = x2, e)(θ2) = 0.7656
P (ACS = x3, e)(θ2) = 0.1142
Note that pa(C18) = ∅, and P (e) are the same in all cases. It is also worthwhile
to note that the initial distribution P (ACS|RWy = f1) above corresponds to the
analysis in the Case 1 in Section 7.2.1, P (ACS|RWy = f2) above corresponds to the
analysis in the Case 2 in Section 7.2.1, and P (ACS|RWx = f0, RWy = f0, RWz = f0)
above corresponds to the analysis in the Case 4 in Section 7.2.1. The remaining four
initial distributions correspond to the analysis in the Case 3 in Section 7.2.1.
It is easily verifiable that the approximations that are made in the analysis in
Section 7.2.1 are justified with an exception of the initial distribution P (ACS|RWy =
f2). It is observed that with the variation of the parameter θ, the changes in this
distribution is noticeable. This is due to the fact that in the confusion matrix shown
in Table 7.2, the approximation
∑K1
j=0 cj,k >> ρkδ is not valid. This is due to the
fact that an unusually high number of the “current fault” cases were mis-identified
as the “friction fault” which caused the sum to become unexpectedly low. However,
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it is important to note that although the change in P (ACS|RWy = f2) is notice-
able, it is less than that in P (ACS|RWy = f1) which varies as anθ2 + bnθ + cn (the
degree of the polynomial is of at the most 2) where an, bn, and cn are real numbers.
Consequently, Lemma 7.2.1, Theorem 7.2.1, and Corollary 7.2.2 are still valid for
the obtained results.
Figure 7.2 shows the outputs under consideration that are obtained from the
Step 6 of the verification procedure (after determining the polynomial coefficients
in Step 5 of the procedure). It is observed that for small variations in the network
Figure 7.2: Sensitivity of Sat-3 ACS states (subsystem level) given a friction fault
evidence at Sat-3 RWy (component level).
parameters, there is a negligible change in the state of the ACS which implies that
when there is an evidence of a friction fault in the Y axis RW (component level),
the probability that the Y axis RW is faulty remains the highest (in the subsystem
level) despite the parameter variations. This indicates that the CDM is not too
sensitive to small variations in the network parameters, as desired.
Next, Figure 7.3 shows the same outputs with the evidence e as the current
fault in Sat-3 X-axis RW. This again indicates that the CDM is not sensitive to
small variations in the network parameters, as desired. Note that Figure 7.3 was
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Figure 7.3: Sensitivity of Sat-3 ACS states (subsystem level) given a current fault
evidence at Sat-3 RWx (component level).
generated by using the following information that are obtained with the recomputed
CPT that is stored at the Sat-3 ACS node, and finally propagating the evidence with
the probability P (e)(θ2) = 0.05, namely (as before, the P (X = xi, e)(θj) values have
been normalized to obtain the sum of the probabilities over the health states xi equal
to 1):
For θ0 = 0.6444 we obtain:
P (ACS = x0, e)(θ0) = 0.0012
P (ACS = x1, e)(θ0) = 0.8971
P (ACS = x2, e)(θ0) = 0.0509
P (ACS = x3, e)(θ0) = 0.0509
For θ1 = 0.6190 we obtain:
P (ACS = x0, e)(θ1) = 0.0012
P (ACS = x1, e)(θ1) = 0.8973
P (ACS = x2, e)(θ1) = 0.0503
P (ACS = x3, e)(θ1) = 0.0511
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For θ2 = 0.5897 we obtain:
P (ACS = x0, e)(θ1) = 0.0012
P (ACS = x1, e)(θ1) = 0.8976
P (ACS = x2, e)(θ1) = 0.0498
P (ACS = x3, e)(θ1) = 0.0514
Finally, let us investigate the outputs P (X = xi|e), where xi is a state of
Sat-3 Y -axis RW in the implemented CDM (refer to Figure 6.3). Let e denote the
evidence RWY fault in Sat-3 ACS. With the given three selected values θ1 = 0.6444,
θ2 = 0.6190, and θ3 = 0.5897, the following results are obtained (note that the
computed initial distributions are the same as above, and we are considering here a
different evidence and a different hypothesis variable):
For θ0 = 0.6444 we have:
P (e) = 0.0909
P (RWy = f0, e)(θ0) = 0.0689
P (RWy = f1, e)(θ0) = 0.4375
P (RWy = f2, e)(θ0) = 0.4936
For θ1 = 0.6190 we have:
P (e) = 0.0900
P (RWy = f0, e)(θ1) = 0.0712
P (RWy = f1, e)(θ1) = 0.4336
P (RWy = f2, e)(θ1) = 0.4952
For θ2 = 0.5897:
P (e) = 0.0891
P (RWy = f0, e)(θ2) = 0.0736
P (RWy = f1, e)(θ2) = 0.4295
P (RWy = f2, e)(θ2) = 0.4969
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As in the above earlier cases, the P (X = xi, e)(θj) values have been normalized
to obtain the sum of the probabilities over the health states xi equal to 1. Figure 7.4
shows the output under consideration that is obtained from step 6 of the validation
procedure (after determining the polynomial coefficients in step 5 of the procedure).
It is observed that as before, for the small variations in the network parameters,
Figure 7.4: Sensitivity of Sat-3 RWy states (component level) given a fault evidence
at Sat-3 ACS (subsystem level).
there is a negligible change in the state of the ACS. When there is an evidence of a
RW fault in the subsystem level, the probabilities corresponding to the RW states
(component level) changes slightly despite the parameter variation. This indicates
that the CDM is not sensitive to small variations in the network parameters, as
desired.
7.4 V&V of the HFDM
In this thesis, by the term V&V of HFDM we imply the verification of fuzzy rule
bases at different nodes of the HFDM. A fuzzy RBR system is usually constructed
by encoding the observations of several human experts, and the experts may have
observations and/or expertise that are in conflict with each other. Therefore, it
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is necessary to validate the diagnostic knowledge that are encoded in one or more
rule base(s). Rule bases that correspond to complex systems often consist of a
large number of rules. The objective of rule base V&V is to ensure that there is
no inconsistency or error in the rule base. The verification of rule-based systems
becomes more important for rule bases that consist of a large number of rules.
Rule base verification has been investigated extensively in literature [160,164,
165]. Formal verification of fuzzy rule bases are usually performed by utilizing petri-
net models to check certain properties such as redundancy, circularity, consistency,
and completeness of rules in a rule base. There is a systematic procedure in which
rule bases are verified. The errors of interest are mainly the structural errors in the
encoded rules. Such errors are related to redundancy (due to redundant and sub-
sumed rules), circularity (due to infinite inference), inconsistency (due to conflicting
rules), and incompleteness (due to missing rules) in the rule bases [160].
Note that the fuzzy rules that are utilized in the HFDM have a specific form
as follows:





k have their usual meaning as mentioned in Chapter 5. Note
that the set of faults F lp = {fk : k = 1, ..., K}, as specified in Chapter 5, corresponds
to the possible health states X lp = {xk : k = 1, ..., K} that are specified in Chapter
6. The following are true for the set of rules that are specified in a FDM (refer to
Definition 5.2.3):
1. There is only one consequent (fault) for each rule, and all the possible values of
the diagnostic signals that correspond to the consequent (fault) are specified in
the antecedent part of the rule. Therefore, a “redundancy error” can occur in
cases where either a rule is specified multiple times, or for a given consequent
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(fault), there exists at least one rule that is subsumed into another rule.
2. The consequent part of a rule never appears in the antecedent part of another
rule. Therefore, the possibility of any “circularity error” is ruled out.
3. Since there is only one consequent for each rule, an “inconsistency error” will
not occur unless the antecedent parts of any two rules that correspond to two
different consequents (faults) are the same.
4. The “incompleteness error” can occur either when there are no rule speci-
fied for a known fault (or health state) of the component, or there exists an
unknown faulty state of the component.
5. Due to the hierarchical decomposition of our methodology the number of rules
are few in numbers.
It is important to note that since the overall spacecraft formation flight is
decomposed hierarchically, the fuzzy rules are specified separately (and in isolation)
for each node in the proposed HFDM (refer to Chapter 5 for details). Faults that
are under consideration in this thesis correspond to the RW nodes, the EPS nodes,
and the Formation node as shown in Figure 5.4. One rule has been specified for
a given fault at a node. Therefore, each of the rule bases that corresponds to one
of the nodes consists of a few rules. Consequently, verification of the rule bases in
somewhat trivial for the implemented HFDM due to the following reasons:
Redundancy: In the implemented HFDM, a single rule is specified for a given
fault, and it is easy to verify that given consequent (fault), there exists no rule that
is subsumed into another rule.
Circularity: As explained above, circularity error is ruled out because consequent
part of a rule never appears in the antecedent part of another rule in the HFDM.
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Inconsistency: One needs to ensure that the antecedent parts of any two rules
that correspond to two different consequents (faults) are not the same. Consider
the fault manifestations that are encoded in the fuzzy rules for diagnosing faults in
the independent components at Level 1 (refer to Section 5.3). It is easily verifiable
that antecedent parts of any two rules (diagnostic signal values for the friction fault
and the current fault as well as the ones for identifying the healthy state) are not
the same. The rules in the formation node as well as the ones in the electrical power
subsystem (EPS) nodes are verified to be consistent as well.
Incompleteness: In this thesis, faults at some selected nodes of the HFDM have
been considered, and one rule was specified for each of the faults under consideration.
Furthermore, since all the faults under consideration were injected in a simulation
model, there was no unknown faulty state. Therefore, any incompleteness error is
ruled out.
Because of the above-mentioned reasons, verification of the implemented fuzzy
rule-based HFDM is not investigated further in this thesis.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, the validation of the Bayesian network-based fault diagnosis model
namely, the CDM that was developed in Chapter 6 is investigated. A thorough
analysis of the parameter variations in the CDM is provided. The parameter vari-
ations are induced by changes in the confusion matrix of a given node. It has been
shown analytically that the behavior of P (h|e) with respect to a varied parameter
of interest θ can be expressed as a ratio of two polynomials of degree 3; where H is a
hypothesis variable in the CDM, and h is a particular state of H which is the focus
of interest. A number of sample CDM verification results are presented in the form
of sensitivity plots which demonstrate that the implemented CDM is not sensitive
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to small variations in the network parameters, as desired. The verification of the
fuzzy rule-based fault diagnosis model namely, the HFDM that was developed in
Chapter 5, is also discussed.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Directions
of Research
8.1 Concluding Remarks
In this thesis hierarchical fault diagnosis framework, models and algorithms have
been developed to facilitate systematic and coherent diagnostic reasoning in complex
systems such as a satellite formation flight system by decomposing its complex
structure hierarchically into simpler modules or components. The decomposition
is driven by the need, from project management perspective, for supporting the
development of the components/subsystems of the overall system by a number of
teams and by performing an integration at the end.
Hierarchical fault diagnosis in satellites formation flight has been investigated
first by developing a fuzzy rule-based hierarchical fault diagnosis model (HFDM),
which is then extended to a Bayesian network-based component dependency model
(CDM) that is flexible to utilize fuzzy rule-based diagnosis at various nodes in
the CDM. The fuzzy rule-based and the Bayesian network-based approaches were
chosen so that appropriate modeling of fault behaviors can be performed which
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would allow diagnostic decision making under uncertainty. The Verification and
Validation (V&V) of the proposed models have also been investigated.
The proposed CDM-based scheme is found to have potential to serve as a fault
diagnosis tool that can automate the tasks of the operators at ground stations. Such
a fault diagnosis tool will be particularly useful to the less-experienced operators for
performing the ground support-based health management tasks of a large number
of satellites in a formation. Furthermore, though the development of our proposed
methodology is based on the health management of satellites formation flight, the
methodology is generic enough to be applicable to other systems or a fleet of systems
that require health monitoring decision support systems (DSS).
8.2 Future Research Directions
One may pursue the following research directions to investigate further the fault
diagnosis models and algorithms that are developed in this thesis.
8.2.1 Investigation of the CPT Generation
In this research the CDM parameters, namely the CPTs, are determined by com-
puting some initial probability distributions and by computing the remaining dis-
tributions by using a weighted-sum of the initial distributions. The weights can
be determined either by consulting the domain experts, or by developing a rigor-
ous weight assignment policy (as discussed at the end of Section 6.2.3). One may
investigate the development of a weight assignment policy that is based on prior
probabilities of the faults in the initial distributions under consideration. However,
in order to minimize biases towards certain types of faults that are frequently identi-
fied, the policy may include other considerations such as component operating hours
since some faults may develop only toward the end of life of the component whereas
184
others may develop at the early stages. In addition, it would be a valuable research
to validate the developed policy with the opinion of a domain expert.
8.2.2 Investigation of the Hierarchical Agreement Factor
As pointed out in Section 6.5, a limitation of the proposed CDM may be the belief
adjustment factor that is used to quantify “hierarchical health state agreements”
between the fault manifestations in two CDM nodes. In this thesis, the belief adjust-
ment factor is defined as a ratio of two class accuracies. This may appear to be an
over-simplification of the component dependency and fault manifestation mappings
in real-world complex dynamical systems. Consequently, it would be necessary to
find an alternative way of defining the belief adjustment factor. Such investiga-
tion may employ suitable estimation models which would be able to quantify the
hierarchical health state agreements in two CDM nodes.
8.2.3 Investigation of the Dynamic CDM
The extension of the proposed CDM to a “dynamic CDM” will be an interesting
research problem that may be pursued especially if data that is representative of
the time progression of faults in the system is available. It is well-known that in
general the more the severity of faults increases in a system over time, the better
the performance of the diagnosis algorithms becomes. Consequently, the confusion
matrices that are used to compute the CDM parameters would change over such time
durations. Therefore, an interesting problem would be to develop a methodology
that would facilitate the selection of appropriate confusion matrices that are based
on the estimated fault severity. This investigation will also allow one to determine
if the CDM approach can be extended to prognosis or failure prediction of various
components in the system under consideration.
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8.2.4 Experimental Validation
Upon the availability of a real formation flight mission telemetry data, investigations
on the validation of the HFDM and/or the CDM with the actual telemetry data
would be an interesting research that one may pursue. Such investigations will
allow one to validate the independence assumptions on fault manifestations that are
made while determining the CDM and the HFDM structures, as well as the CDM
parameters (initial distributions).
8.2.5 The Cost-Benefit Analysis
An important research that is related to the proposed fault diagnosis methodologies
is the cost-benefit analysis in a practical environment with real system data. There
have been considerable interest in such investigations (for example, refer to [166]
where the authors derives cost matrices from confusion matrices). Such analysis
provides more realistic assessment of a diagnostic algorithm under the expected op-
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